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POUCY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE: 
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO A 
PRIVATELY INITIATED NUCLEAR TEST 
MONITORING PROJECT AS A CASE 
STUDY IN NATIONAL SECURITY 
DECISION-MAKING 
BY 
PHILIP G. SCHRAG* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Through his book Essence of Decision, 1 Graham Allison2 
revolutionized the way that academics analyze major foreign 
and defense policy decisions.3 Before Allison's book was 
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Applied Legal Stud-
ies, Georgetown University Law Center. The author is deeply grateful to 
Dr. Thomas Cochran, S.Jacob Scherr, and David Wirth of the staff of the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, to Walter Nicks of the University of 
Nevada-Reno, and to numerous federal officials, for the substantial 
amounts of time that they made available for interviews. The author is 
also indebted to FrederickS. Young, his tireless research assistant, for his 
extensive labors in the library and in the field, and to Ellen Schaffer, Ge-
orgetown University's International and Foreign Law Librarian, for her 
help in tracking down documentary sources. The author appreciates the 
many helpful suggestions on the manuscript made by Dr. Christopher 
Paine and by Professors Lisa G. Lerman, David A. Koplow, and Peter 
Schuck. In 1989, this work will be published by Westview Press as a book 
entitled LISTENING FOR THE BoMB: A STUDY IN NucLEAR ARMS Com-ROL 
VERIFICATION Poucv. 
1. G. Al.uSON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971}. 
2. At the time he wrote the book, Allison was a professor at Harvard 
University. He later became Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment. See Keller, Thinker-in-Residence Brought from Harvard, N.Y. Tunes, 
Aug. 15, 1985, at B8, col. 3. 
3. Since the publication of his book, Allison's view of foreign policy 
making has received wide reception and recognition. "The bureaucratic 
interpretation of foreign policy has become the conventional \\isdom." 
Krasner, Are Bureaucracies Important?, in PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN FoR-
EIGN Poucv 410 (C. Kegley & E. Wittkopt eds. 1983}. See also R. CoULA1>1, 
ILLUSIONS OF CHOICE: THE F-111 AND THE PROBLEM OF WEAPONS ACQ.UISI-
TION REFORM 6-34 (1977}; I. M. DESTI.ER, PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
FoREIGN Poucv 52-82 (2d ed. 1974}. 
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published in 1971, even the leading writers on foreign pol-
icy4 tended to describe and explain governmental decisions 
almost exclusively as if governments were rational human 
beings making carefully considered choices among available 
options.5 Political scientists did not generally ferret out de-
tailed information regarding the process of arriving at partic-
ular governmental decisions. They knew only the actions 
that were ultimately taken. From these actions, they charac-
teristically reasoned backward to explain governmental 
choices.6 
Allison suggested that this classical mode of analysis was 
incomplete or even misleading, in that it suggested that gov-
ernments had become irrational or their decisions incompre-
hensible. Terming this type of thinking "Model I" or the 
"Rational Actor Model," Allison went on to describe two 
other ways of looking at governmental decisions. Drawing 
from the literature of organization and management theory, 
he described, as "Model II," an "Organizational Process" 
paradigm. The Model II analyst describes governmental de-
cisions not as rational choices by governments or their lead-
ers, but as the natural outcomes of standard bureaucratic op-
erating procedures. 7 Elaborating on the theory implicit in 
Neustadt's Presidential Power,8 Allison characterized, as 
"Model III," a conception of governmental decision as the 
outcome of political bargaining among individuals, each of 
whom holds some degree ofpower.9 Thus, government de-
4. Allison quotes the works of such major figures as Hans Morgen-
thau, Stanley Hoffman, Henry Kissinger, and Thomas Schelling and signif· 
icantjournalistic analyses such as those of the New York Times. G. ALLISON, 
supra note I, at I0-26. 
5. Allison quotes many typical examples of this kind of analysis, such 
as the following statement from A. WHITING, CHINA CROSSES THE YALU 
159 (I960): "In sum, it was not the particular problems of safeguarding 
electric power supplies in North Korea or the industrial base in Manchuria 
that aroused Peking to military action. Instead, the final step seems to 
have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of oppor-
tunities within China's doorstep. At the least, a military response might 
deter the enemy from further adventures." G. ALLISON, supra note I, at 
22. 
6. G. ALLISON, supra note I, at I3. A more detailed description of this 
"Model I" thinking appears infra section III. 
7. For a more detailed description of Model II, see infra section IV. 
8. R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER (I960). 
9. A more detailed account of Model III is set forth infra section V. 
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cisions can be looked at in terms of policy, procedures, or 
people. Although the information necessary for Model II or 
Model III analysis is often difficult to obtain, genuine under-
standing of governmental decision-making requires an ex-
amination from all three perspectives. 10 
Allison tested his theory with a case study of the 1962 
Cuban Missile Crisis. Subsequent writers have applied the 
Allisonian models (or variants of them) to a variety of policy 
decisions, including the rise and fall of the multilateral nu-
clear force,u the U.S. 1967 decision to deploy an antiballistic 
missile system,12 the U.S. decision to acquire missiles with 
multiple independendy-targetable warheads, 13 the Japanese 
decision to attack the United States in 1941,14 the major 
Continental powers' decisions to enter World War 1,15 and 
the U.S. program to acquire the Trident submarine.16 These 
studies tend to confirm the value of looking beyond the Ra-
tional Actor Model for an explanation of governmental ac-
tion.17 
10. "Only in comparative analyses of this sort can models be systemati-
cally diversified and mental images of the decision-making process signifi-
cantly improved." Weil, Can Bureaucracies be RatiorzalActors?, 19 INT'L STUD. 
Q 432, 433 (1975). 
11. j. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DECISION (1974). 
12. M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
AND FOREIGN POUCY (1974). 
13. Allison & Morris, Exploring the Detmninants of Military Weapons, 104 
DAEDALUS 99 (1975). 
14. Hosoya, Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making Systcn in 
japan, 26 WoRLD PoL. 353 (1974). 
15. Levy, Organizational Routines and the Causes of IJ~r. 30 INT'L STUD. Q 
193 (1986). 
16. Steinbruner and Carter, Organizational and Political Dimensions of the 
Strategic Posture: The Problems of Reform, 104 DAEDALUS 131 (1975). 
17. For example, Model I tends to describe the reasons for major U.S. 
strategic weapons acquisitions in terms of reactions, based on doctrines 
such as the need for "mutual assured destruction," to various real and 
anticipated Soviet threats. But a more careful analysis, taking account of 
Models II and III, also emphasizes the goals and procedures of the Army, 
Navy, and Air Force, which are "rarely" controlled by political officials; the 
tendency of these services to sponsor weapons systems that are essentially 
marginal improvements to their existing systems; and the political bar-
gaining among services, design laboratories, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, the defense contractors, and members of Congress. Allison & 
Morris, supra note 13. But see Maoz, The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision 
Analysis Applied to Crisis Behavior, 25 j. OF CONFUCT REsOLUTION 677 (1981) 
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Virtually all of the published studies have chosen to fo-
cus on a foreign or defense policy decision or series of deci-
sions that can be characterized as "m<Uor." They involve, for 
example, national or international crises, 18 procurement of 
major weapons systems, 19 or major international negotia-
tions.20 Understandably, few scholars have chosen to ex-
amine the process of governmental decisions in which much 
less is at stake. Yet a careful examination of more routine, 
second-level21 decisions is also needed for several reasons. 
(concluding that "in this particular case the predictions of the analytic 
model fit much better the observed choice processes at both the individual 
and group levels"). Maoz acknowledges that "these findings run contrary 
to most of the evidence regarding choice processes under crisis condi· 
tions, and may suggest that decision-making in the Entebbe crisis is the 
exception rather than the rule." !d. at 704. 
18. Indeed, "[s]tudies of decision-making under crisis conditions have 
become a booming enterprise over the last two decades." Maoz, supra 
note 17, at 677. Maoz' own study of the Entebbe rescue is an analysis of 
this type, as is Allison's EssENCE OF DECISION, supra note 1. 
19. SeeR. CouLAM, supra note 3; E. BEARD, DEVELOPING THE ICBM: A 
STUDY IN BuREAUCRATIC PoLmcs (1976); N. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. 
KANTER, supra note 12; Allison & Morris, supra note 13; J. STEINBRUNEtt, 
supra note 11; and Stein bruner & Carter, supra note 16. 
20. See, e.g., R. NEUSTADT, ALLIANCE POLITICS (1970); I.M. DESTLER, H. 
FUKUI & H. SATO, THE TEXTILE WRANGLE (1979). For an original essay 
applying Allison's models in a completely different context-the control of 
white collar crime-see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corpo-
rate Crime, 85 YALE LJ. 1090 (1976). 
21. There is no clear dividing line between major and second-level de-
cisions, but some characteristics that divide some decisions from others in 
terms of their significance may exist. A "second-level" American foreign 
policy decision perhaps may be identified as one that receives some treat-
ment in major newspapers (thus distinguishing it from completely routine 
or trivial actions, such as the holding of an otherwise unimportant diplo-
matic lunch, or providing an additional military attache to an embassy), 
but which meets all of the following tests: (I) human life was not immi-
nently at risk; (2) the President of the United States was not personally 
involved; (3) no military mobilization was contemplated; (4) less than $100 
million was involved. The following decisions, for example, may be char-
acterized as second-level matters: (1) a change in the U.S. bargaining po-
sition for an arms control negotiation regarding the percentage of weap· 
ons that should be eliminated during a particular phase of a treaty's life; 
(2) a decision regarding whether to position a new surveillance satellite to 
emphasize coverage of the Soviet Union or of other areas of the globe; (3) 
a decision to reprogram $50 million of foreign aid from one country to 
another; (4) a decision to revoke the accreditation of a foreign diplomat 
suspected of spying; (5) a decision to ask an African country for permis-
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
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First, national security decisions are critical, so that even sec-
ond-level decisions will affect, to some extent, the 
probability that the United States will eventually be involved 
in armed conflict, conventional or nuclear. Second, 
although small governmental decisions are by definition less 
important, there are obviously many more of them and cu-
mulatively, their impact is very great. Third, a consequence 
of.Model II is that big decisions are likely to be the product 
of many small ones. For example, the "lengthy process from 
which weapons emerge involves hundreds of important, rela-
tively independent decisions that no one political official can 
possibly oversee."22 Fourth, many scholars lvriting about 
American foreign policy outside of crisis contexts continue 
to rely on Model I, treating governments as if they were sin-
gle, rational persons.23 Finally, studies of second-level gov-
ernmental decisions may shed new light on the application of 
decision theory to major policy choices as well.24 
sion to allow U.S. Navy ships to refuel at its ports; and (6) a determination 
that a third-world nation friendly to the U.S. is engaged in systematic re-
pression of human rights. 
22. Allison & Morris, supra note 13, at 123. 
23. See, e.g., Kanost, The American Perfonnance in Micronesia: A Retrospec-
tive Appraisal, 12 AMERASIA]. 57, 72, 76, 79 (1985) ("In the long run, the 
United States was more willing to make substantial concessions on eco-
nomic issues than to compromise its future regarding strategic control 
over the area .... [r]he United States has assumed that its permanent 
control over the area must be assured"; Lindsay, Trade Sanctions as Policy 
Instruments: A Re-examination, 30 INT'L STUD. Q 153, 156-58 (1986) ("Two 
strategies were used to determine the [countries'] objectives .... [T]he 
initiator's publicly stated goals were taken as objectives ... though where 
information about the decision was scarce, these goals were imputed .... 
The Saudis' announced objective was to pressure the US to force Israel to 
withdraw .... [The] Saudis also intended the embargo to increase interna-
tional support for the Palestinians"); Fischer, Decisions to Use the InttTTia-
tional Court of justice, 26 INT'L STUD. Q 251, 275-76 (1982) (research on 
motivation to invoke World Court conducted by sending questionaires to 
officials asking about the assessments made by "your government" and 
the views of "your state"). 
24. In addition, while Allison focused on govemmetrtal decision-making, 
his models are also applicable to the decisions ofindustrial and other large 
bureaucracies. Indeed, he derived his paradigm for Model II from the 
literature of organization theory. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 69-78. 
Studies ofless critical governmental decisions, therefore, also may be val-
uable for their insight into the more routine choices of corporations, labor 
unions, and other private bureaucratic entities. 
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This Article applies the Allisonian framework to the U.S. 
Government's response to a private arms control initiative 
undertaken in 1986 by the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil (NRDC), an environmental organization. This case lends 
itself to fruitful analysis for several reasons. First, while it fits 
the criteria for second-level decisions,25 it also involves a 
critical area of international relations-the control of nuclear 
weapons. Second, the involvement of numerous govern-
ment agencies in the project presents ample opportunity to 
examine processes within and among agencies. Third, the 
reaction of the United States appears, at first blush, to have 
been ambivalent or inconsistent, for the U.S. Government in 
tum assisted, impeded, and again assisted the NRDC's effort. 
This curious response invites the analyst to see to what ex-
tent, if any, Models II and III can usefully contribute to un-
derstanding why the Government acted as it did. 
While the type of analysis that Allison pioneered nearly 
two decades ago has become a mainstream tool for social 
scientists, it is virtually unknown to lawyers and legal aca-
demics. Indeed, with the exception of a single student-writ-
ten note,26 law reviews, legal treatises and even the adminis-
trative law case books simply do not make use of Allison's 
comparative modeling. The aim of this exposition is to bet-
ter enable lawyers to understand bureaucratic decision-mak-
ing in other contexts. This study may even be more relevant 
than Allison's original work to lawyers' needs in this respect, 
for most bureaucratic problems that lawyers face will be sec-
ond-level decisions rather than major national crises. In ad-
dition, lawyers and legal scholars may benefit particularly 
from the discussion of Model II, for it treats the application 
of statutes and regulations to bureaucratic problems as but 
one way in which standard operating procedures emerge as 
constraints on official behavior. 
The first section describes the NRDC initiative and the 
Government's response. The next three sections describe in 
detail each of Allison's models and apply them to the gov-
ernment's responsive actions. The fifth section considers the 
models in terms of their contributions to understanding the 
Government's actions in this case and speculates about the 
25. See supra note 21. 
26. See supra note 20. 
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relatively greater significance of one of the models to other 
national security decisions of like magnitude. The sixth sec-
tion considers how multi-model analysis can be of practical 
use to legislators and lawyers. The final section describes 
the NRDC project in the two years after the events that are 
analyzed in this study. 
II. THE NRDC PROJECT 
In May 1986, the Natural Resources Defense Council, a 
non-profit environmental organization, 27 signed a novel 
agreement with the Academy of Sciences (SAS) of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics.2s Under this agreement, each 
organization would send scientists to the territory of the 
other organization's country to install and operate sophisti-
cated seismic monitoring equipment near the host country's 
primary site for nuclear weapons testing. When implementa-
tion of the agreement began less than two months later, the 
NRDC accomplished what the U.S. Government, since the 
Eisenhower Administration, had tried and failed to achieve: 
it put American scientists on Soviet soil with types of equip-
ment that could help to verify Soviet compliance with limita-
tions29 on nuclear weapons testing. 
The events leading up to this agreement, the steps taken 
to implement it, and the Government's response to NRDC 
requests for various types oflicenses are set forth later in this 
section.3° First, a description of the historical context of the 
NRDC-SAS agreement is necessary. 
A. Background: Thirty Years of Test-Ban Negotiations 
The NRDC initiative took place in the context of nearly 
thirty years of sporadic efforts by governments to negotiate 
27. See generally NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, FIFTEEN-YEAR 
REPORT 1970-1985 (1985). 
28. The Academy, founded in 1724, is composed of the Soviet Union's 
leading scientislS. The main coordinating body for research, the Academy 
direclS more than 260 laboratories and research stations. 1 NEw ENCYCLO-
PEDIA BRITANNICA MICROPEDIA 50-51 (15th ed. 1987). 
29. These limitations could be either unilateral, as in the case of the 
Soviet Union's self-imposed moratorium on testing in effect at the initia-
tion of the project, or reciprocal, as would be the case under present or 
future treaties. 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 66-89. 
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prohibitions on nuclear weapons tests, efforts which had 
often floundered, at least in major part, over disputes be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union over whether 
compliance with proposed agreements could be monitored 
effectively.31 In 1958, after the health dangers associated 
with fallout from atmospheric nuclear testing had become a 
matter of world concern, scientists representing the United 
States and the Soviet Union concluded that seismic and 
other technology then available would "make it possible to 
detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low-yield 
nuclear explosions (1-5 kiloton (kt))."32 President Eisen-
hower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev began formal 
negotiations on a comprehensive test ban (CTB)33 and en-
tered a testing moratorium which lasted until 1961. After a 
promising initial period, the negotiations became stale-
mated. The U.S. delegates reported to their Soviet counter-
parts "new data" suggesting that the experts had been too 
optimistic in their estimates of the verifiability of a treaty.34 
Desultory negotiations continued after this event.35 But 
when the Eisenhower Administration ended, the two coun-
tries were far apart on numerous issues, including operation 
of the control system of monitoring stations and the number 
of on-site inspections that each side would be allowed to 
31. The advantages and disadvantages of treaties restraining nuclear 
testing are beyond the scope of this study. Two very balanced and well· 
researched analyses of this issue have been published. See NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
204-23 (1985) [hereinafter NAS]; H. YORK & A. GREB, THE CoMPREHEN· 
SIVE NuCLEAR TEST BAN (1979) (California Seminar on Arms Control and 
Foreign Policy Discussion Paper No. 84). Herbert York was President 
Carter's Ambassador to the comprehensive nuclear test ban negotiations 
of 1979-80. 
32. NAS, supra note 31, at 188. Yields of nuclear weapons are ex-
pressed in terms of kilotons (kt) or megatons (mt) of TNT-equivalent. 
33. In arms control parlance, and in this study, the term "comprehen-
sive test ban" and its acronym CTB refer to a prohibition on tests of nu-
clear weapons in all environments: in the air, under water, in space and 
under ground. 
34. NAS, supra note 31, at 189. 
35. For a detailed documentary description of the negotiations through 
1961, see U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, GENEVA CoNFERENCE ON THE DiscoNTINU· 
ANCE OF NucLEAR WEAPON TESTS (1961) [hereinafter GENEVA CoNFER· 
ENCE). 
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conduct in order to resolve seismically suspicious events.36 
The Kennedy Administration continued the negotia-
tions, but its efforts in 1961 were also bogged down in con-
troversy about verification. For example, the United States 
sought to have the detection system in the Soviet Union op-
erated by personnel from other countries, while the Soviets 
wanted it to be run mostly by Soviet citizens. The United 
States insisted on twelve to twenty annual on-site inspec-
tions. The Soviets were willing to concede only three.37 In 
any event, the negotiations and temporary moratorium on 
testing collapsed when, in August 1961, the Soviets resumed 
testing, citing the failure of the United States to adhere to 
the 1958 experts' conclusions and the continued nuclear 
testing of a U.S. ally, France. sa 
By the spring of 1962, the Soviet position on verification 
had become more rigid. The Soviets insisted that any ban be 
monitored only by "national" means of detection, thus ex-
cluding Americans from any monitoring posts on Soviet 
soil.3 9 Mter the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world to 
the brink of nuclear war,4° CTB negotiations intensified, but 
the United States and the Soviet Union were unable to re-
solve their differences concerning verification.41 
36. NAS, supra note 31, at 190. Eisenhower considered his failure to 
achieve a CTB his greatest regret about his presidency. H. YoRK & A. 
GREB, supra note 31, at 8. 
37. NAS, supra note 31, at 191. 
38. Broadcast of Radio Moscow, August 30, 1961, summarized in GENEVA 
CoNFERENCE, supra note 35, at 171-72. In fact, the Soviets had warned the 
previous May that continued French testing might compel the Soviets to 
end their moratorium, but the French did not test between May and Au-
gust. Statement by Charles C. Stelle, Acting U.S. Representative to the 
Geneva negotiations, id. at 629-33. 
39. NAS, supra note 31, at 192. 
40. SeeR. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS (1969). 
41. Late in the fall of 1962, Soviet Premier Khrushchev agreed to "two 
to three" annual onsite inspections as part of a CTB agreement. He was 
apparently under the misimpression that this number would be acceptable 
to President Kennedy. In the opinion of British Labor Party Leader (later 
Prime Minister) Harold Wilson, this misimpression probably resulted 
from the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to the Geneva negotiations was 
"often vague." G. SEABORG, KENNEDY, KHRUSHCHEV, AND THE TEST BAN 
178-81 (1981). Kennedy eventually offered to reduce the U.S. demand for 
annual inspections to seven, but the two leaders were unable to agree to 
the obvious compromise at five. Available evidence suggests that each 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
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At this time, however, a new verification concept en-
tered the debate. U.S. and Soviet scientists, meeting as pri-
vate citizens rather than as government representatives at 
the Tenth Pugwash Conference in September 1962, had dis-
cussed installing a number of unmanned automatic seismic 
stations in both the United States and the Soviet Union. So-
viet concerns about espionage would be alleviated by the fact 
that personnel from other countries would not have to be 
stationed permanently on Soviet soil. In December, the So-
viets expressed their willingness to have such stations in-
stalled in the Soviet Union.4 2 
In the spring of 1963, Premier Khrushchev accepted 
President Kennedy's proposal to negotiate a ban on nuclear 
tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in space, since 
compliance with a ban on tests in these environments could 
be verified without in-country seismic instrumentation or on-
site inspections. The Limited Test Ban Treaty43 signed in 
August of that year forced testing underground. Since the 
political opposition to testing had been rooted primarily in 
fears about fallout from atmospheric testing, rather than in 
opposition to the development of more advanced nuclear 
weapons, the opportunity to prohibit all nuclear testing 
passed.44 
leader was dealing with powerful domestic opponents to any further com-
promise. NAS, supra note 31, at 193. Even if the sides had been able to 
compromise on five inspections, however, they would have remained far 
apart on other verification issues, such as the rights of the inspectors and 
the establishment of seismic control posts to monitor the events from 
which the inspectors would select what they wanted to see. 
42. NAS, supra note 31, at 177. The fact that the 1962 Pugwash Con-
ference produced an idea that later became a foundation for government-
to-government negotiations was an important precedent for the NRDC-
SAS initiative nearly 25 years later. See infra text accompanying note 59. 
43. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, reprinted in U.S. ARMS CoN-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 
AGREEMENTS: TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATIONS 41 (1980) (ratified 
by U.S. Senate Sept. 24, 1963; entered into force Oct. 19, 1963). 
44. Even during the final Moscow negotiations on the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty, the U.S. representatives tried to persuade Khrushchev to 
agree on "the nature and number of the inspections" so that "we can get a 
comprehensive agreement on the end of all nuclear testing" in those talks. 
Hand-delivered letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev in Ambassador Harri-
man's files, quoted in G. SEABORG, supra note 41, at 240-41. Khrushchev 
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
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After entry into force of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to 
test nuclear weapons at "a high rate" and "added signifi-
candy to the variety and sophistication of their nuclear weap-
ons."45 Eleven years passed before negotiations resumed on 
further restrictions on nuclear weapon testing.4G 
The Nixon Administration concluded a Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty (TTB Treaty) with the Soviet Union to prohibit 
underground nuclear tests with yields greater than 150 kt 
(approximately ten times the size of the Hiroshima bomb).47 
This particular threshold was selected both because explo-
sions in this range could be readily detected and identified 
without seismic stations in the Soviet Union or onsite inspec-
tions and because this yield level "was related to our present 
test program at the time."48 Accordingly, the Treaty relied 
on long-distance seismic measurements, satellite photogra-
phy and other "national technical means"49 of verification, 
plus two cooperative measures agreed upon in the Treaty's 
Protocol. Each side agreed that for the purpose of cali-
brating data collected teleseismically, it would supply the 
other side ·with data on the geological characteristics of its 
refused. Glenn Seaborg, then the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, later wrote that "I regard the failure to achieve a comprehensive 
test ban as a world tragedy of the first magnitude," and Ambassador Har-
riman said that "[w]hen you stop to think of what the advantages were to 
us of stopping all testing in the early 1960s when we were still ahead of the 
Soviets it's really appalling to realize what a missed opportunity we had." 
G. SEABORG, supra note 41, at 242. 
45. Id. at 288. 
46. The 1974 negotiations were initiated not because of environmental 
concerns or strong political demand in the United States or in other na-
tions, but because President Nixon, bedeviled by the Watergate scandal 
and unable to complete the SALT II Treaty in time for a long-scheduled 
summit, wanted to conclude quickly an arms control treaty that would not 
be controversial. NAS, supra note 31, at 197. 
47. Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, july 
3, 1974, reprinted in U.S. ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra 
note 43, at 167 [hereinafter Threshold Test Ban Treaty]. 
48. Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties: Htarings on 
Executive N Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
49 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings/Exec N/95] (testimony of Vice Admiral 
Patrick]. Hannifin on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
49. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 47, Art. 11(1). 
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nuclear test sites, 50 and that it would provide the yield, time, 
depth, and coordinates for two nuclear weapon tests at each 
test site. 5 1 A companion Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
concluded by the Ford Administration in 197652 (PNE 
Treaty) similarly banned underground explosions for 
"peaceful" purposes at yields greater than 150 kt. This sec-
ond treaty was necessary to reinforce the TTB Treaty since 
weapons information can be obtained from tests at a given 
magnitude regardless of their purpose. 53 
By the time of the NRDC initiative, twelve years after the 
TTB Treaty was signed, these Treaties had still not been rat-
ified. The Ford Administration did not want them debated 
in the middle of a Presidential election campaign, the Carter 
Administration gave them low priority because it was trying 
to negotiate more important strategic arms and CTB trea-
ties, and the Reagan Administration took the view that reli-
ance on teleseismic verification of compliance with the 
threshold was inadequate. 54 
Both sides stated that they were complying with the 
threshold limit during this long hiatus55 despite President 
Reagan's allegations, in a statement to Congress (disputed 
by the Director of Livermore National Laboratory which de-
signs approximately one-half of the U.S. nuclear weapons},56 
that the Soviets had "likely" exceeded the limit on several 
occasions. 57 
50. Specifically, each would provide information on "the rock charac-
teristics of geological formations and the basic physical properties of the 
rock; i.e., density, seismic velocity, water saturation, porosity and the 
depth of the water table." Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 
supra note 47, at 169. 
51. !d. 
52. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of So· 
viet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful 
Purposes, reprinted in U.S. ARMS CoNTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra 
note 43, at 173. 
53. Hearings/Exec N/95, supra note 48, at 2 (1977) (testimony of Philip 
C. Habib, Undersecretary of State). 
54. NAS, supra note 31, at 199; SENATE CoMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES TREATY, S. 
Exec. Rep. No. I, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT]. 
55. REPORT, supra note 54, at 4. 
56. R. Batzel, A View of Some Issues Related to Potential Soviet Viola-
tions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, reprinted in REPORT, id. at 10-11. 
57. !d. at 4. 
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The Carter Administration revived President Kennedy's 
effort to negotiate a ban on all nuclear testing. During two 
years of negotiations at Geneva, delegates of the United 
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union made significant pro-
gress on many issues, 58 including two critical verification 
questions. The three nations agreed that ten unmanned sta-
tions with specified high-quality seismic equipment and "so-
phisticated encryption devices to ensure authenticity of 
data" would be emplaced at designated locations in the 
United States and the Soviet Union. They also concluded 
that onsite inspections could be handled by "challenges," 
·without quotas. Any request for an inspection that was de-
nied by the suspected party would "have to be taken into 
account in assessing the probability that an alleged test had 
occurred."59 But the CTB Treaty was not concluded. The 
Carter Administration's SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation) 
Treaty proved unexpectedly controversial, and the Adminis-
tration did not want to complicate its already problematic 
ratification process by concluding another nuclear arms con-
trol agreement at the same time. In addition, although the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded, at least for the public 
record, that it could "with some less efficiency" accept a 
CTB Treaty, 60 "senior military officers, whose support was 
critical to the ratification of SALT II, were known to be con-
cerned about the consequences of a ban."61 
After the election of President Reagan, the U.S. Govern-
ment chose not to resume CTB negotiations. The Govern-
ment took the view that "as long as the United States ... 
must rely upon nuclear weapons to deter aggression . . . 
some level of nuclear testing will continue to be required. "62 
As a senior Reagan administration official stated, "it is diffi-
58. The official public report of the progress of the negotiators is the 
Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament, CD/130 (July 30, 
1980), reprinted in Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing (HJ. Res. 3): Hearings 
Before the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 169 (1985). 
59. NAS, supra note 31, at 201. 
60. Hearings/Exec. N/95, supra note 48, at 46 (testimony of Admiral 
Hannifin). 
61. NAS, supra note 31, at 199-200. 
62. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S. POUCY REGARDING LIMITATIONS 
ON NucLEAR TESTING [hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT No. 150] (Special Re-
port No. 150, August 1986). 
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cult to envision circumstances where some level of testing 
would not be necessary to insure the safety, reliability, effec-
tiveness, and survivability of our nuclear weapons."63 In re-
sponse to the argument that a CTB would cause the Soviets 
to have the same weapons degredation that the United States 
experienced, the Administration suggested, in 1985, that be-
cause verification could not be perfected, the Soviets could 
cheat: 
We cannot be certain that a CTB would equally 
constrain the Soviets .... [I]t is quite possible that 
the Soviet military nuclear technology base and 
most of their nuclear stockpile could be preserved 
and maintained indefinitely with tests of a few tens 
of kilotons in violation of a total testing ban. 
Equally important, or perhaps more important in 
this context, are verification uncertainties .... Even 
with monitors on Soviet soil and on-site inspections, 
verification of a CTB would involve considerable 
uncertainties . . . especially if we were largely de-
pendent upon remote teleseismic monitoring. All 
experts agree that there is some lower limit below 
which nuclear tests in hard rock cannot be detected 
with remote seismic monitors; the usual figures 
cited are one, two, or at most a few kilotons .... By 
exploding a device inside a hollow underground 
cavity [larger tests can be made to appear smaller]. 
A militarily significant nuclear test program con-
ducted in this way could be unrecognized by a net-
work of remote teleseismic monitoring stations. 64 
In addition, the Reagan Administration also concluded 
that even the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty should not be 
ratified because the verification provisions negotiated by the 
Nixon Administration were not adequate. "[W]e cannot ef-
fectively verify Soviet compliance with the !50-kiloton 
63. Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, 99th Gong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986) (testimony of H. Allen Holmes, Direc-
tor, Office of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State). Mr. Holmes 
added that "the United States sees objective security risks" even in resum-
ing the negotiations. /d. at 8. 
64. Proposals to Ban Nuclear Testing: Hearings Before the House Commillee 011 
Foreign Affairs, 99th Gong., 1st Sess. 93-94 (1985) (testimony of Donald M. 
Kerr, Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory) (emphasis added). 
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threshold. The remote seismic techniques we must rely on 
today to monitor Soviet tests do not provide yield estimates 
with the accuracy required for effective verification of com-
pliance."65 
The issue of nuclear testing restraints stood at this junc-
ture at the end of 1985. Reversing nearly 30 years of stated 
policy, the Reagan Administration was refusing even to try to 
negotiate a CTB, and it was citing verification concerns as 
one basis for its opposition to a CTB and as the sole basis for 
its opposition to the decade-old TTB Treaty. In the context 
of the Reagan policy, the NRDC took action. 
B. NRDC's Initiative 
The Natural Resources Defense Council has the largest 
staff oflawyers and scientists of any American environmental 
organization. 56 During the nuclear arms buildup of the Rea-
gan Administration, NRDC became directly involved in is-
sues related to nuclear weapons. In 1981, the NRDC began 
publishing a series of Nuclear Weapon Databooks67 and 
Working Papers68 compiling from available technical litera-
ture what is known about American and Soviet nuclear weap-
ons and their testing. In 1983, it co-sponsored the confer-
ence at which scientists first discussed the concept of a post-
war "nuclear winter."69 
Thomas B. Cochran, a physicist on the NRDC staff, 
stood at the center of the organization's projects related to 
nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The idea of installing 
65. SPECIAL REPORT No. 150, supra note 62, at 2. 
66. NATURAL REsouRCES DEFENSE CouNCIL, FIFTEEN-YEAR REPORT 
1970-1985 2 (1985) [hereinafter NRDC]. The Council has offices in New 
York, San Francisco and Washington. /d. at 32. 
67. 1 T. CocHRAN, W. ARKIN & M. HoENIG, NucLEAR WEAPONS 
DATABOOK: U.S. NucLEAR FoRCES AND CAPABILmES (1984); 2 T. 
CocHRAN, W. ARKIN & M. HoENIG, NucLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK: U.S. 
NucLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION COMPLEX (1984). 
68. See, e.g., SANDS, A REviEW OF SoviET MILITARY PowER 1985 (Nu-
clear Weapons Databook Working Paper 85-2, 1985); R. NoRRIS, T. 
CocHRAN & W. ARKIN, KNoWN U.S. NucLEAR TESTS, jULY 1945 TO 31 DE-
CEMBER 1985 (Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper 86-2, 1986); 
SANDS, R. NoRRIS & T. CocHRAN, KNowN SoviET NucLEAR ExPLOSIONS 
1949-1985, PREUMINARY LIST (Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Pa-
per 86-3, 1986). 
69. NRDC, supra note 66, at 18. 
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seismic stations around the U.S. and Soviet test sites evolved 
out of efforts by Cochran and his colleagues to publish 
databooks listing the sizes and dates of all Soviet and Ameri-
can nuclear tests. The Government announced many tests, 
and the U.S. Geological Survey reported others, but it be-
came clear that some classified tests at low yields (one to two 
kilotons) had taken place without detection by any independ-
ent sensors. Cochran's colleague William Arkin jokingly 
suggested that NRDC install its own seismic station in Ne-
vada to monitor these low-level tests. The idea remained 
only a joke because it seemed somehow unpatriotic for 
NRDC unilaterally to release information which the U.S. 
Government was, for some reason, keeping secret, but then 
another colleague suggested monitoring Soviet tests as 
well.70 
In February 1986, Cochran conceived of the idea of 
writing letters to President Reagan and Soviet General Sec-
retary Gorbachev, in which the NRDC would ask the "ap-
proval" of each government to set up, near each country's 
test site, seismic stations which would be "mannedjointly by 
a limited number of U.S. and Soviet seismologists, other 
scientists, and technicians who are not affiliated with the nu-
clear weapons programs" of the two countries.71 But 
Cochran scrapped this version of the idea when a Soviet em-
bassy official in the United States unofficially advised him 
that Gorbachev was unlikely to be receptive, since the propo-
sal would require Soviet governmental approval of a verifica-
tion plan that had no limits on testing. 72 
Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists 
suggested, as an alternative, that NRDC work with the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences rather than with the Soviet embassy. 
Shortly thereafter, Professor Frank von Hippe} of Princeton 
University discussed the idea with Yevgeny P. Velikhov, a 
vice-president of the SAS and Gorbachev's unofficial science 
advisor. Velikhov agreed to host an SAS symposium on test 
ban verification in May 1986, and von Hippe} proposed that 
70. Lin, Gaining Ground Zero, SIERRA MAG., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 33. 
71. Undated draft letters to President Reagan and General Secretary 
Gorbachev, in files of NRDC. 
72. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 5, 
1987). 
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Velikhov invite Cochran, NRDC Board Chairman Adrian 
DeWind (a New York attorney), and Professor Charles Ar-
chambeau, a University of Colorado seismologist who had 
been advising Cochran about the idea of mutual seismic 
monitoring. 73 
The SAS indeed extended the invitations to Moscow. 
After two days of discussions between the Americans and So-
viet Academy members, the Soviets agreed to the NRDC 
proposal. DeWind and Cochran quickly drafted a two-page 
agreement providing that NRDC and SAS would establish 
"three seismic stations adjacent to each of the principal nu-
clear weapons testing sites in the two countries" which 
would be "manned and operated jointly" by the two organi-
zations. The document stated that the parties agreed that 
"the current state of geophysical knowledge gives reasonable 
confidence in the detectability, using practical seismic net-
works, of nuclear weapons tests down to yields at, or below, 
one kiloton." It also stated that the findings of the project 
would help to demonstrate "verification procedures to be 
used during a test moratorium or under a nuclear test ban 
treaty." The Soviets insisted on writing into the agreement, 
that commencement of the project was to begin before the 
end of June "if possible. " 74 Why the Soviets insisted on so 
much speed is not clear, but the Soviet Government's one-
year self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing was due to 
expire on August 6th, and those in the Soviet hierarchy who 
favored extending the moratorium, together with those who 
hoped to put pressure on the U.S. Government to join it 
before it expired, may have wanted to demonstrate some 
progress before that date. 
The one-month provision for commencing the project 
put enormous pressure on the NRDC. The Council had to 
select the equipment to install in the Soviet Union, put to-
gether a team of scientists willing to live in a remote area of 
the Soviet countryside while operating the stations, raise 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to obtain the equipment, 
73. Lin, supra note 70, at 34. 
74. Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings Before tlze Senate Comm. on Fortigr1 Rela-
tions, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 285-86 {1986) [hereinafter Nuclear Testing Hear-
ings] (Agreement between the National Resources Defense Council and 
the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., May 28, 1986). 
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and obtain from the U.S. Government any licenses necessary 
to take the equipment to Kazakhstan, near the Soviet test site 
at Semipalatinsk. Once those licenses were granted, the 
NRDC would also have to prepare for the Soviet's reciprocal 
enterprise in Nevada, by helping the Soviet scientists obtain 
visas, scouting appropriate sites for seismic stations near the 
Nevada Test Site, and obtaining any permits necessary for 
the establishment of the Soviet stations. 
The agreement between the two groups was treated as 
significant news by the U.S. press. The New York Times cov-
ered it on page three the next day,75 and other major 
magazines and newspapers gave the story prominent atten-
tion. 76 Prestigious foundations supported the project by 
speedily providing one million dollars. The Council assem-
bled a seismological team77 and, in one of the events ex-
amined in detail in this study, the U.S. Government granted 
the necessary export licenses before June 30th, enabling the 
NRDC to meet its contractual obligation to the Soviet Acad-
emy. 
The U.S. team of nine scientists arrived in Moscow on 
July 4th, and two days later, it established its first station 
near Karkaralinsk, just 120 miles west of the Semipalatinsk 
test sit~.78 In this first phase of the project, the team brought 
75. Taubman, New Yorkers Sign Soviet Test Pact, N.Y. Times, May 29, 
1986, at A3, col. I. 
76. See, e.g., Palca, Private Diplomacy Emergent, 321 NATURE 638 (1986); 
Duffy, Public Squabbles, Private Deal, TIME, July 14, 1986, at 25; Spiegel, 
Monitoring Nuke Tests, NEWSWEEK, July 28, 1986, at 34; Cowen, Amassing 
Data to Help Monitor Nuclear Tests, Christian Science Monitor, July 16, 1986, 
at 4, col. 4. 
77. The team included Dr. Charles Archambeau, a University of Colo· 
rado expert on seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions, and Drs. John 
Berger and James Brune of the Scripps Institute of Oceanography at the 
University of California-San Diego. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Slide Show Script, December 16, 
1986 [hereinafter NRDC Slide Script]. See also telephone interview with S. 
Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988). 
78. Despite their pressure on NRDC to begin the project by the end of 
June, the Soviets needed a few extra days to prepare to host the Ameri-
cans. Presentation by S.Jacob Scherr, Senior Attorney, NRDC, to a meet· 
ing of the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, Washington, D.C. 
(Dec. 15, 1986) [hereinafter Presentation by Scherr]. See also telephone 
interview with S. Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988). 
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relatively unsophisticated surface seismometers. ' 9 But in the 
second phase, it substituted extremely sensitive equipment 
that had to be installed in boreholes drilled three hundred 
feet into the earth's surface and that could record waves at 
several different frequencies simultaneously. The team in-
stalled the first surface seismometers and took its first re-
cordings-of earthquakes-on its first day at the site.so U.S. 
scientists remained in the Soviet Union for the next year, and 
by the end of the first summer, they had selected the loca-
tions for all three sites and had monitored nuclear explo-
sions detonated in Nevada.s1 
Meanwhile, the NRDC prepared to receive the Soviet 
scientists who would establish three similar stations near the 
Nevada Test Site. The NRDC identified some potential loca-
tions from which the Soviets might choose. It prepared sci-
entific briefings and meetings for the Soviets similar to those 
the Americans had attended in Moscow. Additionally, the 
NRDC intervened with the State Department regarding ac-
quisition of the necessary visas for the Soviet scientists. 82 
In another aspect of the project analyzed in this article, 
the U.S. Government did not grant the Soviets the visas they 
requested that would have permitted the Soviet scientists to 
79. A seismometer is a mechanical device consisting of a casing on the 
outside and a heavy mass on the inside which is supported by springs. 
When the earth vibrates, the casing and the mass move relative to one 
another, and electronic instruments measure the differential movement. 
That movement provides a measure of the earth's motion. Broad, U.S. 
Group Checks Soviet Atom Site, N.Y. Times, july 14, 1986, at A1, col. 5. 
80. NRDC Slide Script, supra note 77. 
81. The Soviets continued their moratorium on nuclear tests until early 
1987. As a result, no Soviet tests were recorded in 1986, and when Soviet 
testing resumed, the Soviets required NRDC temporarily to tum off its 
equipment. At the time the agreement was signed, the Soviets had gi\•en 
no assurances that NRDC would be allowed to monitor tests in the e\'ent 
that testing was resumed. Presentation by Scherr, supra note 78. See also 
telephone interview with S.Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988). In june 1987, 
NRDC and SAS reached a new agreement under which more stations 
would be built that would be allowed to record Soviet nuclear tests, but 
these stations would have to be operated by Soviet scientists and moved 
further from the Soviet test site. Natural Resources Defense Council and 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR, USA-USSR Nuclear Test Ban Verifica-
tion Project Agreement (June 25, 1987). 
82. Interview with Thomas Cochran, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 5, 1987). 
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visit the proposed sites. Instead, the United States gave the 
Soviets two choices. The scientists could travel to the United 
States under U.S. Government (rather than NRDC) auspices, 
in which case they would be required to visit the Nevada Test 
Site, observe a nuclear weapon test, and either observe a 
demonstration of a yield-measurement device known as 
CORRTEX or measure the yield of the blast with similar 
equipment of Soviet origin. 83 If the Soviets selected this op-
tion, they could go anywhere else they wanted, including the 
potential seismic site locations. Alternatively, the Soviet 
scientists could travel as private citizens invited by NRDC, 
but in that case they could stay for only one week, and could 
go only to New York, Washington, La Jolla (site of the 
Scripps Institution of the University of California), and Dal-
las (where the seismometers are manufactured).84 
The Soviets accepted the second option. At La Jolla, 
their NRDC hosts presented them with rock samples and ge-
ological maps from which the Soviets selected three poten-
tial locations for seismic stations. After one week, however, 
the Soviets left, never having seen the station sites, much less 
set up camp as the American team had done in Kazakhstan. 
A subsequent request to visit the selected sites was similarly 
conditioned by the State Department in February 1987. The 
Soviets were given only the choices of an unrestricted visit 
under government auspices including observation of a nu-
clear test, or a seven-day trip during which they would again 
be barred from the proposed sites.85 They elected to stay 
home.86 
Despite this development, the Soviets did not terminate 
the project, and NRDC sought to establish stations for the 
Soviets at the locations they had selected. Even if the Soviet 
scientists were never permitted at the sites, if permission 
could be obtained to establish the stations near the Nevada 
Test Site, the U.S. scientists could make the seismic record-
ings and send the recordings to Moscow either by mailing 
83. U.S. Department of State, Outgoing Telegram No. 305164 from 
Secretary George Schultz to European and other Embassies (Sept. 27, 
1986). 
84. !d. 
85. Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, Senior Attorney, NRDC, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (Feb. 26, 1987). 
86. Telephone interview with S. Jacob Scherr (Sept. 21, 1988). 
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the computer tapes or by transmitting the data via satellite.s7 
But all three of the sites were on federally owned land.88 
Consequendy, the stations could not be constructed89 with-
out U.S. Government permission. In the third of the aspects 
of this project considered in greater detail below, the United 
States granted the requisite authorization. 
In summary, the U.S. Government had to respond to 
NRDC requests for export licenses, travel visas, and permits 
to set up stations on federal land near the Nevada Test Site. 
The United States granted the export licenses very quickly, 
conditioned the visas in a manner so unacceptable to the So-
viets that they never went to the potential station sites, and 
granted the station permits. The Allison framework may 
help to explain this apparently inconsistent government re-
action. 
III. MODEL I 
Model I,90 embodying the "central tradition in the social 
sciences, " 91 is the domain of the armchair analyst. The stu-
dent of governmental policy begins with observed outcomes 
and reasons backwards to discover explanations for those 
outcomes. In so doing, the observer makes three critical as-
sumptions. First, the relevant unit to observe is the nation, 
87. NRDC Slide Script, supra note 77. 
88. Ninety-five percent of the land in the State of Nevada is owned by 
the federal government. Telephone interview with Annette jameson, Bu-
reau of Land Management, Department of the Interior, by Frederick S. 
Young Uuly 21, 1987). Of the privately held land, two thirds is owned by 
railroads. Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, Research and Design 
Engineer, Seismological Laboratory, University of Nevada-Reno (Apr. 21, 
1987). Much of the land near the Nevada Test Site is unsuitable for seis-
mic research because of the lack of granite outcroppings or the presence 
of surface noise. As a result, setting up a seismic research station near the 
test site simply by purchasing a few acres is particularly difficult. /d. 
89. Under the design for sophisticated stations as agreed by the NRDC 
and the SAS, station construction would have to include drilling a 300-
foot borehole in which some of the seismometers would be located. A 
borehole minimizes surface noise. NRDC Slide Script, supra note 77. 
90. In using the term "model," Allison is careful to note that he does 
not mean to imply that political scientists have yet developed any empiri-
cally sound theory; the word "model" in this context means only "concep-
tual scheme." G. ALusoN, supra note I, at 4. This Article uses the term 
with the same meaning as does Allison. 
91. /d. at 28. 
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or, in a variant of Model I, a nation's ruling clique.92 Sec-
ond, nations have goals, and they act rationally to achieve 
them. Events do not just happen nor do they emerge chaoti-
cally from other events. Rather, "[t]he nation ... conceived 
as a rational, unitary decisionmaker, is the agent ... [and 
the] agent selects the alternative whose consequences rank 
highest in terms of his goals and objectives."93 Third, the 
nation makes its rational decisions not incrementally but at a 
particular time.94 
Thus, the actors in the international arena are both na-
tional and rational, and they make unitary decisions to maxi-
mize value, not unlike the utilitarian concept of individual 
human choice. The analyst of a policy decision, then, has a 
clear task: "[i]f a nation performed a particular action, that 
nation must have had ends toward which the action consti-
tuted a maximizing means .... The puzzle is solved by find-
ing the purposive pattern within which the occurrence can be 
located as a value-maximizing means. "95 
Applying this model to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison 
constructs rational responses that may answer the m<Uor 
questions raised by that set of events. Why did the Soviet 
Union install nuclear missiles in Cuba? The Soviet Union's 
motive may have been to force U.S. missiles out of Turkey, 
or to provoke the United States into attacking Cuba so that 
the Soviets could attack Berlin, or to defend Cuba, or to 
show the world that the United States was "too liberal to 
fight," or to double Soviet offensive missile power.96 Why 
did the United States respond with a blockade? Allison con-
cludes that the blockade was a "middle course" between a 
diplomatic response and an air strike or ground invasion, it 
forced the Soviets to make the first warlike move, it took ad-
vantage of U.S. naval strength, and it kept the confrontation 
non-nuclear. 97 
From the perspective of Model I, the United States (or 
the Reagan Administration) muSt have made a rational deci-
92. "Happenings in foreign affairs are conceived as actions chosen by 
the nation or national government." /d. at 32, 37. 
93. Id. at 32-33. 
94. /d. at 33. 
95. !d. 
96. !d. at 43-54. 
97. See id. at 61. 
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sion about how to respond to the NRDC's test ban verifica-
tion project. We should now be able to deduce why the 
United States acted as it did by concentrating on the out-
come and asking what values were thereby maximized. 
A first pass at such an analysis is simple enough. The 
United States quickly granted the NRDC's export license ap-
plication in order to obtain unique seismological data that 
would supplement U.S. intelligence activities. Neither the 
U.S. Government nor any U.S. citizen had ever been able to 
install seismic sensors near the Soviet test site. The NRDC 
project could yield several types of valuable information. 
First, if the Soviets continued their announced testing 
moratorium (which in fact lasted until February 26, 1987),98 
the United States would have a powerful resource with which 
to detect noncompliance with the Soviets' stated policy.99 
While the precise abilities of the three NRDC stations would 
depend on the "noise level" (i.e. ground noise) at the station 
locations, "such a network, if well-sited and stringendy oper-
ated, could reduce the detection threshold at the Semipala-
tinsk test site and environs during the period of opera-
tion."100 More particularly, the United States realized that 
the "network should be able to detect well-coupled events 
considerably below a kiloton at the Soviet test site." 10 1 
98. See Strobel and Dorsey, Soviets Expected to Conduct Nuclear Test by End 
of Week, Wash. Times, Apr. 15, 1987, at 3A, col. 4. 
99. Indeed, the President was concerned that the Soviets might not be 
living up to their proclaimed suspension of testing, for he later said that 
"there were numerous ambiguous events during this period [the Soviet 
moratorium] that can neither be associated with, nor disassociated from, 
observed Soviet nuclear test-related activities." President's Message to 
the Congress and the President's Report on Soviet Noncompliance with 
Arms Control Agreements, 23 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 239, 242 (Mar. 
10, 1987). Of course, distant seismic sensors could detect large Soviet 
tests at Semipalatinsk, but the NRDC instruments would be able to detect 
tests at much smaller yields. 
100. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Natural Resources 
Defense Council Proposal to Place Seismic Monitoring Stations Ncar the 
Soviet Nuclear Test Site 3 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter DARPA Memoran-
dum] (Memorandum to Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy). 
101. Memorandum to Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy, from E.V. Badolato, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Energy for Security Affairs 5 (July 2, 1986} [hereinafter DOE Mem-
orandum]. 
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Second, if the Soviets announced an end to their mora-
torium ,and allowed NRDC to monitor its tests, the United 
States would reap two benefits. To begin with, the United 
States would learn a great deal about close-in monitoring 
near Semipalatinsk which would be relevant if the United 
States and the Soviets eventually negotiated a CTB Treaty 
which included in-country seismic monitoring. At the very 
least, the NRDC experience would help the United States to 
formulate its negotiating position in those negotiations, be-
cause the Government would know much more about the 
problems of monitoring seismic events in that area. 102 Per-
haps more importantly, such monitoring could help to end 
the considerable uncertainty surrounding Soviet adherence 
to their pledge to abide by the TTB Treaty during the ex-
tended pendency of its ratification. Consideration of this last 
possible advantage requires an explanation of the "bias" 
problem. 
Compliance with the TTB Treaty's yield limit of 150 kt 
was never possible to verify by examining the designs of the 
weapons exploded. Weapons design remains, for each side, 
a closely guarded secret. The yields of nuclear explosions 
can only be measured indirectly. Certain cooperative meas-
ures might make this task easier. For example, the Soviets 
might allow U.S. scientists to visit the Soviet test site during 
weapons tests and take samples of the radioactive debris left 
behind. 103 The 1974 treaty provided, however, that each 
side would rely on verification by "national technical 
means," 104 which includes all available intelligence sources 
I 02. The United States would obtain "measurements of seismic noise 
levels, data to evaluate propagation and attentuation of seismic waves at 
regional distances, and data applicable to research on discrimination be-
tween earthquakes and explosions." DARPA Memorandum, supra note 
100, at 4. 
103. This debris would enable the U.S. scientists to make quite accurate 
measurements of yield, and would also enable them to obtain considerable 
information about the nature of the weapons and the purposes of the tests, 
and for this reason neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. has ever proposed 
this type of sampling for purposes of TTB verification. See Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (testimony of Lt. Gen. 
Dale A. Vesser, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff, 
on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). 
104. Threshold Test Ban Treaty, supra note 47, Article Il(l). 
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but in this case refers primarily to the monitoring of the 
waves from an explosion at seismic stations beyond the bor-
ders of the country being monitored. lOs 
Yields of nuclear explosions detected by teleseismic 
means are estimated by comparing the observed amplitudes 
of certain seismic waves with a calibrating ratio. This ratio is 
obtained by correlating the known yields of U.S. tests with 
the amplitudes of the waves the tests produce at teleseismic 
distances. 106 The validity of the comparison using the yield/ 
magnitude ratio based on results emanating from the Ne-
vada Test Site rests on the assumption that the seismic waves 
from Nevada propagate in a manner similar to the ones from 
Semipalatinsk. In fact, they do not. Soviet explosions de-
tected on seismic monitors appear to be larger than U.S. ex-
plosions of the same yield. 107 This difference is called the 
systematic "bias" in measuring Soviet yields, and it appears 
that using the Nevada calibration curve exaggerates the yield 
of Soviet tests by 40 to 50%. 108 But experts disagree about 
the precise degree of this bias. 109 In addition, the peculiar 
105. In the hard rock of the Semipalatinsk test site, explosions can relia-
bly be teleseismically detected and identified at yields down to 1 kt without 
any seismic measurements from Soviet stations. Nuclear Testing Hearings, 
supra note 74, at 249 (prepared statement of Lynn R. Sykes, Higgins Pro-
fessor of Geological Sciences, Columbia University). 
106. Executive N, 94-2, Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explo-
sions Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings/Exec N/100] (statement of 
Milo Nordyke, Leader, Treaty Verification Research Program, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratories). 
107. Hearings/Exec N/100, supra note 106, at 68 (testimony of Dr. 
Nordyke). 
108. /d. 
109. The dispute among the experts has generated considerable argu-
mentation in the technical and popular literature. Compare Alewine & 
Bache, Monitoring a Threshold Test Ban Treat)', 64 EOS, TRANSAcriONS, AM. 
GEOPHYSICAL UNION 193 (1983) (abstract) with Sykes & Cifuentes, Yields of 
Soviet Underground Nuclear Exp!lJsions from Seismic Surface Waves: Compliance 
with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 81 PRoc. NAT'L ACAo. Scr. 1922 (1984) 
and Evernden & Sykes, Nuclear Test Yre/ds, 223 Scr. 642 (1984). The princi-
pal difference between Alewine (who is the head of the geophysical sci-
ences office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) and 
Sykes is that Alewine uses "a correcting factor half that employed by 
Sykes." Wilke, Doubt Cast on Soviet Violations, Wash. Post, june 3, 1983, at 
A23, col. 1. 
This difference of opinion has also had important political ramifica-
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geophysical aspects of any particular test can cause the devia-
tion to be greater or smaller than average, leading to a ran-
dom bias on top of the systematic bias. 110 Not surprisingly, 
soon after U.S. and Soviet observance of the ITB Treaty 
limits began, certain Soviet tests raised questions about 
whether the Soviets were observing the 150 kt limit, and that 
with the passage of time, charges were heard that the Soviets 
were engaged in massive cheating on their commitment. ttl 
If the Soviets allowed the NRDC to monitor nuclear 
tests from the Project stations near Semipalatinsk, some of 
the uncertainty about Soviet yields might be resolved, and 
the charges of Soviet cheating, which tend to inhibit further 
progress toward arms control agreements, might abate.11 2 
Even if the Soviets did not test, however, NRDC's recordings 
from Kazakhstan might help to resolve the question of bias. 
The NRDC stations in the Soviet Union would record nu-
tions. President Reagan charged that the Soviets probably had tested at 
yields higher than the limit, the President's Unclassified Report on Soviet 
Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements (March 10, 1987), reprinted 
in Soviet Compliance with Anns Control Agreements: Hearings Before tlze Suhcomm. 
on Anns Control, International Security and Sciences of the House on Foreign Affairs, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 10, at 284 (1987), while "most" members of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded that "the United 
States has been able to ascertain that the Soviet record has been consistent 
with compliance." REPORT, supra note 54, at 16. 
110. !d. at 67-68. Furthermore, a previously untested type of nuclear 
device designed to produce a yield of exactly 150 kt might actually pro-
duce a larger yield, due to miscalculation. To permit each country to de· 
sign tests to produce yields as large as 150 kt, the parties to the ITB 
Treaty agreed that "one or two slight, unintended breaches per year 
would not be considered a violation of the Treaty," although they would 
be a cause for concern. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, 
supra note 43, at 166. 
111. See, e.g., Sen. James A. McClure, 24 Soviet Violations of the Tllreshold 
Test Ban Treaty, reprinted in REPORT, supra note 54, app. I, at 85-90. 
112. Specifically, the thought was that "[i]f Soviet testing resumes and 
the stations are allowed to record, the data may provide a means of cali-
brating the site using Lg waves [one of several types of waves observable 
on seismographs] and comparing these relatively close in measurements 
with more distant ones. These close-in stations with their probable azi· 
muthal distribution may provide useful information about the mechanisms 
affecting surface wave yield estimates." DOE Memorandum, supra note 
101, at 6. The DARPA Memorandum, supra note 100, at 6, suggests sev· 
eral technical reasons that the results might remain ambiguous despite 
NRDC monitoring. 
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clear explosions of known yield at the Nevada Test Site. 
Scientists might be able to use the amplitude of signals from 
Nevada, as recorded in Kazakhstan, to compute how well sig-
nals are transmitted between those places, and might, there-
fore, be able to estimate with greater reliability the degree of 
attenuation of explosion-generated seismic waves originat-
ing in Kazakhstan and recorded in Nevada.rrs 
A further possible advantage to the United States of the 
NRDC project was one that NRDC itself claimed for its work. 
U.S. and Soviet negotiators in 1978 had discussed at length 
the idea of establishing reciprocal seismic monitoring sta-
tions. No treaty resulted, however, and no one had ever 
tested whether the Soviets would actually allow Americans to 
establish seismic stations in the Soviet Union. 114 The NRDC 
project could help to pave the way for further restraints on 
nuclear testing by demonstrating that the Soviets really 
113. As DARPA stated, "[d]ata could be useful ..• to promote general 
understanding of geological structure and seismic wave propagation in the 
area" of Semipalatinsk. DARPA Memorandum, supra note 100, at 5. 
"Some estimate of regional bias (as opposed to test site bias) may be 
formed but extrapolating it to the test site will introduce additional uncer-
tainty over and above that which may exist due to the variations among the 
three stations." DOE Memorandum, supra note 101, at 6. Indeed, a group 
of University of Nevada scientists who studied the first recordings from the 
NRDC-SAS stations in Kazakhstan found that the apparent magnitudes of 
distant earthquakes recorded at those sites were considerably greater than 
the apparent magnitudes of the same events as recorded at other loca-
tions. They concluded that the total bias of the Kazakhstan sites was twice 
as great as the bias assumed in the U.S. Government's official estimates of 
Soviet test yields. "[T]he low bias estimate could inflate yield estimates of 
!50-kiloton explosions by about 100 kilotons." Kerr, Geoph)·sics Smorgas-
bord was Spread in Baltimore, 236 Sci. 1425, 1426 (1987). 
114. Despite the Reagan Administration's coolness toward resuming ne-
gotiations, the Soviets had remained publicly committed both to negotiat-
ing a comprehensive test ban treaty and to monitoring compliance by us-
ing, among other devices, in-country seismic monitoring stations. Su, e.g., 
Press Release of the Soviet Embassy to the United States Uune 23, 1987). 
The press release contains the text of a Soviet draft CTB Treaty which 
includes, among other verification provisions, a clause providing that "a 
network of seismic stations with standard specifications shall be estab-
lished on the territory under the jurisdiction or control of the States-Par-
ties to the Treaty, to ensure the continuous international exchanges of 
level II seismic data in accordance with agreed guidelines which will form 
an integral part of the Treaty. These stations shall operate with the partic-
ipation of observers from among the members of an international inspec-
torate." !d. 
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would allow the necessary in-country monitoring. Further-
more, this instance would be the first occasion on which U.S. 
scientists would develop working relationships with their So-
viet counterparts in the installation and staffing of such sta-
tions and the collection and distribution of the data. 11 5 
While the foregoing discussion illustrates why the U.S. 
Government might have wanted to encourage the NRDC 
project, at least by expeditiously granting a license to export 
the seismometers, there are also reasons why the United 
States might have wanted to obstruct the project. 
First, improved monitoring of Soviet tests might suc-
ceed too well. For example, marginal gains in reducing the 
degree of uncertainty about yield bias might mislead the 
American public into thinking that the bias problem had 
been solved. 116 Worse, the public might erroneously think 
that all nuclear test verification problems had been solved 
and that the United States should, therefore, be willing to 
sign a CTB Treaty that included provisions for in-country 
seismic verification. The project "may increase international 
perceptions that the Soviets will be reasonable or coopera-
tive in permitting adequate verification of a CTB" Treaty, 
115. The Reagan Administration recognized the value of joint U.S.-So-
viet research projects in nuclear test detection and identification. "Upon 
review of a number of possible scientific disciplines, it was concluded that 
... nuclear testing issues appear to offer the most promising avenues for 
... 'scientific' cooperation and data exchange." U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, VER-
IFYING NucLEAR TESTING LIMITATIONs: PossiBLE US-SoviET CooPERATION 
1986 (Special Report No. 152), reprinted in REPORT, supra note 54, at 44. 
The Administration's report gives the following example of cooperation: 
':Joint Soviet-US efforts could resume on the criteria for the location and 
operation of [remotely operated seismic] stations to include characteriza-
tion of the sites which would have to be available to ensure accurate in-
strument operation. Such an effort would have to include data gathering 
from potential sites for remote stations in the Soviet Union and should 
include installation of research instruments to validate that such instru-
ments can operate reliably, to include data transmission, throughout the 
broad range of environmental conditions within the Soviet Union." Id. at 
56. While the NRDC project does not have these precise aims or require-
ments, it is an effort along the lines the Administration was suggesting. 
116. "[D]ata will likely be used, regardless of other scientific interpreta-
tions, to support argument that seismic waves from STS [Semipalatinsk] 
are biased to produce larger signals for a given yield than those from U.S. 
calibration explosions at NTS [Nevada]." DARPA Memorandum, supra 
note 100, at 6. 
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and it "will be exploited to increase international pressure 
for [a] moratorium .... Ambiguities and normal scatter in 
data will likely permit selection of data to portray easy moni-
toring of U.S.S.R."ll7 
In addition, the reciprocal aspect of the project-the sta-
tions near the Nevada Test Site-threatened to reveal the 
full degree of U.S. testing. The United States apparently 
sought to deny the Soviets easy access to information about 
some low-level U.S. tests. 118 The Soviets would not neces-
sarily pick up data regarding these tests through teleseismic 
monitoring, but sophisticated NRDC-SAS stations ringing 
the Nevada Test Site would end this secrecy and probably 
give the Soviets information not only about the existence of 
such tests, 119 but about test yields as well. 
With this information in mind, the Model I analyst can 
explain why the U.S. Government quickly granted the NRDC 
export license application, but denied the Soviets permission 
to go to Nevada under the terms they sought. On balance, 
the United States wanted seismic data from Kazakhstan-
data to confirm Soviet adherence to the moratorium and per-
haps to help resolve the bias issue-more than it feared that 
such data would be misinterpreted. But the United States 
117. /d. at 4. Indeed, the Soviets might even deliberately try to cawe 
NRDC to report false seismic data, thereby misleading the technical com-
munity with respect to the ability of such stations to detect and identify 
tests. "Opportunities to alter (falsify) [sic] technical data would depend 
upon preventive measures such as procedural and technical controls. We 
do not know enough about the NRDC/SAS operational plans and equip-
ment to speak definitively to this point." DOE Memorandum, supra note 
101, at cover letter. 
118. According to "one federal official," the Government now classifies 
tests with yields less than five kt. Broad, Some Atomic Tests Being Kept Stcrtl 
by Administration, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 3. In january 1988, 
an NRDC study revealed that the U.S. had concealed at least 117 nuclear 
explosions at the Nevada Test Site, 20% of the total number of tests, and 
that nearly all of the secret tests had yields smaller than 1 kiloton. Broad, 
Seismic Data Show 117 Secret U.S. Atom Tests, N.Y. Times, jan. 13, 1988, at 1, 
coL 3. 
119. An official at Livermore National Laboratory has suggested that the 
Soviets already know about the existence of every U.S. test becawe each 
one requires the movement of hundreds of technicians and many vans, 
and the Soviets can observe these movements through satellite photogra-
phy. Broad, Some Atomic Tests Being Kept Secret by Administration, supra note 
118. 
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did not want the Soviets to have stations at the Nevada Test 
Site. The Soviets had urged NRDC to install equipment in 
Kazakhstan right away, but were not planning a reciprocal 
visit until three months later. By expediting the export li-
cense, the United States could obtain data from the Soviet 
Union for three months, including recordings of tests in Ne-
vada, before having to tip its hand regarding the Soviet visas. 
Then the United States could deny the visas (or impose con-
ditions likely to be unacceptable) so that the stations in Ne-
vada would never be established. The Soviets might close 
down the Kazakhstan stations in retaliation, but the United 
States would already have data from those stations. 
This "first pass" Model I explanation, however, does 
not withstand closer analysis. First, the Soviets did not have 
the same need for the Nevada data that the United States had 
for the Kazakhstan data. The U.S. Geological Survey main-
tains a network of unclassified seismic stations throughout 
the country and publishes the data it collects. Some of these 
stations are closer to the Nevada Test Site than the NRDC 
stations are to the Semipalatinsk test site. 120 Even if the So-
viets wanted data on the number and yields of all U.S. tests 
and were not able to get such information from published 
sources, denying or conditioning the Soviet visas would not 
effectively deny them the information. The NRDC would be 
able to set up the stations on its own and simply provide the 
data to the Soviets}21 
120. Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, Research and Design Engi-
neer, Seismological Laboratory, University of Nevada-Reno (April 21, 
1987). These stations pick up most U.S. tests, whether announced or 
unannounced. The stations do not, however, detect the very smallest tests 
that the more sophisticated NRDC-SAS equipment would surely registe1·. 
From 1980 to 1984, the United States conducted between four and eleven 
unannounced tests which were not detected by any unclassified monitor-
ing system. T. CoCHRAN, R. NORRIS, W. ARKIN & M. HOENIG, UNAN· 
NOUNCED U.S. NucLEAR WEAPONS TEsTs, 1980-1984 (Nuclear Weapons 
Databook Working Paper 86-1,January 1986). 
121. The NRDC might have chosen not to do so. After all, the discom-
fort with the appearance of unilaterally aiding the Soviets led Cochran to a 
seismology exchange rather than a Nevada Test Site monitoring project in 
the first place. The fact that the Soviets were supplying data to the NRDC, 
however, meant that it did not seem unpatriotic for the NRDC to supply 
data to the Soviets, and the NRDC did in fact plan to operate the stations 
without the Soviets after the visa incident. 
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In addition, since the United States did offer to let the 
Soviets go to Nevada if they also observed a U.S. test and 
measured its yield, the United States could not have been 
very fearful of Soviet monitoring of the Nevada site. The So-
viets might have accepted the condition and established their 
Nevada stations while also obtaining additional nonseismic 
information. This additional unsought-after data would in 
no way reduce the quality of the seismic information they 
later obtained. Finally, the "first pass" explanation cannot 
account for the granting of the station permits, enabling 
NRDC to emplace the seismic stations on federal land so that 
it could provide the Soviets with the data. 
A second, somewhat different version of this explana-
tion of the U.S. ·response takes public opinion into account. 
The dealings among NRDC, the Soviet Academy, and the 
U.S. Government were hardly taking place in a sealed cham-
ber. Indeed, the negotiations were widely reported in the 
press. 122 All facts considered, it is reasonable to posit that 
the United States preferred that the NRDC project not be 
carried out (because the disadvantages of obtaining mislead-
ing data, generating unwarranted public enthusiasm for a 
CTB, and exposing secret U.S. tests outweighed the intelli-
gence value of the data that would be collected from the So-
viet Union). Nevertheless, the United States wanted the So-
viet Government, rather than the U.S. Government, to be 
blamed in the court of world opinion for the failure of the 
NRDC effort. In that event, a good U.S. strategy might have 
been to appear to be fully cooperative with the venture, by 
granting the export licenses, imposing only reasonable con-
ditions on the Soviet visas, and granting the station permits. 
Regarding the visas, the United States might even have of-
fered the Soviets an invitation that appeared to give them 
more access to Nevada than the Soviets originally sought, so 
that the Soviets could not persuasively claim that the United 
States was denying them the right to participate in the seis-
mology exchange. If the United States could be confident 
that the Soviets would reject both sets of conditions imposed 
upon them, at least one of which appeared reasonable, the 
United States could torpedo the project without taking the 
public heat for doing so. 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
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The attractiveness of this explanation depends, how-
ever, on U.S. confidence that the Soviets would in fact reject 
both offers, and if they did reject the offers, they could not 
successfully characterize the U.S. response as a thinly dis-
guised refusal of the visas. Both assumptions are sufficiently 
weak as to cast doubt on this theory of U.S. motivation. 
While dependence on NRDC to provide the seismic data was 
obviously less attractive to the Soviets than being able to op-
erate stations in Nevada, the dependence was nevertheless 
better than nothing. The Soviets had no reason to think that 
NRDC would provide less than full and accurate data (partic-
ularly since simultaneously recorded U.S. Geological Survey 
data might reveal any gaps). Furthermore, the Soviets under 
General Secretary Gorbachev had proved particularly adept 
at test ban public relations, and the United States could not 
confidently have counted on packaging a rejection as a gen-
erous offer. 
A third and somewhat more sophisticated variant of the 
Model I analysis focuses on the CORRTEX issue. By 1976, 
when the PNE Treaty was signed, U.S. scientists had devel-
oped an electronic sensing device that would be used as one 
step in a process to measure the yields of Soviet peaceful ex-
plosions which qualified for U.S. monitoring under the Pro-
tocol to that treaty.l23 Between 1976 and 1981, scientists at 
123. Hearings/Exec N/95, supra note 48, at 92 (testimony of Alfred D. 
Starbird, Assistant Administrator for National Security, Energy Research 
and Development Administration). The Protocol provided that for any 
"peaceful" nuclear explosion (one conducted away from a designated 
weapons test site) consisting of individual blasts, each of which was below 
150 kt in yield but which, in the aggregate, exceeded 150 kt, the party 
carrying out the explosion had to notify the other party in advance and to 
permit it to make its own on-site measurements of yield. Protocol to the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, art. VI, reprinted in U.S. ARMS CoN-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 43, at 179-87. No SUCh re-
quirements were imposed under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Possible 
explanations for the different approaches to verification in these two com-
panion treaties are (1) that tests at designated test sites could easily be the 
subject of focused intelligence efforts, such as satellite photography, 
whereas tests at other locations in the Soviet Union require special verifi-
cation techniques, and (2) that the detailed procedures of the Peaceful Nu-
clear Explosions Treaty's Protocol took two years to negotiate, whereas 
President Nixon, in the midst of the Watergate crisis, wanted a treaty with 
the Soviet Union which could be negotiated quickly. The procedures of 
the PNE Treaty were never used because the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 
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Los Alamos National Laboratory refined this device into a 
system called CORRTEX. 124 National technical means of 
verification were initially considered adequate with regard to 
both the TTB Treaty and explosions under 150 kt carried 
out within the PNE Treaty. The Reagan Administration, 
however, decided in 1982 that the TTB and PNE Protocols 
were inadequate, and that the two treaties should not be rati-
fied unless the Soviets agreed to modify them to provide for 
"direct, accurate" measurements of the yields of tests even at 
nuclear test sites. 125 The Soviets, however, showed no inter-
est in renegotiating the treaties they had signed in the 
1970's. 
In 1984, President Reagan attempted to edge the Sovi-
ets closer to accepting a modification of the treaties to allow 
CORRTEX measurements by proposing that the United 
States and the Soviet Union observe a nuclear test at each 
other's test site. 126 When the Soviets did not respond to this 
overture, the President in 1985 offered the Soviets a unilat-
not having been ratified, has not entered into force. Even if the Treaty 
had entered into force, these verification procedures might never be used 
because the Soviets might not conduct any explosions with aggregate 
yields in excess of 150 kt away from designated test sites. 
124. The acronym stands for Continuous Reflectometry for Radius ver-
sus Time Experiments. These experiments consist of an electronic unit, a 
small computer, and one or more coaxial cables. The cables are lowered 
into a hole drilled into the earth relatively near the hole through which the 
explosive device was placed. The device sends a rapid series of electronic 
pulses through the cable. As the shock wave produced by the explosion 
travels the length of the cable, it short circuits the cable at distances pro-
gressively closer to the electronic device. These distances are measured 
by the speed with which the pulses are reflected by the short-circuit and 
return to the electronic device. The faster the cable is destroyed, the 
greater the yield of the explosion. The computer quickly shows the rate of 
disintegration of the cable and the approximate yield of the blast. U.S. 
DEPT. oF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATioNs OFFICE & Los AuMos NATIONAL 
LABORATORY, CORRTEX (1986) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NE-
VADA OPERATIONS OFFICE] (brochure). The brochure adds that "[a]ll 
equipment for power, recording, and data reduction can easily fit into a 
small trailer." For a more technical description, see Deupree, Eilers, Mc-
Kown & Storey, CORRTEX: A Compact and l'ersatile System for Time Domain 
Rejlectomelry, in INSTRUMENTATION IN THE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY & ADVANCES 
IN TEST MEASUREMENT: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 26TH INTERNATIONAL INSTRU-
MENTATION SYMPOSIUM (1981). 
125. REPORT, supra note 54, at 6, 8. 
126. SPECIAL REPORT No. 150, supra note 62. 
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eral VISit to the U.S. test site in Nevada to observe a 
CORRTEX demonstration. 127 Still the Soviets did not re-
spond. In early 1986, however, the Soviets did agree to a 
series of meetings in Geneva to discuss test ban issues. 
These meetings gave the United States another forum in 
which to try to interest the Soviets in CORRTEX, "but it was 
clear the two sides had conflicting purposes-the United 
States wanted to deal with verification proposals and the So-
viets wanted to talk about a complete ban."l28 
This frustrating effort by the United States to persuade 
the Soviets to modify the TTB Treaty suggests a CORRTEX-
related theory of why the United States quickly granted the 
NRDC its requested export licenses but conditioned the 
visas of the Soviet scientists. The U.S. Government may 
have wanted the NRDC project to fail (because the costs in 
terms of optimistic interpretations of data and revelation of 
U.S. testing outweighed the benefits of seismic data collec-
tion), but the value of moving the Soviets a step closer to 
accepting CORRTEX would have been very great-great 
enough, at least, to make attractive to the United States a 
package that included both the NRDC project and Soviet 
participation in a CORRTEX demonstration. 129 
But this explanation, too, has its gaps. If the United 
States really wanted to use Soviet interest in the NRDC pro-
ject to impose pressure to observe a nuclear test and 
CORRTEX demonstration, it could have focused the pres-
sure more clearly by stating as a policy that the entire NRDC 
127. !d. Technically, the President did not insist that the Soviets ob-
serve CORRTEX. He offered to let them watch a CORRTEX demonstra· 
tion or to use a non-seismic method of their own choosing to make direct 
yield measurements of a U.S. nuclear test. !d. 
128. REPORT, supra note 54, at 6. 
129. This participation might not only lead, eventually, to better verifi-
cation of the TTB Treaty, but it might tarnish the image the Soviets had 
tried to create during their self-proclaimed moratorium, an image of not 
wanting to dirty their hands by having anything to do with nuclear tests. 
Observing a U.S. test might not appear to third world countries to be as 
negative an act as ending their moratorium, but to countries that per-
ceived the world in terms of a North-South struggle, superpower coopera-
tion in nuclear weapons testing might tend to discredit the observer along 
with the observed. This problem of public relations could, of course, be 
one of the reasons why the Soviets showed so little interest in President 
Reagan's repeated offers to observe a U.S. nuclear weapon test. 
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project would only be allowed to go forward in the context 
of Soviet acceptance of President Reagan's standing offer. 
To have conditioned all three necessary ingredients-the ex-
port license, the visas, and the station permits-on Soviet ac-
ceptance of the package would have been more logical. In 
that case, the United States would neither have expedited the 
export licenses unconditionally nor offered the Soviets the 
option of working with NRDC on the project in states other 
than Nevada. 130 
This explanation is hard pressed to account for the 
speed with which the export license was granted, and like all 
130. Furthermore, a policy of using the NRDC project to force the Sovi-
ets to observe a U.S. test created a significant public relations risk. The 
Soviets might accept the offer to view a test in a way that made the United 
States appear to be interested in creating nuclear explosions and the So-
viet government interested in ending them. For example, the Soviets 
might announce that they were visiting the test site most reluctantly, be-
cause they opposed continued nuclear testing and were only doing so be-
cause the United States had forced them to observe a weapons test as a 
condition of being allowed to participate in a scientific exchange designed 
to demonstrate the feasibility of banning all nuclear tests. From a U.S. 
point of view, any such short-term propaganda victory for the Soviets 
might be outweighed by the verification gains if the Soviets, having seen 
CORRTEX in operation, embraced it. But that a demonstration would 
make a significant difference in the Soviet attitude toward CORRTEX 
seems unlikely; after all, Soviet scientists had already had ample opportu-
nity to learn about it by reading the open literature on the device. 
The reason the Soviets were so negative regarding this device is un-
clear, but two possible explanations exist. First, they may have felt in-
sulted that the United States demanded additional verification measures 
(particularly in a climate of U.S. accusations about "likely" violations) after 
both countries had long ago signed a treaty which did not provide for such 
measures. Second, the use of CORRTEX to measure the yields of Soviet 
nuclear tests would require a team of fifteen Americans drilling holes and 
operating electronic equipment on the Soviet nuclear test site ("a few tens 
of feet from the emplacement hole") before, during, and immediately after 
Soviet tests. In many ways, "onsite" CORRTEX inspections would be far 
more intrusive than onsite inspections under a CTB, because under a CTB 
regime, no testing would be legitimate, and an inspecting country would 
only look at a wilderness area where a suspicious event had occurred, not 
at a nuclear weapons test itself. The Soviets may not have had confidence 
that their counter-intelligence equipment and procedures could insure 
that CORRTEX observers and equipment monitored only yields and not 
radioactive by-products or other indications of the purpose or nature of 
nuclear tests. Hearings/Exec N/100, supra note 106, at 20 (testimony of 
Robert B. Barker, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy)); 
U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE, supra note 124, at 2. 
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of the other Model I explanations, it cannot begin to account 
for the' granting of the station permits.l31 If governments 
are rational actors, the Soviets had some reasons for wanting 
to establish seismic stations in Nevada. If it were also in the 
U.S. interest to let the Soviets do so, unconditional grants of 
visas would have seemed in order. If, on the other hand, let-
ting the Soviets have stations in Nevada were not in the U.S. 
interest, or were in the U.S. interest only if the Soviets also 
observed a CORRTEX demonstration, denying or condi-
tioning the station permits would have made more sense 
than denying or conditioning the visas. With NRDC help, 
the Soviets would be able to select sites and obtain data with-
out physically setting foot in Nevada, but if permission to 
construct the stations had been denied, neither NRDC nor 
the Soviets could have continued to pursue the Nevada end 
of the seismic verification project. 
IV. MODEL II 
To the analyst using Model II, the "U.S. Government" 
barely exists. A "government consists of a conglomerate of 
semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a sub-
stantial life of its own." 132 Each of these organizations 
works, to a large extent, independently of the others, 
although their outputs are "partially coordinated by govern-
ment leaders." 133 The behavior of each organization is de-
termined primarily by pre-established routines, and explana-
tion of governmental behavior "starts from this base line, 
noting incremental deviations." 134 Thus, national govern-
ments are not in fact "national," and their conduct cannot be 
well understood without penetrating the veneer of govern-
mental unity and looking at the conduct of particular agen-
131. Other observers of the Government's reaction to the NRDC pro-
ject, applying Model I reasoning, have concluded that the United States 
was inconsistent because of its "unease," Garelik, The Grounds for a Test Ban 
Treaty, DISCOVER, June 1987, at 50, 58, or because it was "ambivalent," 
Goldman, Gallis & Voas, Verifying Arms Control Agreements: The Soviet 
View 122 n.25 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 87-316F, at 
73-74, prepared for the Subcomm. on Arms Control of the Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, April 10, 1987). 
132. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 67. 
133. !d. 
134. Id. at 68. 
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cie~ or departments. Consideration of more than one such 
agency is usually necessary. The various aspects of a prob-
lem must be delegated to particular offices which were previ-
ously given primary responsibility for, and "primary power" 
over, an area oflife (such as diplomacy, or military readiness, 
or intelligence) .1ss 
Governmental behavior is not necessarily "rational," 
either. The organizations that are the true decision-makers 
do not look at all aspects of a problem and then carefully 
canvass all available options in order to maximize utility ac-
cording to a long-range pfan for achieving considered and 
agreed goals. Instead, these organizations tend to focus pri-
marily on only those aspects of the problem for which they 
have responsibility, and even when an agency considers 
more than one piece of a problem, it looks at the pieces one 
by one. Agencies also tend to attempt solutions that are 
"good enough" rather than those that are necessarily the 
best. These solutions may be directed not to the "national 
interest" or even to the goals of the highest leaders of gov-
ernment. An agency's central concerns may be oriented 
around maintaining "organizational health" by avoiding de-
creases in budgets, limitations on personnel, or encroach-
ments by other agencies on the agency's mission.136 Perhaps 
most importandy, the organizations operate almost exclu-
sively by "standard operating procedures" (SOPs) rather 
than by tailoring action to the needs of each situation, be-
cause SOPs "permit concerted action by large numbers of 
individuals, each responding to basic cues." 137 
To the Model II analyst, leaders appear to play only spe-
cialized, severely bounded roles. Leadership decisions are 
confined by the bureaucratic outputs of various organiza-
tions, which are themselves limited by those organizations' 
own constraints, capabilities, and SOPs. In Model II, "ex-
isting organizational routines for employing present physical 
capabilities constitute the range of effective choice open to 
135. /d. at 80. 
136. /d. at 71-72, 82. 
137. /d. at 83. Although Allison does not make the point, a positive fea-
ture of governmental use of SOPs is that in situations affecting individuals 
or corporations, standard responses are consistent with the notion of 
"equal protection under law"; that is, oflike cases receiving similar treat-
ment. 
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government leaders confronted with any problem." 1 ~1s 
Given this system, the "organizational outputs structure the 
situation within the narrow constraints of which leaders must 
make their 'decisions' ... the formal choice of the leaders is 
frequently anti-climactic." 139 
In Allison's characterization of Model II, law plays only 
a minor role. Allison mentions the law only once in his para-
digm for Model II, when he says that the "set of constraints 
[affecting an organization's goals] emerges from a mix of the 
expectations and demands of other organizations in the gov-
ernment, statutory authority, demands from citizens and spe-
cial interest groups, and bargaining within the organiza-
tion." 140 That the law must, at least some of the time, signif-
icantly affect SOPs and, as a result, significantly influence 
decisional outcomes, seems evident. 
Allison's evidence for the validity of Model II analysis, 
based on his study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, is striking, for 
Model II resolves some riddles of that event that Model I 
cannot begin to answer. For example, given the fact that the 
Soviets were trying to deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba 
secretly, before the United States could discover their pres-
ence, Model I has a difficult time explaining why, after the 
missiles were delivered to Cuba in a clandestine manner, 
their sites were set up in a way that virtually advertised their 
presence. The surface-to-air missiles defending each site 
were positioned in the same trapezoidal pattern in which sur-
face-to-air missiles were arrayed around strategic missiles in 
the Soviet Union. Each site had four rocket launchers, as in 
the Soviet Union. The sites were not camouflaged until after 
the United States announced it had discovered the missiles. 
The Russian troops wore civilian clothing when they arrived 
at Cuban docks, but they formed in ranks of four to go to 
their truck convoys and decorated their barrack areas with 
insignia including the Red Army Star.t41 
Model II can account for this "irrational" behavior. The 
equipment was transported to Cuban shores by a Soviet mili-
138. !d. at 79. 
139. !d. This statement is a somewhat oversimplified summary of Al-
lison's paradigm. For the complete statement, see id. at 78-96. 
140. !d. at 82 (emphasis added). 
141. /d. at 106-09. 
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tary intelligence agency which was accustomed to secretive 
procedures. Upon delivery, however, the equipment became 
the responsibility of the Soviet Air Defense Command and 
the Strategic Rocket Forces, which had no SOPs for secret 
operations. The Air Defense Command constructed surface-
to-air missile emplacements just as it had always done-in a 
trapezoidal pattern. The Strategic Rocket Forces put four 
launchers on a site because "literally according to the book" 
a strategic rocket site is supposed to have four launchers. 
Missile sites were not camouflaged because they were not 
camouflaged in the Soviet Union. The regiments of soldiers 
behaved exactly as they had been trained.l42 
U.S. Governmental conduct is also clarified by Model II 
analysis. On October 4, 1962, after the Kennedy Adminis-
tration learned that a CIA agent had seen what looked like a 
strategic missile in Cuba, the Committee on Overhead Re-
connaissance, which had responsibility for U-2 overflights, 
decided to send a plane over the island. But the flight did 
not take place for ten more days. The delay cannot be ex-
plained in terms of maximizing national utility. The delay 
can be understood, however, in terms of a battle between the 
Air Force and the CIA over whose pilots would fly the mis-
sion. For the Air Force to win the fight (arguing that if a 
plane were shot down, the pilot would be safer in uniform) 
took five days. A second five days were lost apparently be-
cause the Air Force pilot had to be trained to fly the CIA's 
modified version of the U-2 plane.t43 
Applying this model of organizational processes to the 
U.S. Government's response to the NRDC seismic verifica-
tion project, the first step is to note that there was no unified 
142. !d. at 110-12. 
143. !d. at 122-23. Allison offers many other examples showing the in-
fluence of turf battles and standard operating procedures having more in-
fluence than leadership decisions on governmental behavior during the 
crisis. A few months earlier, for instance, Secretary of Defense McNamara 
had stated that in a nuclear war, the United States would launch its weap-
ons at Soviet military sites, rather than cities, to encourage the Soviet 
Union to do likewise. Yet at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, follow-
ing that organization's SOPs, the head of the Strategic Air Command dis-
persed his B-47 bombers with nuclear weapons to civilian airports across 
the country, even to southeastern cities within the range of Soviet missiles 
in Cuba that had already become operational. !d. at 138-39. 
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"U.S. Government response," but only responses of particu-
lar agencies or groups of agencies, linked loosely by liaison 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the responses that occurred 
were not reactions to "the NRDC project," but only to par-
ticular aspects of that project--export, visas, or construction 
of the stations. Although NRDC initially described the over-
all nature of its project to a senior government official, 144 the 
"government" never planned a unified, coherent policy ap-
proach to all aspects of the NRDC project. The Govern-
ment's "response" was easily split, partly because, depend-
ing on the stage of the project, different agencies had pri-
mary responsibility for dealing with the NRDC, and partly 
because the NRDC's project calendar required it to apply for 
the various government licenses at separate times, months 
apart. Looking at each aspect of the project as an isolated 
part then becomes necessary. 
A. The Export License 
In june, 1986, expected waiting time for a license to ex-
port controlled goods to the Soviet Union was sixty days 145 
even when the level of technology was relatively low. The 
NRDC application was granted on June 24, a mere four 
working days after it was filed. Several questions arise re-
garding this license. Why was it granted at all? Why did it 
144. NRDC project co-director Dr. Thomas Cochran met with Deputy 
Secretary of State John Whitehead on February 20, 1986, and again on 
June 3, 1986 (immediately upon returning from Moscow), to brief him on 
the project. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran in Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 5, 1987). 
145. Estimate of Paul Freedenberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce 
for Trade Administration, quoted in Sfiligoj, Government Export License Propo-
sal to Reduce Response Time by Half, AMERICAN METAL MARKET/METALWORK-
ING NEws, June 23, 1986, at 5, 38. Secretary Freedenberg's estimate may 
have been low; a 1986law review note puts the average West-East process-
ing time at 192 working days. Note, Trade Regulation-Export Controls, 16 
GA.]. INT'L & CoMP. L. 197, 202 (1986). But the Note cites a 1983 mono-
graph as its authority, and Commerce probably improved its performance 
between 1983 and 1986. The Freedenberg estimate is supported by a 
Commerce Department official who works in the lower ranks of the Office 
of Export Administration. Interview with Donald Hammond, Office of 
Technology and Policy Analysis, International Trade Administration, De-
partment of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (April 27, 1987) (estimating 
60 days as normal processing time for the level of technology involved in 
the first NRDC export). 
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take as much as four working days? Why did it take only four 
working days? 
Exports ofU.S. equipment to foreign countries are gov-
erned by the Export Administration Act of 1979, as 
amended. 146 The Act has multiple, sometimes contradictory 
purposes-to facilitate exports by U.S. businesses, to further 
U.S. foreign policy, and to protect national security.147 The 
Act assigns to the Department of Commerce principal re-
sponsibility for achieving these objectives, and it provides for 
a licensing scheme as the primary device for regulating the 
export of sensitive technology. 148 The Department main-
tains a "control list" of types of goods and information 
which cannot be exported to other countries without a li-
cense.149 If an item appears on the list, no person in the 
United States may take the item to another country without a 
license from the Department--either a "general license" 
(permission under regulations to send the item to certain 
countries but not others) or a "validated license" (a piece of 
paper authorizing a particular export). 150 As a practical mat-
ter, with only a "few minor exceptions," all exports of U.S. 
goods and technology require one type of license or the 
other.l5l 
Certain types of equipment could be of some military or 
intelligence value to a potential enemy of the United States. 
These items, selected jointly by the Defense and Commerce 
Departments, are designated on the control list as subject to 
national security controls. 152 In addition, the Act permits 
the President to "prohibit or curtail the exportation of any 
146. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401 et seq. {West 1985 & Supp. 1988). 
147. Id. §§ 2401, 2402, 2404, 2405. 
148. /d. §§ 2403, 2409{a){1), 2415{8). 
149. Id. § 2403{b). 
150. /d. § 2403{a). For an overview of the statutory plan, sec Evrard, 
The Export Administration Act of 1979: Anal)·sis of its Major Provisions and Potm-
lial Impact on United States Exporters, 12 CAL. W. lNT'L LJ. 1 (1982}. 
151. Flowe, Export Licensing of Computer Equipment and Technology-A Practi-
tioner's Perspective, 10 N.CJ. lNT'L L. & CoM. REG. 633, 635 (1985). Thus, 
even the baggage that a tourist takes on a Western European vacation 
must be licensed, although in this case, the "exporter" need not apply for 
a particular "validated license" because ordinary baggage is covered 
under a General License called, appropriately enough, "BAGGAGE." 15 
C.F.R. § 371.6 (1988). 
152. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2404 {West Supp. 1985). 
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goods ... to the extent necessary to further significantly the 
foreign policy of the United States," 153 subject to certain 
procedural constraints. These "foreign policy controls" can 
only be imposed if the President (or an appropriate official 
exercising delegated power) consults "at the earliest possible 
opportunity" with other countries "with which the United 
States maintains export controls cooperatively," and with 
two statutorily designated Congressional committees. Fur-
ther, foreign policy controls may not be imposed until after 
Congress has been sent a written report indicating, among 
other things, how they will further U.S. foreign policy. The 
written report must be followed, within a year, by oral testi-
mony about those controls to the two committees which had 
to be consulted in advance. 154 In addition, foreign policy 
controls must be indicated on the control list. 155 
Numerous government offices deal with the export li-
cense process. In the Department of Commerce, the Office 
of Export Administration (OEA) includes twenty-four offices 
staffed by "230 licensing officers and other profession-
als."156 The Department receives about 140,000 applica-
tions a year, 157 requiring a high degree of standardization in 
processing. The applications are screened to determine 
whether they must be referred to other agencies. If an appli-
cation pertains to an item and destination controlled for pur-
poses of national security, OEA refers it to the Department 
of Defense.158 Similarly, if an item is subject to foreign pol-
icy controls, it is reviewed by the Department of State, and 
the State Department additionally has a statutory right to re-
view "any" application. 159 If other agencies are entitled to 
or ask to review an application, the referrals must take place 
within twenty days, and the other agencies have twenty days 
after receipt in which to respond, although they may, at the 
end of that time, routinely request a further twenty-day ex-
153. /d. § 2405(a)(1). 
154. /d. § 2405(d), (f). 
155. !d. § 2405(1). 
156. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OVERVIEW OF THE EXPORT ADMIN-
ISTRATION PROGRAM at iv, 1 (1985). 
157. !d. at 15. 
158. Flowe, supra note 151, at 638. 
159. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(a)(l), (a)(5). 
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tension. 160 Then, within sixty days after receiving the rec-
ommendations of other agencies, OEA must grant or deny 
the license, subject to appeal. 161 Thus, under the statutory 
plan, OEA must grant or deny licenses within five months 
after application is made. 
Although, in practice, these "time limits are often not 
adhered to,"162 OEA does manage to process most cases 
within five months. In fact, by 1986 the processing time for 
West-East transfers had been reduced to sixty days.I63 Typi-
cally much of the delay in processing time is due to the inter-
nal procedures of the agencies to which the OEA refers ap-
plications for comment. For example, at the Department of 
Defense, applications referred by OEA are received at the 
Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), an 
agency with seven "directorates" of its own. 164 Upon re-
ceipt, the application is logged into a computer system and 
then 
assigned to a technical expert who assesses the im-
pact of the proposed export on national security. 
The export regulations[,] . . . technical data, per-
sonal knowledge, recommendations on previous 
cases, intelligence reports, and consultations with 
the military services and/or the applicant are all 
used in this assessment. . . . The case then under-
goes a policy review which considers the technical 
assessment as well as other pertinent information 
on which a final DOD position is based.I65 
If DTSA, speaking for the Department of Defense, disagrees 
with the conclusions of the OEA staff, an interagency meet-
ing must be held to resolve the differences. According to the 
Department of Defense, in such meetings it "frequently finds 
itself advocating its position ... in isolation. Often the other 
participating agencies will challenge DoD's national security-
based objections with arguments of foreign policy or com-
160. Id. § 2409(e). 
161. Id. § 2409(£). 
162. Flowe, supra note 151, at 658. 
163. See supra note 146. 
164. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE TECHNOLOGY SECUR-
ITY PROGRAM, A REPORT TO THE 99TH CoNGRESs, 2o SESs. 4 (1986). 
165. Id. at 34. 
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mercia! competitiveness." 166 
When the NRDC applied for its export license in June 
1986, OEA had primary responsibility for evaluating there-
quest. In addition, if any of the items to be exported to the 
Soviet Union were listed on the control list for national se-
curity reasons, DTSA would also contribute to this review. 
The NRDC's license application listed eleven models of 
equipment that it wanted to install in Kazakhstan. 167 Eight 
of the eleven models consisted of seismometers, a drum re-
corder, an oscilloscope, a frequency counter, and a sweep 
function generator. The control list included a listing for 
"electronic and precision instruments specially designed or 
modified for geophysicial or mineral prospecting, 168 but this 
listing did not apply to the seismometers the NRDC pro-
posed to export. These particular instruments were "off the 
shelf items designed for multiple purposes (including earth-
quake monitoring)" and had not been "specially designed" 
for prospecting. 169 This category did not fit the seismome-
ters, and no listing covered drum recorders, oscilloscopes, 
frequency counters, or sweep function generators. 170 There-
fore, these eight models of equipment were all swept up in a 
catch-all category, numbered "6599G," entitled "other elec-
tronic and precision instruments, including photographic 
equipment and film." For items in this category, individually 
validated licenses are necessary only for exports to country 
groups "S" and "Z"; Libya, Cuba, Kampuchea, North Korea, 
and Viet Nam, and for exports to military or police entities in 
166. !d. at 38. 
167. Rider A to NRDC Export License Application 001 Qune 16, 1986). 
The application covered 33 pieces of equipment, but there were several 
multiples of the same model. 
168. International Trade Admin. Commodity Control List, 15 C.F.R. 
§ 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 6598F (1986) [hereinafter ITA Control List] 
(amended by 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 6598F (1988), which removes 
such electronic equipment from control). Exports to the Soviet Union of 
goods fitting within this listing were subject to "foreign policy" controls. 
/d. If the seismometers had fit this description, the State Department 
would have had to pass on the application, and the government might 
have had discretion to deny it. 
169. Telephone interview withjohn Vema, Office of Export Licensing, 
Department of Commerce Qune 15, 1987). Mr. Vema processed the 
NRDC application. 
170. See ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1. 
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South Africa and Namibia. 171 For these eight types of equip-
ment, therefore, the NRDC was not required to apply for ex-
plicit permission at all. 
The three other types of items were a "DCS-302 Event 
Recorder," an "SMR-104 lab playback system," and an 
"SMR-102 field playback system," all manufactured by Terra 
Technology Corporation.172 These items use cassette tapes 
to receive and record information from seismometers and to 
plot the data on special paper; the information can also be 
played from the tapes into a computer for further analysis.173 
They are therefore "recording or reproducing equipment," 
within the meaning of Section 1572A of the Control List.17-t 
A digital tape recorder is exempt from export licensing if it 
uses a "tape width not exceeding 1/4 inch" and packs its 
data at a "density not exceeding 800 [bits per inch]." 175 But 
the DCS-302 event recorder the NRDC wanted to employ, 
while using quarter-inch tape, was able to record 1200 bits 
per inch, and was therefore subject to controls. 17G On the 
other hand, the regulations also provide that for exports to 
"Country Group Y" (which includes the Soviet Union), 
"[l]icenses are likely to be approved for export to satisfactory 
end-users . . . [of d]igital magnetic recorders specially 
designed for seismic/geophysical applications and operating 
in the frequency range of 5 to 800 Hz." 177 The DCS-302 
records at 50 to 600 Hz, so while a license was required, it 
would be granted for exports to the Soviet Union as long as 
171. ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 6599G. 
172. NRDC Export Application 001, Rider A, supra note 164. 
173. Brochures of Terra Technology Corp., Seattle, Wa. 
174. ITA Contol List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A. The 
Control List defines this category to include all such equipment, subject to 
a few specific exceptions such as non digital tape recorders designed for 
voice or music. /d. § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A{a)(i). 
175. ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A, 
Note 2{c){6). 
176. Handwritten, undated notes of Donald Hammond, OEA, supplied 
to the author by NRDC attorney David Wirth. 
177. ITA Control List, supra note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A, Ad-
visory Note 5(e) (1986). The most recent C.F.R. revision renames Group 
Y countries as Group Q,W.Y. While Group Q,W.Y. contains more coun-
tries, both groups include the Soviet Union, id. § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 
1572A, Advisory Note 5(c) (1988). 
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the end-user was acceptable. 178 In this case, the end-user 
was the NRDC itself, and the license application specified 
that "this equipment will remain under the ownership and 
control of U.S. citizens at all times [and] will not be con-
signed or sold." 
In light of Model II two questions can be anwered about 
the NRDC license: why it was granted, and why it took as 
long as six days. The license application was filed with OEA 
in the Department of Commerce, and there it underwent a 
point-by-point comparison with the control list. OEA 
learned from this review that most of the items on the appli-
cation were ones for which no approval was needed, and that 
with respect to the items for which a license was needed 
under Section 1572A, the regulations mandated that for an 
American end-user who proposed to bring the equipment 
back to the United States when the work was done, an export 
license should be granted. NRDC got its license because, for 
this equipment, a license would have been granted to any 
American proposing to use it in the Soviet Union. The con-
trol list established the standard routines of OEA and of the 
other agencies that advised it, routines that were used 
thousands of times a year. These regulations and routines 
did not distinguish between exports that advanced verifica-
tion of nuclear test ban treaties and those that did not, or 
between those that encouraged investigation of CORRTEX 
and those that did not. Indeed, to the standard procedures 
of OEA and the other relevant agencies, the fact that this 
exporter's purpose was to demonstrate seismic verification 
of restraints on nuclear testing was profoundly irrelevant. 
While the Secretary of State can review any export li-
cense application, 179 the law apparently provides that for-
eign policy control may only be exercised if it is made part of 
the regulations. The IT A Control List describes the controls 
on the recording equipment NRDC wanted to use as for na-
tional security rather than foreign policy purposes, render-
ing the Secretary of State powerless to block an export. 180 
178. Unacceptable Soviet end-users include, for example, plants pro-
ducing military goods. See Interview with Norman D. Kass, Defense Tech-
nology Sec. Admin., in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 10, 1987). 
179. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
180. "The Secretary shall clearly identify on the control list which goods 
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The granting of the license was fairly routine, and the 
reason why six days (four working days) were needed is ap-
parent. Under the national security controls of Section 
1572, DTSA must review the application and Commerce 
could not have granted the license instantly. Six days is 
barely time to get the application from the Commerce De-
partment's headquarters over to the Defense Department in 
Virginia, have it logged in and reviewed by the proper peo-
ple and return it to the OEA. 
The more interesting question, is not why the licensing 
took as many as six days, but why it was achieved in such a 
short time, when OEA is given by statute five months to 
make a determination and usually takes sixty days, even for a 
relatively simple West-to-East export. 1SI 
The statutes do not explain the result, but the regula-
tions are helpful, and the actual operating practices of OEA 
or technology, and which countries or destinations, are subject to which 
types of controls under this section." 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(1) (West 
Supp. 1988). In the case of listing 1572A, "national security" controls, 
and not "foreign policy" controls, are imposed. IT A Control List, s11pra 
note 168, § 399.1, Supp. 1, sec. 1572A. Therefore, while the application 
could have been received by the Department of State, such re,iew is irrele-
vant because the Department's foreign policy control could not have been 
imposed. Foreign policy controls are imposed under listing 6599, for the 
seismometers, oscilloscope, etc., but only with respect to country groups S 
and Z and not for the Soviet Union. Thus the State Department can advise 
OEA-and perhaps thereby determine-whether a proposed export of a 
seismometer to Cuba should be permitted, but is not given the same dis-
cretion with respect to exports to the Soviet Union of goods described in 
6599. As indicated supra notes 167-171, the State Department could ha,•e 
exercised considerably more discretion if the seismometers had happened 
to be of a type designed specially for mineral prospecting, for then the 
equipment would have fallen in a different category. In this case, the ap-
plication was not sent to the State Department. Telephone interview l\ith 
Pam Vigness, Exporters Assistance Division, Office of E.xport Licensing, 
Dept. of Commerce, May 26, 1987 (based on Ms. Vigness' computer 
search of the processing record for License B 130273). 
181. See mpra notes 145, 160-161 and accompanying text. The likeli-
hood of substantial delay is so great that for exports to the Soviet Union, 
the Commerce Department's regulations direct exporters not to request 
information about an application, in the absence of emergency circum-
stances, until six weeks after they mailed the application to the Depart-
ment. International Trade Administration, Export Licensing General Pol-
icy, 15 C.F.R. § 370.ll(a)(2)(iii)(B) and note following (1988). 
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are of great significance. 182 Over the years, American ex-
porters have complained bitterly about the slow treatment 
that their applications have received from the Department of 
Commerce.IB3 In response, OEA has quietly adopted a two-
track processing system, in which approximately 98% of ap-
plications are handled through the usual routines, and the 
other 2% are expedited on a special fast track, known as 
"special processing" or "emergency clearance." 184 
Formal authority for the fast track derives from a federal 
regulation 1B5 which is extremely vague. According to the 
regulation, an exporter may apply for emergency clearance, 
and if emergency handling is warranted (the regulation spec-
ifies no standards), the exporter will be notified by telephone 
when a license is granted. The regulation further provides 
182. These operating practices have been committed to writing in an 
informal operating manual of the Exporters Assistance Division of OEA. 
but the manual is not shown to the public. Part of the reason that the 
manual is not public is that it is still, after more than a year, in a process of 
development, but in addition, the Division prefers to keep it private be-
cause "if you put everything out on the table, everyone will try to use it to 
push his case through." Interview with James Truske, Exporters Assist· 
ance Division, OEA (May 28, I 987). 
183. See, e.g., Export of Alaskan Crude Oil-Foreign Policy Implications: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 361-65 (1983) (testimony of 
C.N. Winningstad, Chairman of Floating Point Systems, Inc.) (com-
plaining that the government often takes a year to process license applica-
tions, despite a (then) six-month deadline); Aerospace Industry, Machine Tools 
Industry, and Electronics Industry: Hearings Before the Subcommillee on National 
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 145-47 (1982) (testimony of Victor Ragosine, representing the 
American Electronics Association); id. at 175-78 (testimony of Robert S. 
Lovett, representing the Scientific Apparatus Makers Association); Second 
Annual judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, 104 F.R.D. 207, 298-99 (1984) (statement ofHylan B. Lyon, Texas 
Instruments, Inc.); Schatz, A Moving Modem Story, DATAMATION, July 15, 
1984, at 64; Flowe, supra note 151, at 658. 
184. Interview with James Truske, supra note 182. The 2% figure ap-
plies to cases handled from their inception on the fast track; another 3% 
are placed on the fast track after they are the subject of such delay within 
the Department that the statutory deadlines for action will soon be trig-
gered. /d. 
185. International Trade Administration Individual Validated Licenses 
and Amendments, 15 C.F.R. § 372.4(h)(i) (1988) [hereinafter ITA Individ-
ual Licenses]. 
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that a such license will expire in one to two months rather 
than the customary one year period. 
In practice, cases get onto the fast track if, as a result of 
an event beyond the exporter's control, quick licensing is 
needed. For example, if a production line in another coun-
try breaks down and an American part is needed to repair it, 
emergency clearance is warranted. However, if an exporter 
contracts to deliver merchandise at an early date, sooner 
than export licensing on the normal track would occur, 
emergency handling is not considered warranted. The 
agency takes the position that the exporter "got himself into 
it." 186 The decision to put a case on the fast track is made or 
implemented by an "emergency handling officer of the 
day," 187 one of fifteen rotating entry-level civil servants who 
form part of the staff of the Exporters Assistance Division of 
OEA. If the officer of the day believes the case to be among 
the 2% qualifying for emergency handling (a decision which 
can be overriden by the head of the Division), he or she gives 
the file a special cover page, called a Special Processing Con-
trol Record. 188 This record alerts those who handle the file, 
both in the Department of Commerce and in any agencies to 
which the matter is referred, to take the case out of the usual 
order and to expedite it as much as possible. Normally, ex-
port license cases are sent from office to office in OEA in 
batches of three to four hundred cases, every few days, and 
186. Interview with James Truske, supra note 182. Getting export li-
cense cases expedited requires mastery of intricate regulations, but under-
standing the bureaucrats and the bureaucracy is important as well. Ex-
porters who need quick treatment may hire as a consultant a Washington 
attorney or other specialist who knows the OEA bureaucrats by name and 
is deeply familiar with their regulations and written and unwritten operat-
ing procedures. The D.C. bar includes a specialized group of la\\1'ers 
whose work is to try to expedite the export license applications of firms 
from all over the United States. They make telephone calls and personal 
visits to focus the attention of OEA personnel on the cases for their clients 
and to argue the substantive case in favor of granting the license, where 
necessary. Telephone interview with Martin Kalin, one such specialist 
(Mar. 30, 1987). 
187. Telephone interview with Pam Vigness, Exporters Assistance Divi-
sion, OEA (May 26, 1987). 
188. Interview with james Truske, supra note 182. See also Berlack, Prac-
tical Tips on Obtaining Export Licenses, in 2 I. MARGUUES, THE COMMERCE 
DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON IMPORT ADMINISTRATION AND E.XPORT ADMINISTRA-
TION 1984, at 253, 277 (1984). 
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are reviewed within each office on a first-come, first-served 
basis. If a case has the Special Processing cover page, how-
ever, it is individually hand-carried to the licensing officer, 
and that officer reviews it within a day, rather than letting it 
work up through the pile of applications awaiting considera-
tion. The Exporters Assistance Staff checks with the office of 
the licensing officer two to three times a day so that as soon 
as that officer has approved the application, it can be taken to 
the next office (often the Review and Referral Unit, which 
sends copies to any other agencies that must be consulted). 
The application is, again, hand carried to this Unit if it is cov-
ered by a Special Processing form.ts9 
The NRDC application moved as quickly as it did be-
cause it was assigned to the fast track. On June 16, it was 
given Emergency Control Number 4001, and the file was 
covered by a Special Processing Control Record. 190 The file 
was moved quickly among offices. The file originated in the 
Exporters Assistance Division, where the Special Processing 
Control record was assigned, and it was immediately sent to 
the Electronic Components Division of OEA for review. 
Then the file was transmitted to the Review and Referral 
Unit which within two days of the original filing, sent it for 
concurrent review to the Department of Defense and the De-
partment of Energy. 191 These offices also expedited consid-
eration. For example, the Defense Technology Security Ad-
ministration marked its own file "Urgent," 192 and, after com-
pleting its review in two working days, DTSA received the 
application from the Review and Referral Unit of the Depart-
ment of Commerce on june 20, a Friday, and notified Com-
merce of its approval on Tuesday,June 24. 193 DTSA used its 
own "fast track" procedure for notifying the Department of 
189. Interview with James Truske, supra note 182. 
190. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Spe-
cial Processing Control Record 400 I, covering Export License Application 
B 130273 (hand dated june 16, 1986, machine dated june 18, 1986). 
191. Telephone interview with Pam Vigness, Exporters Assistance Divi-
sion, OEA (May 26, 1987). 
192. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Defense Technology Security Administra· 
tion, Export Control Case Work Sheet for Case Number B 130273 Qune 
20, 1986). 
193. U.S. Dep't of Defense, Office of Strategic Trade Policy, Case 
Processing Work Sheet for Case No. B 130273 Qune 20, 1986). 
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Commerce of its favorable recommendation. Usually, DTSA 
collects its recommendations on export license cases in 
"batches," and transmits these batches to OEA periodically. 
This application fell into batch number 705, 194 the recom-
mendations for which went in writing to the Department of 
Commerce onJuly 2, after the date by which the Soviets had 
told the NRDC it needed to have the shipments undenvay. 
But a DTSA official followed the standard procedure for 
emergency cases, telephoning OEA of DTSA's decision on 
June 24. 195 That very day, OEA notified the NRDC by tele-
phone that its application had been granted. 196 Similarly, 
the Department of Energy received its copy of the applica-
tion on June 23 and notified OEA of its approval on June 
24.197 
Although an examination of the U.S. Government's pro-
cedures for processing export license applications reveals 
that NRDC's application moved quickly because it was 
scooped up into the "fast track" procedures of the Depart-
ment of Commerce and other agencies, the documents raise 
four questions that Model II, with its focus on organizational 
routines, can not answer. First, the Special Processing Con-
trol Record is hand-dated June 16, two days before NRDC 
filed its application for a license. How can even "special" 
processing begin to deal with an application that had not yet 
been filed? Second, although attachment of a Special 
Processing Control Record can predictably lead to expedited 
consideration, we do not yet know how the NRDC project 
qualified for the fast track rather than routine treatment. In-
deed, the NRDC-SAS agreement seems to be a contractual 
arrangement of the very sort that OEA does not usually re-
gard as a legitimate case warranting expedition. 198 Third, 
the regulations specify that if emergency treatment is given 
to an application, the validity period of the license "will end 
no later than the last day of the calendar month following the 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran Uune 24, 1986) (entry for 
2:32p.m.). 
197. Telephone conversation between Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC, 
and Kathleen Vial, Department of Commerce, reflected in Daily Journal of 
Dr. Thomas Cochran Uune 24, 1986). 
198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
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month in which the license is issued unless a longer validity 
period can bejustified." 199 In this case, although NRDC did 
not request nor desire a "longer validity period" the license 
that was granted was valid for a full thirteen months.2oo 
Fourth, even if we consider the Department of Commerce's 
special processing to be normal, it does not satisfactorily ex-
plain why the case moved so swiftly through DTSA in the 
Defense Department as well, since " 'other agencies will pay 
no attention to the EC [Emergency Clearance] status of the 
application, whatsoever.' "201 
The Department of Commerce Special Processing Rec-
ord itself contains a clue to at least the first three of these 
oddities; in the "remarks" column are two handwritten nota-
tions: "RUSH STATE DEPT. REQUEST NEED BY JUNE 
2.4" and "Expedite per [Secretary of Commerce] Baldrige 
Request. " 202 But an explanation of these notations, and of 
what happened when the application arrived at the Defense 
Department, must await consideration of Model III, in which 
the discretion of individual policy makers is seen to affect the 
decisions of their government. 
B. The Visas 
As in the case of the export licensing, our question 
about the Soviet scientists' visa applications may be broken 
down into three parts. First, why was there an issue about 
the entry of the Soviet scientists? That is, was the issuance of 
visas more complicated than ministerially stamping their 
passports and, if so, how? Second, assuming that their ad-
mission was not automatic, and given the fact that their mis-
sion would tend to advance the cause of a nuclear test ban 
which the U.S. Administration did not support, why were 
they admitted at all? Finally, why was their admission subject 
to their having to choose one of two sets of conditions-ob-
servation of a CORRTEX demonstration or exclusion from 
199. ITA Individual Licenses, supra note 185, at (h)(5). 
200. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Export License B 130273 (orally granted 
June 24, 1986, written license machine datedjune 27, 1986). 
201. Berlack, supra note 188, at 278. 
202. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, supra 
note 190 (emphasis in original). 
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the areas to which they needed to go for on-site selection of 
seismic station locations? 
Like export licensing, visa issuance is heavily regulated 
by federal statutes and regulations; these statutes and regu-
lations strongly influence the day-to-day operating proce-
dures of the State Department and the Justice Depanment, 
the agencies with primary responsibilities for admitting for-
eign nationals to the United States. People (other than Ca-
nadian or certain Mexican nationals)203 who desire to enter 
the United States must have valid visas. The law distin-
guishes between immigrant visas (for those desiring to take 
up permanent residence in the United States) and nonimmi-
grant visas (for temporary visitors).204 Since the Soviet 
scientists who proposed to visit Nevada in connection with 
the NRDC-SAS project were to be temporary visitors, they 
applied for nonimmigrant visas. 
The State Department controls visas205 and therefore 
has primary regulatory authority. By statute, the State De-
partment includes a Visa Office within the Bureau of Consu-
lar Affairs.206 Consular officers of the U.S. Embassies abroad 
perform the day-to-day work of reviewing applications for 
nonimmigrant visas.2o1 
A nonimmigrant seeking to enter the United States must 
apply for one of thirteen categories ofvisa.208 Many of these 
categories were unsuitable for the NRDC project,209 but 
three categories might have been considered: the A-2 visa, 
the J-1 visa and the B-1 visa. An "A-2" visa210 can be 
granted to employees of a foreign government (other than 
diplomatic officers, who come within the scope of the "A-1" 
visa category) "who are accepted by the Secretary of 
State."211 Had the Soviets applied in this visa category, the 
203. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Documentary Require-
ment, 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.1(a), (c) (1988). 
204. 8 U.S.C.A. § 120l(a) (1977). 
205. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (1976). 
206. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1104(c) (1982). 
207. Jd. § 1201(a)(2). 
208. Jd. §§ II01(a)(15), 1201(1)(2). 
209. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a)(l5)(D) (alien crew members); 
(a)(15)(K) (alien fiances entering to marry U.S. citizens). 
210. Jd. § II01(a)(15)(A)(ii). 
211. Jd. 
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Department of State, exercising the power of the Secretary, 
would have had unlimited discretion to "accept" them; that 
is, to accept or refuse the application. But if the Soviet scien-
tists, who were employed by the Institute of the Physics of 
the Earth, had elected this option, they would have had to 
say that they were employees of the Soviet government. 
Although the Institute, like other Soviet scientific establish-
ments, obtains its budget from the Soviet state, its scientists 
do not regard themselves as government employees.21 2 To 
apply for A-2 visas, they would have had to characterize 
themselves in a disagreeable way. 
The Soviets might have considered applying for a ':J -1" 
visa, the type of visa often used for scientific exchanges. This 
type of visa is given to scholars with specialized skills coming 
to the United States "for the purpose of ... studying; ob-
serving, [or] conducting research."213 But a visa can be 
granted under this section only if the program under which 
the scholar is coming to the United States has been "desig-
nated" by the Director of the United States Information 
Agency. The NRDC-SAS program had not been so desig-
nated, and no application for designation had been made. 
The Soviet scientists therefore applied for "B-1" visas. 
B-1 visas are granted to aliens having permanent residences 
in foreign countries who are visiting the United States tem-
porarily.214 An alien in this category is entitled to a visa, 
however, only if he is not rendered ineligible by the McCar-
ran-Walter Act.21 5 This controversial216 law, passed over 
212. Cf Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC, in Washington, 
D.C. (Mar. 5, 1987). Cochran's knowledge of how Institute scientists re-
garded themselves was based on conversations with Soviet scientists over 
the course of a year. 
213. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (1970). 
214. !d.§ 1101(a)(15)(B). 
215. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, 
184-185 (1952) (ineligibility provision codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(28)(c), 
(d) (1982)). 
216. For recent criticism of the provisions pertaining to the exclusion of 
prospective visitors who believe in or advocate Communism, see, e.g., 
Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Ass'n of the Bar of 
the City of New York, Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update, 8 SETON 
HALL LEGIS.j. 249 (1985); Kalven, U.S. Visa Policy: The Machinery of Exclu-
sion, BuLLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SciENTISTS, May 1987, at 21; Kemper, Do 
Not Enter, Boston Globe, Feb. 17, 1985, Magazine at 12. 
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President Truman's veto in 1952, makes prospective visitors 
ineligible to receive nonimmigrant visas if they: 
are members of or affiliated with ... the Communist 
or any other totalitarian party of any . . . foreign 
state [or if they] advocate the economic, interna-
tional, and governmental doctrines of world com-
munism ... or [if they] are members of or [are] affil-
iated with any organization that advocates the eco-
nomic, international, and governmental doctrines 
ofworld communism .... 217 
A consular officer in the State Department post (embassy or 
consulate) at which the application is presented218 makes the 
determination of whether an applicant for a visa fits this or 
any other category of excludable alien.219 In the case of a 
person applying for a B-1 visa, the consular officer's determi-
nation is based on the information disclosed in required 
State Department Form 156, any information that U.S. Gov-
ernment agencies happen to have about the applicant, and 
such information as may be obtained in a personal interview 
with the applicant. 22o 
In principle, the consular officer's decision as to the 
alien's admissibility is final, and not subject to review by the 
Secretary ofState.221 In practice, however, the State Depart-
ment has circumscribed its consular officers' discretion by is-
suing an extensive body of regulations222 and supplementing 
217. 8 U.S.C. § ll82(a)(28)(C) and (D) (1982). 
218. 8 u.s.c. § 1201(g) (1982). 
219. The law lists 33 grounds for excluding an alien. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(l)-(32) (1982). However, 24 grounds were repealed in 1986. 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a) (Supp. 1986). 
220. Although interviews are required of almost every applicant for a 
nonimmigrant visa, 22 C.F.R. § 41.114(a) (1986), they play only a small 
role in the process. In the routine case, the interview lasts only five to ten 
minutes even for those applying to immigrate rather than to visit. Note, 
Consular Discretion in the Immigrant rrua-Issuing Process, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 
87, 100 n.63 (1978). 
221. The Secretary of State is charged with administering the immigra-
tion laws "relating to ... consular officers of the United States, except 
those powers ... relating to the granting or refusal of visas." 8 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1104(a)(1) (1977). See Note,justicefor the Alien: The AdequaC)' of the Gansu-
far JTua Issuance System, 7 OKLA. L. REV. 461, 464 (1982). 
222. 22 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.50 (1988) (including 14 pages of regulations 
governing issuance of nonimmigrant visas). 
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the discretion with an even longer volume of formal adminis-
trative requirements, embodied in the Department's Foreign 
Affairs Manual.223 The regulations make the issuance of 
most nonimmigrant visas a matter of law rather than discre-
tion. 
Some of these provisions are relevant to the applications 
of the Soviet scientists. The regulations require a consular 
officer to issue a visa to an applicant unless there is a statu-
tory or regulatory basis for denial. 224 In the case of an appli-
cant from a communist country, a person who has served 
voluntarily "in a political capacity" with the "organization in 
power" is deemed to be affiliated with a proscribed organiza-
tion, rendering the applicant ineligible for admission under 
the communist-exclusion provision of the McCarran-Walter 
Act.225 The Foreign Affairs Manual adds that "an alien who 
is or was employed in a responsible position in an agency of 
the government of a Communist or Communist-controlled 
country is presumed to be ineligible" for a visa.226 Even 
though a State-funded scientific organization like the Insti-
tute of the Physics of the Earth may not technically be an 
"agency of the government" of the Soviet Union, as a matter 
of practice the State Department regards working as a scien-
tist in such an organization as the equivalent of working for a 
Soviet Government agency.227 In addition, Form OF 156 
asks applicants whether they are or have been members of 
223. The sections of the Foreign Affairs Manual applicable to nonimmi-
grants are reprinted in 6 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 32-1 to 32-349 (1988). The text is considerably longer than 
349 pages, however, because many inserted pages are numbered with 
decimals. 
224. 22 C.F.R. § 41.90 (1986). 
225. I d. § 41.91 (a)(28)(iii). 
226. u.s. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, PART II, 22 C.F.R. 
§ 41.9l(a)(28) Note 2.2, reprinted in 6 GoRDON & RosENFIELD, supra note 
223, at 32-216. 
227. "Life in the Soviet Union is such that if you are involved at all in 
society, as opposed to being a babushka wanting to visit a relative, you 
can't help being affiliated in some way with the Communist Party. If you 
have a job, you're going to belong to some organization. All those organi-
zations are Communist-dominated or affiliated. So unless you're what 
they call a parasite or a hooligan, you'll come under [subsection] 28 [of the 
Immigration Act)." Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, Director, Office of 
Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assistance, Visa Office, U.S. De-
partment of State, in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 16, 1987). 
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"Communist organizations and those affiliated there-
with."228 If an applicant refuses to answer this question, the 
refusal "may be considered an admission of affiliation in a 
proscribed organization. "229 Although the operative word 
in the Manual is "may," the Department routinely treats fail-
ures to answer this question by Soviet applicants as admis-
sions of affiliation. 230 In these. cases, too, the consular officer 
may refuse the visa.231 
As a matter of standard practice, applicants from com-
munist countries who seek nonimmigrant visas for non-offi-
cial travel232 to the United States are routinely regarded by 
consular officers as ineligible to receive such visas if: they 
hold responsible positions in any sector of the Soviet estab-
lishment; admit their membership in a Communist-affiliated 
organization; or refuse to answer the standard questions 
about such membership. While it is not known for certain 
how the Soviet scientists who sought to visit Nevada dealt 
with the questions on their Form OF 156,233 the Soviet 
scientists would have been regarded, at least by senior offi-
228. See A. FRAGOMEN, A. DEL REY, & S. BELL, 1987 IMMIGRATION PRo-
CEDURES HANDBOOK 1-36 (1987). 
229. u.s. DEP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, PART II. 22 C.F.R. 
§ 41.9l(a)(28) Note 2.41, reprinted in GoRDON & RosENFIELD, supra note 
223, at 32-216.1. 
230. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227. 
231. If these guidelines do not sufficiently constrain the discretion of a 
consular officer, a further set of procedures may suffice to ensure that, 
despite the statutory bar on Secretarial intervention, the discretion exer-
cised is really that of senior department officials, rather than the consular 
officer, if they have an interest in the particular application. A refusal must 
be reviewed by the principal consular officer at the post. 22 C.F.R. 
§ 4l.l30(b). The principal officer may ask the Visa Office in Washington 
for an advisory opinion, or the Department may ask for a report and may 
issue such an opinion on its own initiative. 22 C.F.R. § 4l.l30(c). If the 
consular officer declines to follow the advisory opinion issued in Washing-
ton, he must explain the refusal to the Visa Office. !d. Furthermore, an 
"interpretation of law, as distinguished from an application of the law" is 
binding on the consular officer. !d. 
232. Official governmental travel is accomplished on "A" visas, includ-
ing diplomatic and official visas, rather than "B-1" and other types of visas. 
See supra notes 208-212 and accompanying text. 
233. Since NRDC, an environmental organization, is not accustomed to 
obtaining visas for foreign scientists, it left the visa application process to 
the Soviet scientists. NRDC did not request or receive copies of the Sovi-
ets' application forms, nor did it do any research or advise the Soviet 
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cials in the Visa Office, as Communist-affiliated by virtue of 
their connection with the Institute of the Physics of the 
Earth. At least equally important, is the fact that Soviet 
scientists, following their standard operating procedure, do 
not file U.S. applications with the U.S. Embassy personally, 
but have them submitted by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.234 The Ministry, following its standard operating 
procedure, never fills out the part of the form requesting in-
formation about Communist affiliations.235 Under these cir-
cumstances, the consular officer handling the applications 
would have been required, under the procedures of the For-
eign Affairs Manual, to regard the applicants as ineligible for 
entry into the United States. 
But a determination of ineligibility is only the first step 
of a two-step process. A statute provides that the consular 
officer or the Secretary of State may apply to the Attorney 
General of the United States for a waiver of ineligibility, and 
that the Attorney General has discretion to grant the 
waiver.236 While "waiver" by the Attorney General of statu-
tory ineligibility to enter the country might at first blush 
seem to be an extraordinary procedure, the volume of appli-
cations from otherwise ineligible applicants has swelled con-
siderably over the years,237 and the granting of waivers now 
has its own standard operating procedure, one that has be~n 
influenced by a further legislative enactment, known as the 
McGovern Amendment. In 1975, the United States, Canada, 
and most European countries (including the Soviet Union) 
Academy with respect to U.S. visa law. Interview with S. Jacob Scherr in 
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 7, 1987). 
234. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227. 
235. /d. 
236. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(3) (1985) provides that an ineligible alien ap-
plicant for a nonimmigrant visa "may, after approval by the Attorney Gen-
eral of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular of-
ficer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be 
granted such a visa and may be admitted into the United States temporar-
ily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General. ... " 
237. In 1985, 47,574 waivers were sought by persons classified as ineli-
gible because of their belief in or advocacy of Communism. The Implemen-
tation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings Before the Commission on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, 99th Gong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986) [hereinafter Helsi111li 
Hearings] (testimony of Michael Newlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Consular Affairs). 
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signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, 238 in which the signatory countries un-
dertook, among other obligations, t9 reduce restrictions on 
the free travel of foreign nationals in their countries. 239 
As part of its response, Congress (at the urging of Sena-
tor McGovern) provided by law in 1977 that the Secretary of 
State "should, within 30 days of receiving an application for 
a nonimmigrant visa by any alien who is excludable from the 
United States by reason of membership or affiliation with a 
proscribed organization but who is otherwise admissible to 
the United States, recommend that the Attorney General 
grant the approval necessary for the issuance of a visa. "240 
The Secretary may refuse to make such a recommendation 
only by determining that the admission of the alien would 
jeopardize "the security interests of the United States" and 
so certifies to the Speaker of the House and the Chairperson 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.24I The McGov-
ern Amendment established a strong Congressional policy 
against the exclusion of aliens on the basis of their political 
beliefs. The Amendment also imposed on the State Depart-
ment personnel the considerable bureaucratic burden of 
having to justify to Congress a refusal to recommend a 
waiver. 
As a result,242 the State Department routinely recom-
mends waivers. In 1985, 98.3% of the 47,574 alien appli-
cants who had been rendered ineligible for admission be-
cause of their Communist affiliations were actually admit-
ted.243 Two collateral practices demonstrate the tenacity 
238. See Historical Note following 22 U.S.C.A. § 3002 (1979). 
239. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Au-
gust 1, 1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1314 (1975). 
240. 22 U.S.C. § 2691(a) (1982). 
" 241. /d. 
242. "But because of the McGovern amendment that we have men-
tioned earlier, in most cases automatic waivers ofinadmissibilit)' were sub-
mitted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service [of the Justice De-
partment] .... " Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237, at 28 (testimony of 
Michael Newlin). 
243. /d. In 1979, the McGovern Amendment had been amended to per-
mit the Secretary to refuse to recommend a waiver for aliens from "signa-
tory counties which are not in substantial compliance with the provisions 
of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the human rights and humanitarian 
affairs provisions." Pub. L. No. 96-60, § 109(2)(d), 93 Stat. 395, 398 
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with which the State Department holds to its practice of rec-
ommending waivers. The law is silent with respect to 
whether the ineligible alien must file a form in order to trig-
ger the waiver process, but the Department does not require 
this further application. Once the State Department deter-
mines that the applicant is excludable, it processes the 
waiver application on his or her behalf without even inform-
ing the applicant that it is doing so.244 In addition, in at least 
a substantial fraction of the two percent of cases in which 
waivers are denied, the Department resorts to a subterfuge 
so that it can avoid taking responsibility for the refusal and 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 269l(d) (1982)). This provision pointedly re-
ferred to the Soviet Union, among oher countries. See 125 GoNG. REc. 
8345-47 (April 24, 1979) (statement by its sponsor, Representative So-
larz). The Solarz Amendment does not prohibit the Secretary from sug-
gesting waivers routinely; it only removes the requirement that the Secre-
tary recommend a waiver. In actuality, the Solarz Amendment did not 
change the State Department practice of recommending waivers in nearly 
every case. Although the practice could have changed with respect to So-
viet-bloc applicants after 1979, "[o]ld habits die hard. They [State Depart· 
ment bureaucrats] [still] act as if they had [sic] to justify a tum-down." 
Telephone interview with Hon. Michael Heilman, Judge, Board of Immi-
gration Appeals and former Associate General Counsel of the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service Qune 30, 1987). The Department's ration-
ale for not having changed its practice is that the United States has never 
made a formal determination that the Soviet Union or any other country is 
not in substantial compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Making such a 
determination "could affect other policies and interests going beyond the 
area of visas, so it hasn't been done." Telephone interview with Cornelius 
D. Scully, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations and Advisory Assist-
ance, Visa Office, U.S. Department of State Quly 6, 1987). The standard 
practice of recommending waivers for Soviet applicants based on an inter-
pretation of the Solarz amendment as requiring a formal determination is 
consistent with the State Department's liberal administration of the Mc-
Govern Amendment itself. The statutory language directs that the Secre-
tary "should" recommend waivers. Solarz stresses that the language was 
deliberately "not mandatory." 125 GoNG. REc. 8347 (April 24, 1979) 
(statement of Representative Solarz). "[T]he conferees went to a good 
deal of trouble to use the word 'would' [sic] not 'shall,' but the fact of the 
matter is that the Department of State has treated it as though it were 
mandatory." !d. According to one Representative, in one year "well over 
I 000 recommendations for exclusion had been made by our intelligence 
agencies. Not one of them had been acceded to by the State Department. 
In effect, every single recommendation against the admission of an exclud-
able alien was overturned." 125 GoNG. REc. 8346 (April24, 1979) (state· 
ment of Representative Ashbrook). 
244. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227. 
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can avoid notifying Congress that it is recommending against 
a waiver. Under even the most liberal reading, the McGov-
ern Amendment only requires that State recommend a 
waiver, not that the Attorney General grant one. In cases in 
which the State Department wants to exclude the applicant 
but wants to avoid public responsibility, it sends a formal 
recommendation for a waiver to the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS). Then, in oral communications or 
meetings, INS informs the Service that the State Department 
really wants the waiver request to be denied. "They may 
want the Attorney General to be the 'hard nose' while State 
plays the innocent party, recommending entry."245 The re-
sult is a "collusive rejection."246 
Based on standard procedures two of the three ques-
tions posed at the outset of this subsection become answer-
able. The admission of the Soviet scientists into the United 
States was not a simple rubberstamping operation because, 
under the routines originating in the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 and embedded in the State Depart-
ment's Foreign Affairs Manual, visa applicants who hold re-
sponsible positions in the Soviet economy, or who decline to 
answer the question about Communist affiliation on Form 
OF 156, are deemed to be affiliated with a Communist or-
ganization and therefore ineligible to enter the United 
States. On the other hand, the Soviets scientists were ulti-
mately admitted because under practices originating in the 
McGovern Amendment of 1977, the State Department has 
developed a very strong presumption of not excluding appli-
cants on the basis of their Communist affiliations. 
These scientists, however, were not merely tourists or 
even business persons who just happened to be connected in 
Soviet society. They intended to carry out a project that 
would prove that U.S. nuclear test-ban policy was based on 
false premises about seismic verification. Could they not 
have been excluded simply on the ground that their presence 
in the United States was inconsistent with U.S. foreign pol-
icy? The answer to this question appears to be negative, in 
terms of operating procedure if not law. The State Depart-
245. Interview with Hon. Michael Heilman, supra note 243. 
246. Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237, at 17 (statement of Reprcscntati\'e 
Barney Frank). 
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
62 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 21:1 
ment's consistent practice, under the McGovern Amend-
ment, has been to treat it as though it eliminated any discre-
tion to deny visas to Communist-affiliated aliens based on 
generalized foreign policy concerns.247 The Department 
takes the position that although the text of the McGovern 
Amendment does not preclude it from taking foreign policy 
interests into account, the intent of the Amendment was to 
effect just such a preclusion. "The result has been that the 
Secretary of State is effectively precluded from acting in such 
cases on the basis of legitimate foreign policy factors and 
considerations .... Accordingly, for all practical purposes, 
247. This is the practice under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982), dealing 
with those affiliated with Communist organizations. A parallel provision, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(27) (1982), bars entry of any alien who (in the opinion 
of the consular officer) seeks to enter the United States "to engage in ac-
tivities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the 
welfare, safety, or security of the United States." Conceivably, this other 
provision could be used to deny admission to an alien applicant seeking to 
enter the United States to engage in a project that was at odds with U.S. 
foreign policy. However, such a usage of (a)(27) would not have been 
consistent with the Department's ordinary practices. In a typical year, only 
33 people are denied admission under this provision, compared with 
47,574 people denied, initially, on the basis of Communist affiliations, and 
most of them are individuals thought to be planning activies "harmful to 
national security ... [such as] engaging in certain kinds of study in this 
country at the behest of or with the support of Libya [for the purpose of 
advancing terrorism]." Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237, at 28-30 (testi-
mony of Michael Newlin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Consular 
Affairs, and Cornelius D. Scully, Director, Office of Legislation, Regula-
tions, and Advisory Assistance, U.S. Department of State). In addition, 
invoking subsection (a)(27) affords the State Department considerably less 
flexibility than subsection (a)(28) because neither the provision of the law 
allowing a waiver, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982), nor the provision al-
lowing the imposition of conditions on an alien's visit applies to exclusions 
under (a)(27). See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3) (1982). Thus, if (a)(27) had been 
invoked in the case of the Soviet scientists, they could not have been ad-
mitted at all. Of course, to find that an alien's visit was consistent with 
"the public interest" might be theoretically possible only if the alien 
agreed voluntarily to certain restrictions, and therefore to use (a)(27) to 
exact self-imposed restrictions (e.g., geographical limitations) on a pro-
posed visit, but the State Department never uses (a)(27) to impose condi-
tions. Interview with Cornelius D. Scully, supra note 227. For a construc-
tion of (a)(27) and its relationship to the McGovern Amendment, see 
Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally 
divided court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). 
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foreign policy factors are no longer considered m such 
cases. " 248 
Although a close look at the laws, regulations and proce-
dures of the State Department helps to clarify why the Sovi-
ets were neither routinely admitted nor altogether excluded 
from entry to the United States, it does not explain why their 
entry was conditioned on their observation of a CORRTEX 
demonstration or, alternatively, on their refraining from vis-
iting the potential sites for seismic stations. The regulatory 
scheme can shed some light regarding how their visas were so 
conditioned, but not about why the conditions were imposed. 
The authority for imposing conditions on the visit of a 
nonimmigrant stems from a section of the 1917 Immigration 
Act and, curiously, predates both the Communist exclusion 
provisions and the authority of government officials to waive 
excludability and admit otherwise ineligible aliens. Prior to 
1917, Congress had already barred certain categories of 
nonimmigrants from visiting the United States. These cate-
gories included "idiots," epileptics, paupers, polygamists, 
anarchists, and prostitutes. 249 In 1917, Congress imposed 
further limitations on the granting of nonimmigrant visas; 
these included prohibitions on the entry of applicants who 
were illiterate, psychopathic, or chronically alcoholic.250 
But to some members of Congress, the statutory exclu-
sion of visitors in all of these categories (particularly the bar-
ring of illiterates, which generated considerable contro-
versy)251 seemed excessively Draconian. A clause, which be-
248. Letter to Vice President George Bush from Acting Assistant Secre-
tary of State Alvin Paul Drischler (October 18, 1983), repri11/td i11 129 
CoNG. REc. 515128 (1983). In the few cases in which State Department 
Officials informally request the Department of justice to reject their own 
formal recommendation for a waiver, see supra note 246 and accompanying 
text, foreign policy considerations are taken into account, notwithstanding 
the contrary implication in Mr. Drischler's assertion that "the Attorney 
General, whose discretionary authority has not been affected by the 'Mc-
Govern Amendment' is not in a position to evaluate or act upon foreign 
policy factors." /d. 
249. Immigration Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898 (1907). 
250. Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874, 875 
(1917). 
251. Congress had three times previously passed such a literacy pro\i-
sion, only to have it vetoed by Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson. 
H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., repri11ted i11 1952 U.S. CooE 
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came known as the "Ninth Proviso," was included in the 
1917 legislation to permit the Commissioner General of Im-
migration with the further approval of the Secretary of Labor 
to "prescribe conditions, including exaction of such bonds as 
may be necessary, to control and regulate the admission and 
return of otherwise inadmissible aliens applying for tempo-
rary admission."252 In the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, when 
those with Communist affiliations were added to the list of 
excluded aliens, a provision was added to the law which 
made explicit the power of the Attorney General253 to waive 
altogether most of the statutory prohibitions on the entry of 
nonimmigrants (as opposed to the power to "prescribe con-
ditions" on their entry).254 This waiver section was much 
used, and by the 1980s was invoked tens of thousands of 
times a year.255 The "conditioning" aspects of the Ninth 
Proviso were, however, relegated to what became an ex-
tremely obscure section of the Immigration Law,256 one so 
obscure, in fact, that it is invoked only in a minute number of 
cases per year. 257 In those few cases in which conditions are 
imposed, the only types of restrictions that are used are geo-
graphical limitations, and the reason for these restrictions is 
almost always that the State Department has learned that the 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 1653, 1665. In passing the 1917legislation, Con-
gress overrode a second Wilson veto. /d. 
252. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 878 (1917). 
253. The Attorney General had meanwhile succeeded to the powers 
over immigration of the Secretary of Labor. REORG. PLAN No. V OF 1940, 
reprinted in 54 Stat. 1238 (1941). 
254. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(3) (1964). The occasion for dividing the 
Ninth Proviso (which implicitly authorized complete as well as conditioned 
waivers) into separate sections providing for waivers and for the imposi-
tion of conditions may have been the fact that Congress for the first time 
in 1952 created certain categories of aliens (e.g., suspected saboteurs) 
whose excludability could not be waived. !d. Since the language had to be 
changed for this purpose, and since the entire Immigration Act was being 
reworded at this time, a general overhaul of the section may have been 
opportune. 
255. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
256. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(6) (1964). 
257. Telephone interview with Harvey Adler, Inspections Program, U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Uuly 14, 1987). Mr. Adler 
directs the INS unit which passes on requests for (d)(3) waivers and occa-
sionally (but always at the request of the State Department or an intelli-
gence agency) imposes conditions under (d)(3). /d. 
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applicant is someone believed to have connections with an 
Eastern bloc intelligence service, who proposes to come to 
the United States for a legitimate scientific conference but 
who, if allowed to travel freely, might obtain technological 
information whose export is restricted.258 The invocation of 
the "conditions" section of the law is, indeed, so unusual 
that none of the articles critical of the McCarran Act's exclu-
sions of Communists mention this practice.259 The subject 
of conditions on entry never came up in Congressional hear-
ings exploring the Government's exclusion of aliens and its 
use of the waiver power26° and the leading treatise on immi-
gration law cites the section once in passing but gives neither 
explanation nor examples of its use.261 The "conditioning" 
of nonimmigrant visas is so infrequent that the State and jus-
tice Departments have no "standard operating procedure" 
for this practice; accordingly, Model II is of little help in elu-
cidating the application of geographical restrictions to the 
Soviet scientists. Further understanding, if it is to come at 
all, must devolve from Model !11.262 
258. !d. 
259. See, e.g., supra note 216. 
260. See, e.g., Helsinki Hearings, supra note 237; Implementation of the Helsinki 
Accords: Hearing on Basket Three Before the Commission on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
261. 1 GoRDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 223, § 2.53(b), at 2-365 
(1986). 
262. Indeed, the documentary record tends to suggest that such cases-
or at least this one--are handled in ways inconsistent with even the most 
fundamental standard bureaucratic procedures. In run-of-the-mill waiver 
cases, the State Department either sends a wire to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) requesting the waiver, in which case the 
waiver is kept on file by the Service, or makes a telephone request for the 
waiver, in which case the request is noted in a telephone log maintained by 
the Service. In principle, requests for conditioned waivers also should be 
recorded in one of these two ways, because the imposition of conditions 
does not change the fact that a waiver must be granted before the alien is 
admitted. However, with respect to the Soviet scientists who came to the 
United States in connection with the NRDC project, the INS files include 
neither a wire from the Department of State requesting a waiver nor a 
telephone log entry. INS officials do not know why the usual documenta-
tion is missing in this case. Telephone interview with Daniel Collins, As-
sistant Chief Inspector, Inspections Branch, Immigration and NalUraliza-
tion Service (Aug. 20, 1987). 
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C. The Seismic Station Permits 
Even more essential to the NRDC's ability to fulfill its 
agreement with the SAS was obtaining government permis-
sion to install the seismic stations, since all of the suitable 
land was owned by the U.S. Government.263 The Nevada 
stations could be established without a Soviet physical pres-
ence, since the data could be sent by radio or mail to Mos-
cow. But without government permission to set up the sta-
tions (including permission to drill a 300-foot deep borehole 
at each site),264 there could be no monitoring of tests in Ne-
vada. 
In San Diego during their restricted visit, the Soviet 
scientists selected three sites, each about 100 miles from Na-
tional Test Site. One, at Troy Canyon, Nevada, was in Hum-
boldt National Forest. The other two, at Deep Springs, Cali-
fornia, and Nelson, Nevada, were on federal lands managed 
by the Department of the Interior. 
Establishment of a station in a national forest required a 
permit from the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of 
Agriculture. The permitting standards and process had been 
established by law and regulation long before the NRDC-
SAS agreement was signed. The Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), among other statutes,265 
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to permit the public 
to obtain various kinds of permits, licenses or leases to use 
National Forest land for a variety of purposes, most ofwhich 
are called "special uses."266 The Secretary has delegated the 
263. See supra note 88. 
264. Construction of each station would require cutting into a hillside to 
expose an area of granite rock about 12-15 feet square. On top of the 
rock, a vault 8' x 6.7' x 4.5' would be built, resting on a four-inch thick 
concrete pad. The surface seismometers and electronic equipment would 
be placed in the vault, and additional seismometers would be installed in a 
hole drilled 100 meters into the rock. Then the vault would be buried 
beneath two feet of earth. In addition, two of the stations which were lo-
cated away from power lines would need solar panel assemblies and shel-
ters, and all of the stations would require telemetry equipment to transmit 
their seismic data to a satellite or a satellite relay station. See, e.g., U.S. 
Dep't of Agriculture, Special Use Application and Report, filed by Univer-
sity of Nevada-Reno (Feb. 24, 1987). 
265. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 472, 551 (1982); 30 U.S.C.A. § 185 (1982). 
266. All uses of national forests except the disposal of timber, 36 C.F.R. 
pt. 223 (1987), and minerals, 36 C.F.R. pt. 228 (1987), the grazing of live-
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permitting authority to the Forest Service, a unit of the De-
partment of Agriculture.267 
Although no sections of the FLPMA specifically regu-
lates seismic research stations, the law does authorize the 
Secretary to grant a "right-of-way"268 to use forest land for 
"systems for transmission or reception of ... electronic sig-
nals."269 In the case of a "resource monitoring site" incor-
porating radiotelemetry equipment, a Forest Service officer 
must also be satisfied that the site will not be "suited for gen-
eral communication use. " 270 An applicant for a special use 
right-of-way files a written proposal which includes a descrip-
tion of the project, information showing that the applicant is 
technically and financially capable of constructing and oper-
ating the project, a description of any public benefits, and a 
statement of environmental impact and of how the environ-
ment will be protected.271 When an application has been 
filed, a Forest Service officer assesses the applicant's qualifi-
cations, completes an environmental analysis, determines 
compliance with other law, and consults any other interested 
parties.272 In the case of simple uses having no environmen-
tal impact, comments from others are not solicited. In the 
stock, 36 C.F.R. pt. 222 (1987}, and ordinary recreation such as camping 
(which requires no permit}, 36 C.F.R. § 250.50(c}, are special uses requir-
ing authorization. 36 C.F.R. § 250.50(a} (1987}. 
267. 16 U.S.C.A. § 551 (1982}; 36 C.F.R. § 200.1 (1987). 
268. The use of the term "right-of-way" for construction of a research 
station (as opposed to a road or railway line} may seem odd. The termi-
nology, however, apparently dates back to the days in which communica-
tions systems consisted only of linear networks such as telegraph \\ires. 
Although communications became wireless, government officials (appar-
ently making only incremental changes in their standard procedures} con-
tinued to categorize licensing for all communications facilities under the 
heading of "rights of way." See Pub. L. No. 82-367, 66 Stat. 95 (1952} 
(inclusion of radio and television transmitting facilities}, amending Pub. L 
No. 61-478, 36 Stat. 1253 (19ll} (rights-of-way issuable for poles and 
lines for electricity and communications}. 
269. 43 U.S.C.A. § I76l(a}(5} (1982}. In terms of effect on the land, the 
drilling of a hundred meter borehole might seem like the most significant 
~ctivity requi??g federal al?p~o~~· b~t. the. routines o~ the Fores.~ Se~ce 
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case of a more significant disruption of the environment, the 
officer typically contacts interested state and local agencies 
such as State recreation and road departments, environmen-
tal groups, and specially affected private parties. Contact 
with other federal agencies is less common.273 Finally, the 
District Ranger or Forest Supervisor for the affected forest 
makes a decision to grant or deny the application.274 The 
special use right-of-way may be denied only on the basis of 
five grounds: (1) incompatibility with the "purpose(s) for 
which the lands are managed, or with other uses"; (2) incom-
patibility with "the public interest";275 (3) lack of qualifica-
tions of the applicant; (4) illegality; and (5) lack of financial 
capacity to undertake the project.276 
Similarly, establishment of the stations at the other two 
sites required rights of way to be issued by the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Inte-
rior. 277 Because seismic research stations use communica-
273. Telephone interview with Reuben Williams, Lands Specialist 
(Group Leader in Charge of Special Uses), U.S. Forest Service, by Freder-
ickS. Young (Aug. 3, 1987). 
274. FSM, supra note 269, at § 2704. One way a District Ranger (typi-
cally a GS-12 employee with 8-15 years of experience) can grant a right-of-
way application is if the use has already been approved at a higher level, 
for instance, if the Forest Supervisor makes the decision. Forest Supervi-
sors are usually career officials at the GS-14 level with degrees in forestry 
or engineering and about 15 years of experience. A Forest Supervisor is 
five bureaucratic rungs below the Secretary of Agriculture (after the Assis-
tant Secretary for Natural Resources and the Environment, the Chief of 
the Forest Service, and the nine Regional Foresters). Telephone interview 
with Reuben Williams, supra note 273. 
275. The public interest category is used to deny an application if the 
Forest Service wants to deny it but "nothing else fits." This category may 
be employed where the proposed use was consistent with state law and not 
environmentally unsound, but which Forest Service officials determined 
was not in the public interest to be built in a national forest, such as a 
casino (in a state which permitted gambling) or an abortion clinic. Tele-
phone interview with Reuben Williams, supra note 273. 
276. 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(h) (1986). 
277. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579,90 Stat. 2743 (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 961, 1761 (1982)). The Bureau also issues 
"permits" under 43 U.S.C.A. § 1732(b) (1982), but when it has discretion, 
it prefers to issue "rights of way" because a permit cannot be revoked 
without a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, 43 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1732(c) (1982), and the permittee may appeal locally, whereas revoca-
tion of a right-of-way does not require a hearing, and appeals are heard in 
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tion links, the BLM, like the Forest Service, grants rights of 
way for their use under the authority given it to authorize the 
use of public lands for systems for "transmission or recep-
tion of ... electronic signals ... or such other ... systems or 
facilities which are in the public interest and which require 
rights-of-way over, upon, under or through" those lands.278 
The procedures and standards for granting these rights of 
way are governed by codified regulations.279 The applicant 
must file a form indicating its name and address, a descrip-
tion of the project, a map, a statement of financial and tech-
nical capacity, and certification that the applicant is author-
ized to do business in the state.280 This application is then 
evaluated by a "realty specialist," ajunior BLM official who 
heads a small interdisciplinary team charged with writing an 
environmental analysis in accordance with the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act.281 The analysis must take into account 
a list of specified considerations which includes among 
others: air quality; noise; general hazards; flood plains; pale-
ontological resources; soil resources, vegetation resources, 
wildlife resources; threatened and endangered species; cul-
tural resources; visual resources; recreation and wilderness 
resources; and socioeconomic concerns.282 The realty spe-
cialist also determines compliance with federal and state 
laws, consults with "Federal, State, and local agencies having 
an interest, as appropriate," and proposes any "appropriate" 
modifications in the proposal. 283 
Arlington, Va. Interview with Annette jameson, Natural Resource Special-
ist, Lands Division, BLM, Department of the Interior, by Fred Young ijuly 
9, 1987). In 12 years at BLM, Ms. Jameson has worked on more than 300 
right-of-way applications. Telephone interview with Ms. Jameson, supra 
note 88. 
278. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1761(a)(5), {a){7) (1982). 
279. 43 C.F.R. § 2800 (1986). 
9~0 .d.!l. r. '!<' 11 8 9~09 !l.(<O) (lQ~f>) 
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The proposal then goes to an "authorized officer" who 
makes the actual decision to grant or deny the request.284 
This official is usually a Resource Area Manager, a GS-12 or 
GS-13 career officer, seven rungs on the hierarchy below the 
Secretary of the Interior. In some BLM Districts, the "au-
thorized officer" is a District Manager, one level above the 
Resource Area Manager.2ss The officer begins the decision 
process with a presumption in favor of granting a right-of-
way, because "[i]t is the objective of the Secretary of the In-
terior to grant rights-of-way . . . to any qualified individ-
ual."286 Further, the regulations specify only five grounds 
for denial: (1) inconsistency with the purpose for which the 
lands are managed;287 (2) inconsistency with the public inter-
est;288 (3) lack of qualifications of the applicant;2B9 (4) ille-
galilty; or (5) lack of technical or financial ability.290 
The Model II framework provides the means to under-
stand why the Government granted the permits necessary to 
build the nuclear test monitoring stations on federal land. 
Concerning the site in Humboldt National Forest, the appli-
consistent with BLM's Master Plan submitted to the public in 1975-78, 
public hearings can be avoided. Telephone interview with Annette Jame-
son, supra note 277. 
284. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4 (1986). 
285. Below the Secretary are several Assistant Secretaries, one of whom 
is responsible for BLM and several other agencies. One of the Assistants 
to this Assistant Secretary is the BLM Director. Below the BLM Director 
are several Deputy Directors, one of whom is in charge of resources. The 
fifty State Directors report to this Deputy Director. District Managers 
(California has four districts) report to the State Director, and Managers of 
the Resource Areas (the Riverside, Cal., district has five Resource Areas) 
report to the District Manager but are delegated the authority to decide 
right-of-way applications within their Resource Areas. Telephone inter-
view with Annette Jameson, supra note 88. 
286. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2800.0-2 (1986) (emphasis added). 
287. The purpose for which the lands are managed is, however, "multi-
ple use," so BLM attempts to allow the widest possible variety of uses. 
Telephone interview with Annette Jameson, supra note 88. 
288. BLM officials interpret this standard to preclude them from grant-
ing rights-of-way for purely private convenience (e.g., if a homeowner 
wanted to build a road on BLM land solely for the purpose of shortening 
the drive to his house by a quarter of a mile) or for uses that would cause 
undue and unnecessary environmental degradation. /d. 
289. U.S. citizenship was formerly, but is no longer, required. !d. 
290. 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4(a) (1986). 
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cant filed all of the necessary standard papers.291 The appli-
cation contained nothing that would trigger any of the five 
grounds listed in the Forest Service regulation as bases for 
permit denials. A covering letter even stated the willingness 
of the applicant to adjust the site location "somewhat" pro-
vided that "line of sight communications, granite structure 
and low quiescent noise must be maintained. "292 The appli-
cation adverted to one of the principal criteria that the For-
est Service was required to keep in mind--environmental 
disruption. 293 
Similarly, the two applications filed with the Department 
of the Interior met all of that department's criteria. The ap-
plications contained the required back-up materials, includ-
ing maps and diagrams of the proposed station construction, 
and provided no grounds on which the applications could be 
denied.294 BLM assigned the required analysis to staff mem-
bers who, drawing on other experts as needed, wrote a land 
suitability report and an environmental assessment. Since 
the seismic stations would not interfere with other proposed 
uses of the land (because they were small and, for the most 
part, underground), they were granted by the Resource Area 
Manager or District Manager as a routine matter. 
The U.S. Government granted permits to build the seis-
mic stations on federal land because, under the standard op-
erating procedures of the two relevant Departments, permits 
to build seismic stations are always granted to applicants 
who show themselves financially capable of constructing and 
operating the stations and who are solicitous of the environ-
ment, provided that the stations did not conflict with other 
public uses of the land. Decisions of this kind are so un-
remarkable that they are routinely made by junior or mid-
level officers, without any high-level policy review or referral 
291. See U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, supra note 264 and accompanying 
text. 
292. /d. 
293. "Slight visual impact, stations are small and hidden from view to 
minimize visual impact, disturbance and vandalism. A small road will be 
needed for the drill rig to access the site." /d. 
294. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, APPUCATIONS FOR TRANSPORTA-
TION AND UTILITY SYSTEMS AND FACIUTIES ON FEDERAL LANDs, filed b)' Uni-
versity of Nevada-Reno with the Las Vegas, Nev., and Ridgecrest, Cal., 
offices of the Bureau of Land Management Uan. 30, 1987). 
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to any official in Washington. Once appropriate applications 
were filed, the Government's decision to authorize the use of 
public land for seismic research stations was virtually inevita-
ble. 
v. MODEL III 
The analyst who makes use of Model III focuses more 
on the actions of individuals, and the interpersonal bargain-
ing among them, than on either the rational justifications for 
decisions or the structure and standard procedures of the 
bureaucracies that make or implement them. In Allison's 
terms, governmental decisions are the result of moves in a 
"competitive game" made by players who act "according to 
various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal 
goals ... not by a single rational choice but by the pulling 
and hauling that is politics. " 295 The outcome may be due to 
the triumph of one individual or group over the other, or 
may result from "compromise, conflict, and confusion of of-
ficials with diverse interests"296 and is not what any person 
or group wanted. In either event, however, that outcome is 
determined more by the "power and skill" of the players 
than by rationality or routines. Bureaucratic structures are 
not irrelevant. Bureaucratic loyalty, for example, might af-
fect how a particular player conceives of what outcome will 
best serve the national interest. Nonbureaucratic concerns 
are relevant as well, including personal beliefs or ideology, 
domestic political concerns, and personal interests.297 
Bureaucratic routines are significant, though not deter-
minative, because they establish the "action channels" that 
structure the game. The action channels pre-select the ma-
jor players and allocate power among them (e.g., by deter-
mining which agency has principal responsibility for imple-
menting a decision, thereby giving that agency's head some 
additional influence over its outcome).29S 
Formal (including legal) and informal rules of the game 
also affect the outcome by making some moves (such as cer-
tain kinds of bluffs or deceit) legitimate and others im-
295. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 144. 
296. /d. at 145, 162. 
297. /d. at 167. 
298. ld. at 169-70. 
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proper.299 Even after the formal decision is made, the game 
continues, characteristically expanding. More players, who 
will have to implement the decision, enter the field. The 
players in conflict over a decision will often try to "maneuver 
to get the action into the channel that they believe offers the 
best prospect for getting their desired results," but often 
they will have no choice in the matter of implementation. As 
a result, the implementing players may go "beyond the spirit 
if not the letter" of the decision or, if they disagree with it, 
may delay or disobey it.3oo 
Model III analysts are not shocked that the outcome of 
what passes as decisional process301 is often incoherent. Due 
to the number of simultaneous games and players, the re-
sulting actions "rarely follow from an agreed doctrine in 
which all players concur" and "rarely reflect a coordinated 
government strategy and thus [should not be read as] con-
scious 'signals.' " 302 Indeed, misperception is essential to 
the process of government, for it is "the grease that allows 
cooperation among people whose differences othenvise 
would hardly allow them to co-exist. "303 
Applying Model III to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison 
addresses the question of why the United States responded 
with a blockade by recounting the opening positions of each 
of the members of President Kennedy's Executive Commit-
299. /d. at 170-71. 
300. !d. at 173. 
301. In the words of former National Security Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, "[i]n the making of national security policy, we have, in effect, 
a chaotic nonsystem." D. CLARKE, PUBLIC PoLICY AND PoLITICAL INSTITU-
TIONS (epigraph) (1985). 
302. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 175. 
303. Id. at 178. Model III seemed considerably more esoteric when Al-
lison described it in 1971 than it is today, after the American public has 
now been exposed for years to spectacular conflicts within the national 
security policy apparatus. The public spectacles have included frequent, 
major clashes between Secretaries of State and National Security Advisors 
to the President, such as those between Secretary William Rogers and Ad-
visor Henry Kissenger, Secretary Cyrus Vance and Advisor Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Secretary Alexander Haig and Advisor Richard Allen, and Sec-
retary George Shultz and Advisor John Poindexter, the last of which be-
came the "battle royal" through which Secretary Shultz was e.xcluded even 
from knowledge of the Government's repeated sales of arms to Iran. Stt 
Pear, Those to Whom "Battle Royal" is Nothing New, N.Y. Times, July 28, 
1987, at A14, col. 1. 
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tee, and, drawing particularly on Robert Kennedy's posthu~ 
mously published memoir, 304 he describes the argument and 
bargaining among them.305 Allison highlights, for example, 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to use the crisis to force 
the President to undertake a massive air strike and invasion 
of Cuba in order to overthrow Fidel Castro.306 But the De~ 
fense Department's misrepresentation that a "surgical" air 
strike (limited to the Soviet missiles) was impossible was a 
key factor leading to the President's decision in favor of a 
blockade rather than an air strike.307 Similarly, he explains 
that President Kennedy summoned U.N. Ambassador Adlai 
Stevenson to a meeting of the inner circle and allowed Ste~ 
venson to argue for exchanging U.S. missiles in Turkey or 
the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay for Soviet withdrawal. The 
President rejected Stevensen's advice in front of the inner 
circle, thereby "sacrific[ing] the Ambassador to the hawks in 
order to allow himself to choose the moderate, golden 
mean."308 
Model III analysis has considerable inherent appeal. 
Every close reader of a good daily newspaper is constantly 
bombarded by details of at least some of the political give~ 
and-take of governmental policy-making, including the for-
mation of national security policy. The media frequently re-
ports on disagreements between the Secretary of State and 
the Secretary of Defense, or between one or both of those 
Secretaries and the National Security Advisor, as well as ef-
forts of Congressional leaders to influence foreign and de-
fense policy. In an academic setting, however, Model III 
must overcome two obstacles. First, the model is suspect 
precisely because it is so familiar. "[A]ccording to prevailing 
doctrine, politicking lacks intellectual substance. It consti-
tutes gossip for journalists rather than a subject for serious 
investigation. " 309 Second, the Model relies heavily on infor-
mation-particularly interview information-that is unusu-
ally difficult to obtain.310 Despite these problems, Model III 
304. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS (1968). 
305. G. ALLISON, supra note I, at 193-210. 
306. /d. at 198. 
307. /d. at 204-05, 209-210. 
308. /d. at 209. 
309. /d. at 146. 
310. "What is required is access ... to a large number of the participants 
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can at least contribute considerable information to the other 
forms of analysis, and perhaps it possesses substantial per-
suasive power of its own. 
A Model III analysis of the governmental response to 
the NRDC initiative centers around Richard Perle, for no in-
dividual was better poised than he to influence U.S. reaction. 
In the Spring of 1986, Perle was completing his fifth year as 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Pol-
icy, including arms control. As a result of his extensive 
Washington experience, his support from Secretary of De-
fense Caspar Weinberger, his charm, and his skill at bureau-
cratic infighting, Perle's influence in national security deci-
sions was far greater than his rank would suggest. 
Perle had served on the staff of Senator Henry M. Jack-
son from 1972 until President Reagan had appointed him to 
his Pentagon post.3 ll He and Senator Jackson both viewed 
the Soviet Union as a nation that wants "a world in which no 
decision can be taken anywhere that isn't consistent with 
in a decision before their memories fade or become too badly discolored. 
Such access is uncommon. But without this information, how can the ana-
lyst proceed?" !d. at 181. Allison quotes Prof. Richard Neustadt: "If I 
were forced to choose between the documents on the one hand and late, 
limited, partial interviews with some of the principal participants on the 
other, I would be forced to discard the documents." !d. Because gaps arc 
-inevitably created by lack of access to officials or lapses in memory, Model 
III analysis must occasionally speculate as to events rather than rely on 
interview or other information. See, e.g., id. at 190-91 (speculation that 
CIA Director John McCone learned of Soviet plans to install missiles in 
Cuba from French intelligence}, 229-30 (speculation that the ultimate set-
tlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the President's sending ofRoben 
Kennedy to assure Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that U.S. missiles in Tur-
key would be removed-without the knowledge of any other members of 
the Cabinet}. 
Conducting this study on the NRDC project required approximate!)• 
three dozen interviews, primarily with federal officials, over an eight 
month period. Even so the record is incomplete, because a few officials 
refused to be interviewed, a few declined to answer particular questions, 
and in a few cases, the interviewees' memories had faded. Another prob-
lem in studying recent national security decisions is that some of the docu-
ments may remain classified for decades. See Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 
Fed. Reg. 14,874 (1982}. 
311. Nomination of Richard N. Perle to be AssistaTZl Secretary• of Deferue: Htar-
iTZgs Before the Smale Committee on Armed Services, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 1-2 
(1981}. 
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Moscow's interests."312 Together, they succeeded in re-
stricting arms control agreements with the Soviets by chal-
lenging, from the right, the arms control measures negoti-
ated by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter.313 He had ar-
rived in office thinking that the only good arms control 
agreement was the 1963 atmospheric test ban treaty.3I4 
From his Defense Department post, he had pressed for U.S. 
negotiating positions so stringent that the Reagan Adminis-
tration's first Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
called them "absurd"315 because they were so unlikely to 
lead to any strategic agreement with the Soviets.316 Yet his 
bureaucratic skill and political support was such that he was 
regarded as "the major player on arms control in this town 
for many years,"317 the person "having more impact on pol-
icy in arms control than any other official in the U.S. govern-
ment,"318 and even "the single most effective bureaucrat in 
the government."3I9 
Perle was no stranger to the issues of nuclear test ban 
proposals or export licensing. He was the Pentagon's princi-
pal policy-maker on nuclear testing constraints, and just days 
before the NRDC and the SAS had reached their agreement 
in Moscow, he told Congress that even if the United States 
could verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban at this 
point, "a comprehensive test ban would [not be] in our inter-
est" or the interest of the world320 because of the need to 
develop ever-improved safety devices. He had appeared on 
a San Francisco television show to say that "there is signifi-
312. Gerstenzang, Soviets' Mortal Foe Lurks at Pentagon, L.A. Times, Nov. 
11, 1985, at 1, 12, col. 2 (interview with Richard Perle). 
313. /d. at 12 col. 4. 
314. Miller, Sometimes I Say Things Differently, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1987, 
at A16, col. 4. 
315. Hiatt, Perle's Distrust Shapes U.S. Policy, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at 
A1, col. 1. 
316. See generally S. TALBOIT, DEADLY GAMBITS (1984). 
317. Gordon, Perle is Bowing Out, His Goals and Acerbity Intact, N.Y. Times, 
Mar. 13, 1987, at A16, col. 2 (statement of House Armed Services Com-
mittee Chairman Les Aspin). 
318. S. TALBOIT, supra note 316, at 17. 
319. Hiatt, supra note 315, at col. 3 (statement of Senator Larry 
Pressler). 
320. Nuclear Testing Issues: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1986). 
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cant evidence the Soviets have violated the 150 kiloton 
threshold [of the "'TB Treaty]"; confronted by statements to 
the contrary by prominent seismologists who had been De-
fense Department consultants, he replied that "they're a 
bunch of seismologists feathering their own nests."32l 
Perle's view that the U.S. Government was too lax in 
dealing with the Soviets extended not only to arms control 
but also to U.S. exports. Upon assuming office, he entered 
into an extended feud with the Commerce Department, 
claiming that by supporting U.S. exporters, Commerce was 
allowing militarily significant technology to leak to the East. 
On Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci's last day in 
the Pentagon, Perle persuaded Carlucci to transfer the De-
fense Department's functions in export controls (including 
reviewing applications filed ·with the Commerce Department) 
from the Undersecretary for Research and Development to 
himself.322 
Perle believed that the Commerce Department's attitude 
toward U.S./U.S.S.R. relations permeated the State Depart-
ment as well. The people at State, he believed, were too ea-
ger to obtain agreements with the Soviets, regardless of the 
content of these agreements. 323 As a result, Perle was sure 
that State Department officials in conflict with him often at-
tempted to conceal at least some of their actions.324 
At the Natural Resources Defense Council, Thomas 
Cochran realized that NRDC would need a certain degree of 
government cooperation for the seismic monitoring project 
to succeed. Cochran was well aware of Perle's reputation 
321. Perle and the Scientists (KRON-TV, Channel4, San Francisco, Califor-
nia, broadcast, May 9, 1986) {6:00PM News) [hereinafter "Perle and the 
Scientists"]. The same program revealed that when Air Force Intelligence 
had asked seismologists to advise on Soviet Nuclear Tests, Perle had writ-
ten a letter complaining that the "intelligence community is undermining 
the Administration's position. My department will control this area." /d. 
at 5. 
322. Hiatt, supra note 315, at A20, col. 2. 
323. Hiatt, A Richard Perle Sampler, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at A20, Col. 
2. Perle's regard for academics was no higher: "We have a tendency to 
turn over negotiating responsibility to mid-level officials who may or rna)' 
not be competent negotiators and sometimes to academics who couldn't 
negotiate a sabbatical." Interview with judith Miller, supra note 314, at 
col. 2. 
324. Perle and the Scientists, supra note 321. 
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and his view on nuclear weapons issues. Therefore, he 
sought a more receptive audience within the U.S. Adminis-
tration. NRDC had no links with Secretary George Shultz, 
but the Chairman of NRDC's Board of Directors, Adrian W. 
(Bill) DeWind, was a senior partner at the New York law firm 
of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison. Through de-
cades oflaw practice, DeWind had come to know many, per-
haps most, of the members of the nation's legal and financial 
establishments. Among his many contacts was john C. 
Whitehead, who had been appointed, a few months earlier, 
as Deputy Secretary of State. 
Whitehead, sixty-four years old, had assumed office 
without prior government experience after thirty-eight years 
as an investment banker. Early in 1985, Secretary Shultz had 
tapped him for the Number Two job at State, and Whitehead 
fulfilled Shultz's expectations. After a few months on the 
job, those who had worked with him were praising him for 
"acting decisively when options are put to him rather than 
looking for others to choose. "325 
In policy matters, Whitehead was a moderate conserva-
tive. He wrote in 1984, before his appointment, that the So-
viet Union "has lost its appeal to third world nations and 
may now be slipping backward. Over time, these develop-
ments may permit some moderation in the increase of de-
fense expenditures .... "326 Significantly, he came to the 
Government with the "strong conviction that now is the time 
for private-sector companies to step up and play a larger role 
in solving the country's social problems."327 
At Cochran's request, DeWind asked Whitehead for a 
meeting when the NRDC project was still at the conceptual 
stage. This first meeting took place on February 20, 1986, 
three months before NRDC representatives went to Moscow 
325. Gwertzman, Parting the Fog at Foggy Bottom, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 
1986, at B6, col. 3. 
326. Whitehead, Markets Would Flourish With Reagan, N.Y. Times, Oct. 
21, 1984, at 2, col. 3. 
327. Vise, Interview with john C. Whitehead, Wash. Post, Feb. 10, 1985, at 
G2, col. 5, G3, col. 3. Whitehead was referring to domestic problems, but 
his belief that government is not able to solve many domestic problems 
may have predisposed him at least to be intrigued by the possibility that a 
private initiative might make a contribution to arms control. 
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to work out an agreement with the Soviets.328 DeWind flew 
to Washington for the meeting, and took with him Cochran 
and another NRDC staff member. Whitehead brought Paul 
Nitze, one of the Reagan Administration's principal anns 
control negotiators, andjames Timbie, an experienced anns 
control analyst who was serving on Whitehead's staff. 
The concept of an agreement between NRDC and a So-
viet insititution had not, as of this meeting, arisen. Cochran 
disclosed the NRDC's proposal to suggest, in separate letters 
to President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, that 
each nation permit seismic monitoring near its test site by 
non-governmental scientists of the other country. NRDC 
hoped that the State Department representatives would be 
enthusiastic, not because the Reagan State Department 
would want to edge the world a little closer to a comprehen-
sive test ban, but because the NRDC proposal might obtain 
for the United- States some unique seismic data that could 
reduce uncertainty about ITB Treaty compliance.329 
The State Department representatives were skeptical,sso 
however, and Whitehead wrote to DeWind a few days later 
to express "certain concerns." First, he worried that "pri-
vate citizens"331 could "draw conclusions about Soviet com-
pliance with testing constraints that differ from the judg-
ments of U.S. officials with access to more sources of infor-
mation." Second, "the Soviets could try to turn your 
proposal to their advantage in their campaign for a CTB." 
Finally, a CTB in the near future was a bad idea because con-
tinued nuclear testing was required to maintain confidence 
in U.S. nuclear forces.ss2 
When the Soviets proved less receptive to the idea of 
sending letters to the superpower leaders,333 this idea was 
328. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC (entry for Feb. 20, 
1986). 
329. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 5, 1987). 
330. Interview with Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to Deputy Sec-
retary Whitehead, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 10, 1987). 
331. Whether DeWind meant the NRDC or the American public is un-
clear. 
332. Letter to Adrian De Wind, Chairman, Board of Trustees, NRDC, 
from Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead (March 4, 1986). 
333. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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abandoned in favor of the direct agreement between NRDC 
and the Soviets that was signed in Moscow on May 28, 1986. 
News of the agreement was reported from Moscow in The 
New York Times,334 and it was from such press accounts that 
Perle and other Pentagon officials first learned of the pro-
ject.335 
Immediately upon returning from Moscow, De Wind and 
Cochran met again with Whitehead. In this june 3rd session, 
De Wind and Cochran described the agreement they had 
reached and made two alternative requests of Whitehead. 
First, they proposed that the U.S. Government assume re-
sponsibility for the project. This change would have spared 
the NRDC from the enormous administrative burden of run-
ning a scientific mission in the Soviet Union, but the U.S. 
officials did not want to encourage the seismic exchange to 
this extent. Alternatively, DeWind and Cochran sought the 
help of the State Department with the export licenses and 
Soviet visas that they knew would be necessary. 
Whitehead liked the idea that NRDC scientists would be 
able to collect unique data from within the Soviet Union, 
and, while he did not support a governmental take-over of 
the project, he believed that the Government should not dis-
courage NRDC in any way.336 He told the NRDC represent-
atives that he was personally supportive of the concept of as-
sisting the organization to obtain the necessary governmen-
tal approvals, but he could not promise much because the 
decision was not up to the State Department alone. White-
head did, however, promise to appoint a State Department 
official to act as a liaison between the Department and 
NRDC. The next day, his office called Cochran to inform 
him that Bismark Myrick, in the Office of Strategic Nuclear 
Policy, a part of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
would act as liaison. 337 
Representatives of Whitehead and other interested gov-
ernment players convened three days later, as part of the In-
334. Taubman, New Yorkers Sign Soviet Test Pact, N.Y. Times, May 29, 
1986, at A3. 
335. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for International Security Policy (Aug. 18, 1987). 
336. Telephone interview with Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to 
Deputy Secretary Whitehead (Aug. II, 1987). 
337. Interview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, supra note 72. 
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teragency Working Group on Nuclear Testing Limita-
tions.338 This Working Group had been set up years earlier, 
338. This working group was one of dozens of interagency committees 
established under the authority of the National Security Council as fora in 
which representatives of different agencies could meet to reach consensus 
or explore differences regarding national security policy. "Working 
groups" are the lowest level in a hierarchy of such bodies. The member-
ship of working groups generally consists of civil servants not holding 
political appointments, although they sometimes include politically ap-
pointed deputy assistant secretaries. In either event, working group mem-
bers attend the meetings with instructions from their superiors to negoti-
ate for particular outcomes deemed desirable by senior agency officials. If 
the working group reaches consensus on an issue, it writes a descriptive 
memorandum which is circulated at higher levels. If an issue is very con-
troversial, however, the working group may not achieve agreement, and it 
will instead prepare an "options paper" describing the problem and the 
results favored by various agency representatives. The problem is then 
passed along to the next level on the hierarchy, the "interagency group," 
known in the national security community as an "IG." At this level, assis-
tant secretaries of the various departments explore the issues on which the 
working groups divided, and they either agree or write options papers for 
the next level, the "senior interagency group" or "SIG," which is attended 
by undersecretaries or deputy secretaries. Next, disagreements may be 
taken to the National Security Council itself, whose divisions can be re-
solved only by the President. Bamford, Carlucci a11d the N.S.C., N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 18, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), 16, 26; U.S. TOWER COI\II\IISSION, REPORT 
oF THE PRESIDENT's SPECIAL REVIEW BoARD II-14 to II-15 (1987). 
This description is idealized. Because of bureaucratic or personal dis-
agreements or rivalries, there are many occasions on which working 
groups or interagency groups are unable to reach consensus, but for 
which it makes little sense to convene the very busy highest officials of 
several agencies (in SICs or the NSC, or even in IGs). During the Reagan 
administration, "generally the SICs and many of their subsidiary groups 
... fell into disuse." !d. at Il-l. The membership of IGs (in terms of 
agencies, rather than particular incumbents of offices) is determined by a 
formal order issued by the President's National Security Advisor, and the 
membership of working groups is determined by the IGs to which they 
report. Interview with William Clay, a State Department official involved 
in developing the Government's response to the NRDC project (April 
1987). William Clay is not the real name of this official. Four of the au-
thor's interviewees agreed to speak only on the condition that they not be 
identified by name, and accordingly, the names, precise titles, and exact 
interview places and dates of these informants have been withheld. All of 
them specified the accurate but not fully informative descriptions to which 
the author was limited in identifying them. These four officials are Leo-
nard Appleby, a foreign service officer who participated in State Depart-
ment policy making at the working level, interviewed in March 1987; 
Steven Blair, an official actively involved in the NRDC's project, inter-
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and it had been meeting periodically to discuss the U.S. re-
sponse to General Secretary Gorbachev's testing morato-
rium. The main activity of this Group was developing ways 
to put pressure on the Soviet Union to accept President Rea-
gan's alternative to a mutual halt on testing-a Soviet visit to 
the Nevada Test Site to observe an American test and to 
measure its yield with CORRTEX or some similar instru-
mentation. The NRDC project was discussed at the june 6th 
and subsequent meetings, but it was always "a kind of 
sidebar. "339 
The membership of the Group included junior officials, 
none of them presidentially appointed but all experienced in 
nuclear policy, from the Soviet desk of the State Department, 
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the staff of the 
National Security Council, the Department of Energy, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The representative of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense was retired Colonel Ed 
Nawrocki, who reported to Richard Perle and to his Deputy, 
Frank Gaffney. The Group was led by State Department offi-
cial Bismark Myrick.34o 
At this point, NRDC had not yet formally applied for any 
form of government permission, so there was no paper on 
which anyone could act. But from Myrick's report on the 
meeting with Whitehead, members of the Group knew that 
the NRDC would soon be asking for an expedited export li-
cense, and at this meeting the Working Group began to dis-
cuss the NRDC project in general terms. They quickly real-
ized that because of the nexus between the particular equip-
ment the NRDC sought to export and the existing export 
regulations, the government would eventually have no 
choice but to grant the export license.341 Because the Sovi-
viewed in March 1987; William Clay, a State Department official, inter-
viewed in April 1987; and Charles East, a member of the staff of the Na-
tional Security Council, interviewed in August 1987. 
339. Interview with Leonard Appleby, supra note 338. 
340. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. Certain meetings of 
the Group, including the june 6 meeting, were also attended by Dr. Ralph 
Alewine Ill, Director of the Geophysical Sciences Group, Office of Strate-
gic Technology, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Interview 
with Dr. Ralph Alewine in Roslyn, Va. (May 5, 1987). 
341. One of the Pentagon officials present at the meeting was aware that 
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ets had insisted, however, on a clause in the NRDC-SAS 
agreement providing that seismic monitoring in Kazakhstan 
would begin by the end ofjune, slow or routine processing 
of the expected application might derail the project. The is-
sue for the Group, therefore, was whether to try to accelerate 
the processing, to decelerate it, or to let it take its normal 
course, whatever that might be. 342 
Deliberate delay was, in practice, a genuine possibility. 
Had the State Department recommended rejecting the appli-
cation: 
it wouldn't have been approved. We all appreciate 
the law, but if a high official wants to stop some-
thing it can be stopped. There are thousands of bu-
reaucratic reasons why you can stall. Delay is some-
times worse than denial. On a denial, you can go to 
court. But delay is the government's most potent 
tool. You have to back up a decision to deny, but 
not a decision to delay.343 
The government does in fact stall from time to time: 
We even stall a company out of business. I don't 
want to tell you about specific cases, so I have to be 
round about. Suppose a company had done a lot of 
sales of something that has dual civilian and military 
uses, such as radios. Now say that a country's status 
has changed because of a change of government, as 
in Iran. And let's say that the new government still 
wants the product, but the U.S. doesn't want them 
to have it. And let's say that we haven't formally 
pronounced an embargo, for political reasons. But 
whenever we become aware of an export by the 
American supplier of radios, we can have the Cus-
toms office hold up the goods and inquire whether 
they need a license, even though we know they 
don't. Then we can require them to document that 
the government had already licensed the export of a far more sophisti-
cated seismic system-one just like the borehole system that the NRDC 
planned to export a few months later to replace the early surface system-
to Bulgaria, to enable that Soviet ally to build an earthquake warning net-
work. /d. 
342. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. 
343. Interview with Donald Hammond, supra note 145. 
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every component of the radio is decontrolled, and 
when they finally submit the documentation, we can 
pass the papers around from office to office. I know 
that kind of thing has happened.344 
The State Department members of the Working Group were 
aware that (despite his letter to Cochran three months ear-
lier), Whitehead had a "fairly relaxed attitude" about the 
project. 345 However, they expected resistance from other 
agencies, particularly Perle's office. One State Department 
member argued for expediting consideration of the license 
application when it arrived, but the representative of the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (reflecting the atti-
tude of Director Kenneth Adelman) suggested that the 
group explore means to slow down the procedure.346 When 
Perle's representative Ed Nawrocki took a middle course, ar-
guing that the project was "just a routine scientific ex-
change" and that the Government should follow the normal 
procedures for such exchanges,347 Myrick supported him. 
Those inclined to try to obstruct the process could not realis-
tically expect to budge the group away from a compromise 
on which the two leading players-the State Department 
chairman and the man representing Perle-agreed. More-
over, the leaders "realized that there had to be grounds for 
holding up an export license and even if you had grounds to 
refuse one ... [i]t would look bad to hold them up on proce-
dural grounds."348 
On this issue, then, the critical bargaining took place at 
the lowest possible level, the Working Group. On approxi-
mately June 11, 1986, the Group reached a consensus in 
favor of handling the license application, when it arrived, ac-
cording to standard procedures. 349 
Working Group consensus can be challenged at higher 
344. !d. 
345. Interview with William Clay, supra note 338. 
346. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. 
347. Interview with Col. Ed Nawrocki, Office of Verification Policy, 
UASD/ISD Department of Defense, in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 16, 1987). 
348. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. 
349. /d. According to Blair, the group's consensus is reflected in part of 
a still-classified document entitled Memorandum from Bismark Myrick to 
the Members of the Working Group on Nuclear Testing Limitations Uune 
11, 1986). 
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levels,350 however, and when the Interagency Group on Nu-
clear Testing Limitations convened at the Pentagon on june 
17, 1986 with Perle the chairman,351 Perle questioned the 
Working Group's consensus. 
In the eyes of Perle and his deputy and successor Frank 
Gaffney, the project was very dangerous. Gaffney saw the 
project as "a calculated effort by the Soviet government to 
undermine U.S. security policy." Gaffney maintained that 
the U.S. Government should do "everything it legally could 
do to discourage it as we would discourage any subver-
sion."352 Perle's opinion was equally negative. If Perle 
could have had his way, he would have prevented the project 
from going forward because he thought "it could give the 
public the misleading impression that seismic verification 
alone would be sufficient to verify a test ban" treaty.353 In 
the June 17 meeting, he said that the NRDC program would 
350. This procedure, like many other practices in the system of national 
security decision-making, has no basis in regulations or other WiiUen 
guidelines. "Executive orders delegate some of the President's authority 
to specific Cabinet officers. More frequently, however, the operating rules 
[determining which bureaus have responsibility for 'moving' an issue 
through the government, which ones must 'clear' communications to peo-
ple outside of the government, or even to senior government officials, and 
how high in the government an issue must go] are not written down any 
place but are understood intuitively by those involved." M. HALPERIN 
wrrn: P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, BuREAUCRATIC PoUTics AND FoREIGN PouCY 
107 (1974). 
351. The role of presiding over the IG rotated between Allen Holmes, 
Director of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the Department of 
State (in practice, his deputy John Hawes usually attended for him), and 
Perle, and between the State Department and the Pentagon, reflecting the 
perennial rivalry between the two Departments for control of nuclear arms 
control policy. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. "Much of the 
story of the Reagan Administration's arms·control policy is the story of the 
struggle" between Perle and Richard Burt, a predecessor of Holmes. S. 
TALBOIT, DEADLY GAMBITS 15 (1984). 
352. Interview with Frank]. Gaffuey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy, in Washington, D.C. 
(July 2, 1987). In August, 1986, Gaffuey wrote that "Soviet authorities 
hope the NRDC experiment will serve ... to confuse the domestic debate 
about the need for American nuclear testing and the reasons why we op-
pose the effort of the Soviet Union and others to promote an inequitable 
and unverifiable ban on nuclear testing." Gaffuey, Test Ban: The "Quick 
Fix" Won't Work, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1986, at Al5, col. 1. 
353. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335. 
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not advance U.S. policy, and therefore the Government 
should not make it easy, but should slow or stop the pro-
gress. 354 The IG members from other departments, particu-
larly the Department of Energy to which Cochran had circu-
lated a draft list of the equipment he proposed to use, re-
plied that the seismic equipment that NRDC wanted to 
export did not seem to present any problems, and that 
Cochran had expressed his willingness to substitute other 
equipment if the proposed items were problematic.355 
Checked by the regulations, Perle retreated.356 He rejected 
any extra-legal opportunities for delay because he did not 
want to expose himself or the Defense Department to 
charges of arbitrariness. 357 
Within a few days, Perle met in the Pentagon withjohn 
Konfala, Director of the Pentagon's Office of Strategic 
Trade. That Office acts for the Department of Defense when 
the Department of Commerce receives a license application 
that requires concurrent Defense approval. 358 Perle alerted 
Konfala to the imminently expected application and told him 
that the Department would not object to the export li-
cense.359 
Perle's decision not to fight the export license did not, 
however, solve NRDC's problem. Under normal proce-
dures, the Government would take approximately sixty days 
to process the papers,360 and when the IG met on June 17, 
354. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. 
355. !d. 
356. !d. 
357. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335. "We 
couldn't do anything about it because they were within the technical limits 
set by the export regulations," Perle says. "It would have been different if 
they had needed an exception from us; then I would have been very com-
fortable denying it, just because I didn't like the project." !d. 
358. "There's nothing in writing about it so don't bother to file a [sic] 
FOIA [Freedom oflnformation Act] request. I don't know exactly when it 
was. I won't tell you who attended." Telephone interview with John 
Konfala, Director, Office of Strategic Trade, Defense Technology Security 
Agency (April 14, 1987). 
359. !d. 
360. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. In addition, Donald 
Hammond, a Commerce Department official who helped NRDC to com-
plete its application, told NRDC attorney David Wirth that under standard 
Department procedures, the application would not be approved for 
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1986 NRDC had not yet filed its application. The Working 
Group consensus had resolved only to handle the applica-
tion through normal channels, and had specifically decided 
not to expedite consideration of the NRDC application. 
At this juncture, Bill DeWind intervened to assist the 
project. One of his law partners, Bayless Manning, was an 
old friend of Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and 
had served with him on the Board of Directors of the Aetna 
Corporation. At DeWind's request, Manning telephoned 
Baldrige and cleared the way for DeWind to speak with him. 
At Baldrige's direction, DeWind then spoke with Laverne 
Smith, Director of the Department's Exporter Assistance Di-
vision.361 
At about the same time, Cochran moved on another 
front. He contacted Bismark Myrick, his contact at the State 
Department, to request State's help in expediting the license 
application. Myrick told him that although State would not 
publicly support the NRDC project, it would "give whatever 
support it could to expedite the export license within the 
Government."362 Myrick also advised Cochran (probably 
following whatever general directions Whitehead had given 
Myrick) that normal Commerce Department processing 
would take sixty to 120 days, and that NRDC should there-
fore ask the licensing officials in the Department of Com-
merce to call Myrick to confirm that the "application should 
be handled on an emergency basis. "363 This conversation 
encouraged Cochran and others at the NRDC to inform the 
Commerce Department officials that the State Department 
wanted the license application expedited. On june 18, 1986, 
however, Myrick remonstrated with Cochran, telling him that 
NRDC's statements that State wanted the license expedited 
were "putting us [at State] in a bad position" with colleagues 
months. Telephone interview with David Wirth, NRDC attorney (April 2, 
1987). 
361. Interview with Adrian W. DeWind, NRDC Board Chair, in Las 
Vegas, Nev. (Jan. 15, 1988). 
362. Memorandum to David Wirth, NRDC, from Thomas Cochran, 
NRDC (June 10, 1986) (reporting conversation of June 9, 1986 between 
Cochran and Bismark Myrick). This conversation took place afler the 
Working Group meeting of June 6 and two days before Myrick's memo-
randum reporting the "hands-off" consensus of the Working Group. 
363. /d. 
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in other agencies, and he asked Cochran not to say that State 
was being helpful. 364 
Meanwhile, Cochran and David Wirth had been meeting 
frequently with Commerce Department officials for guidance 
on completion of the application forms, no easy task for a 
first-time exporter because of the need to include the num-
bers of the sections of the regulations governing each piece 
of equipment. Every contact was a problem. "First we 
needed to find out what we needed to do to apply. There's a 
phone number for export licenses in the Department of 
Commerce, but it's busy all the time. People with automatic 
redialers call it a hundred times to get through, so there's no 
chance of getting them on the phone. We went down there 
personally, since we were in Washington .... "365 After sev-
eral false starts, and unfruitful meetings, Cochran and Wirth 
were referred to Don Hammond, an official in the Office of 
Export Administration of the Commerce Department who 
took an interest in their project. Hammond could sympa-
thize with their problems: 
They'd bucked up against the bureaucracy in a way 
that isn't that unusual. The office of Export Admin-
istration is a big organization with one phone 
number. The people who work in it have evolved a 
scheme to cope with the large numbers of exporters 
who want attention. Whomever you get passes you 
on to someone else. They have lists of ten referral 
numbers. If 75% of the individuals take that tack, 
people will be referred fifteen times before they 
give up. I've had a woman crying on the phone with 
me, begging me not to hang up, because no one 
else would talk with her. 366 
Hammond had another reason for taking some extra time to 
help the NRDC. Before coming to the Department of Com-
merce, he had worked for twenty years at the Naval Research 
Laboratory. At the Laboratory, "all I'd heard about the ver-
ification of nuclear test restrictions was just talk: 'it can be 
done, it can't be done.' Just a lot of arm waving.'' Now, at 
364. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran (entry of june 18, 1986); in-
terview with Dr. Thomas Cochran, supra note 72. 
365. Telephone interview with David Wirth, supra note 360. 
366. Interview with Donald Hammond, supra note 145. 
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last, "[s]omebody was doing something other than just talk-
ing about verification. "367 
Hammond spent several hours helping the NRDC to 
prepare its application. He found out which items of equip-
ment required a license. With respect to the items about 
which he was unsure, he informally consulted colleagues 
who would know the relevant export control regulations. 
Though his job was to be a technical advisor on the formula-
tion of certain types of regulations and he was not in the Of-
fice of Export Licenses which actually processed applica-
tions, he considered what he could do to speed the applica-
tion once it was filed. 368 
The application was filed with the Commerce Depart-
ment on June 18, 1986,369 but the key people at the Depart-
ment had anticipated its arrival. Two days earlier, the 
"emergency handling officer of the day, "370 Dale N. Tashar-
ski, had prepared a Special Processing Control Record371 to 
cover the application when it arrived. 372 Without any further 
notations, this form would have caused other Commerce of-
ficials to give the application priority over others and to hand 
carry it among offices.373 But on this form, two further nota-
tions had been added. In the "Remarks" box on the form, 
Tasharski had printed, in block letters, "RUSH STATE 
DEPT. REQUEST NEED BY JUNE 24." Under his notation, 
in a different hand, someone else had written, "Expedite per 
Baldrige Request. "374 
The irregularity of the entries can be explained only by 
speculation. Mr. Tasharski (who handled dozens of special 
processing requests each time he rotated through the duties 
of "emergency processing officer of the day") no longer re-
calls precisely who asked him to make the "rush" notation. 
However, he thinks it unlikely that a State Department offi-
367. !d. 
368. !d. 
369. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran (entry of june 18, 1986). 
370. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
371. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
372. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Spe-
cial Processing Control Record 4001, covering Export License Application 
B 130273 (hand-datedjune 16, 1986, machine-datedjune 18, 1986). 
373. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
374. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra note 372. 
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cial would have called him directly. More likely, some higher 
official in Commerce relayed the State request to him.375 
What was the chain of information? Myrick had asked 
Cochran to have the Commerce Department call Myrick's of-
fice.376 Probably, when a middle-level Commerce Depart-
ment official phoned Myrick's office on Cochran's urging, 
Myrick or a subordinate made the "State Department re-
quest."377 Since Laverne Smith, with whom DeWind spoke 
at Secretary Baldrige's request, was Tasharski's immediate 
superior,s7s it seems highly likely379 that she was the source 
or author of the second notation. 
The Office of Export Licensing was alerted to the exi-
gency three times, which might have been enough to ensure 
expedition of the processing. Nevertheless, Hammond 
made sure that nothing went wrong. "I don't work in that 
office and couldn't order anyone to do anything," he says. 
But you get to know the individuals in the office and 
who has to sign off at each step of the way. You get 
to know them on a personal basis, and you talk to 
them about something other than business, and to 
develop a relationship other than a professional 
one. And then people will do things for you, almost 
as a personal favor, if you don't ask too often and if 
it doesn't get them in trouble. I can ask favors of 
people a few times a year. And I was able to get 
faster action on this one.3so 
NRDC had every advantage in Commerce: the Department's 
Special Processing routine reserved for two percent of appli-
cations; an expedition request from another agency; inter-
375. Cf Letter from Dale N. Tasharski, Trade Specialist, Nashville Dis-
trict Office, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Philip G. Schrag Uune 11, 1987). 
376. See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
377. The circumstantial evidence suggesting that the call to Commerce 
originated with Myrick or his office includes (1) Myrick's statement to 
Cochran, (2) the fact that Myrick's office was handling the NRDC project 
for the State Department on a day-to-day basis, and (3) Richard Perle's 
statement that if Myrick did help to expedite the processing of the export 
license, "that would have been consistent with the position that he took [in 
interagency meetings] all along." Telephone interview with Richard 
Perle, supra note 335. 
378. Interview with james Truske, supra note 182. 
379. Ms. Smith declined to be interviewed. 
380. Interview with Donald Hammond, supra note 145. 
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vention from, or attributed to the Secretary himself;381 and a 
sympathetic employee with direct, personal access to the li-
censing officials. As a result of this four-pronged pressure, 
Commerce acted in record time, and within two days of be-
ing filed, the application had completed its Commerce De-
partment review and was on its way to the Department of 
Defense. 382 
Review at Defense was another matter. No one at State 
could intervene there because the principle ofleaving NRDC 
to the standard routines had been settled by the IG. NRDC 
had no connections with the Secretary of Defense, and no 
sympathetic employee was likely to emerge. 
Nevertheless, when the application reached the Office of 
Strategic Trade Policy (OSTP) in the Defense Depart-
ment,383 NRDC benefitted fortuitously both from the nota-
tion on the cover sheet reflecting Baldrige's personal interest 
and from Perle's prior consideration of the matter. "The 
fact that Baldrige was interested carried some weight . . . 
Commerce would be on the phone with our office every day 
[if we didn't make a prompt decision on this case]."384 This 
fact might alone have been enough to speed up the first half 
ofOSTP review, the technical assessment ofwhether the ex-
port was consistent with the export control regulations. All 
applications evaluated at OSTP also undergo a second, "pol-
icy" review, however.sss This additional review could have 
slowed the application considerably. Fortunately for the 
NRDC, in this instance, "Perle and the other policy people 
had [already] met, so we didn't have to go back to the policy 
381. Appealing to the Secretary through an outside channel was not 
without its risks. A Commerce Department official later told the NRDC's 
David Wirth that such tactics "would help us in the short run but would 
hurt us in the long run, because by disrupting the routine of the Depan-
ment of Commerce workers, we would make enemies who would retaliate 
against us when we filed our subsequent applications." Telephone inter-
view with David Wirth, supra note 359. 
382. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
383. The application was hand carried across the Potomac as pan of its 
"special processing." Telephone interview with john Konfala, Director, 
Office of Strategic Trade Policy, Defense Technology Security Adl\linistra-
tion (April 14, 1987}. 
384. /d. 
385. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
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people";386 as a result, the policy review within OSTP was 
fast and virtually pro forma. 387 
If the application had simply arrived in OSTP in the nor-
mal course of business, it would have taken ten to fifteen 
days to process and could legally have remained in defense 
for forty days.388 In fact, because of pressure from OSTP's 
Commerce Department counterparts and because Konfala 
had already discussed the project with Perle and knew that 
there was "high-level focus" on this project at State, Defense 
and Commerce,389 the Department of Defense approved the 
application within two working days. 390 Defense then expe-
dited communication of its decision to the Department of 
Commerce, which immediately thereafter granted the li-
cense.391 Indeed, Commerce not only speedily granted the 
license, but gave NRDC one year to complete the export, 
rather than the month which is the standard expiration pe-
riod for licenses granted through special processing. Grant-
ing a one-year license for an application handled through the 
Department's expedited procedures is extremely rare. It 
happens only once every four or five months, and it hap-
pened in this case because the papers showed the personal 
386. Interview with Norman D. Kass, Office of Strategic Trade Policy, 
Defense Technology Security Administration, in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 10, 
1987). 
387. According to Mr. Kass, prior political review was one of six reasons 
why the application cleared the Defense Department's reviewers so 
quickly. The others were (1) the fact that the equipment was going to 
remain under the control of American scientists, so OSTP did not have to 
investigate a Soviet end-user; (2) the fact that the NRDC had done its 
"missionary work" by explaining the project to senior officials at State 
before filing its application, so "even though it was embarrassing that a 
private group had done something that the US government hadn't been 
able to achieve, we knew what we were dealing with"; (3) the fact that 
Commerce officials had called ahead to say that the application would 
soon be arriving; (4) calls from the NRDC to alert OSTP officials that the 
application was arriving from Commerce; and (5) the evident urgency that 
the applicants from the NRDC felt. /d. 
388. Id.; 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2409(e) (1985). 
389. Telephone interview with John Konfala, supra note 383. 
390. See supra note 193. Perle did not know until the author's interview 
with him more than a year later that the application had moved through 
his Department so quickly. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra 
note 335. 
391. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text. 
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concern of Secretary Baldrige.392 Reflecting on the speed 
with which this application was processed, one Defense De-
partment official noted, in a colloquial paraphrase of Allison, 
"This shows how the government works. From an adminis-
trative standpoint, there are established procedures. But 
also there's a lot of ad-hoc-ism."393 
NRDC's next problem was obtaining the visas for Soviet 
scientists. During the deliberations on how to respond to 
the expected export license application, the Working Group 
had known that the NRDC-SAS agreement called for recip-
rocal visits to the United States. The Working Group had 
never discussed the proper response to Soviet visa applica-
tions, however, because its members believed that the Sovi-
ets would never actually implement this part of the arrange-
ment. The Group reasoned that since the U.S. Geological 
Survey openly published seismic data from Nevada, includ-
ing data showing most, if not all, of the U.S. nuclear tests, 
the Soviets would not want to go to the expense of sending a 
team to Nevada. The Soviets insisted on negotiating recip-
rocal rights into the agreement, the Group assumed, only so 
that the deal ·with NRDC did not look to the world like a uni-
lateral U.S. inspection of the Soviet Union. As a result, 
Working Group consideration of these two phases of the 
project were "two very distinct operations."39-t 
Mter the license was granted, some officials began to fo-
cus on the next stage. At an IG meeting onjune 27, 1089, 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Kenneth 
Adelman said that if the Soviets did propose to come, his 
agency would oppose the visit. In july, when U.S. scientists 
were already placing their seismic equipment in Kazakhstan, 
American newspapers reported the NRDC's announcement 
that the Soviets were indeed planning to come to the United 
States to select sites for their stations. The Soviets wanted to 
have these sites operational by October.39s 
Reacting quickly, the State Department sent a telegram 
392. Interview with james Truske, Division of Exporters Assistance, De-
partment of Commerce (May 28, 1987). When the Secretary is interested, 
"people hop to be accommodating." /d. 
393. Telephone interview with john Konfala, supra note 383. 
394. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. 
395. See, e.g., Gerstenzang, Soviet Scientists Plan to Monitor Nroada A-Tests, 
L.A. Times,July 15, 1986, at 16, col. 1. 
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
94 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 21:1 
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, alerting the Embassy to the 
U.S. newspaper reports. "Given the media attention from 
both sides which the travel of such a team of Soviet scientists 
would attract, and the need to consider the question of visa 
issuance for these purposes, post should alert the Depart-
ment ASAP when these Soviet scientists apply," the cable or-
dered. "Please advise via Visas Donkey Chipmunk . . . for 
appropriate adjudication. "396 
Several aspects of this telegram are worth noting. First, 
it is clear from the text that media attention was among 
State's early concerns regarding the visa problem, and the 
public relations factor would continue to mold U.S. policy. 
Second, although the law gives consular officers theoretically 
unreviewable discretion with respect to decisions on the ex-
cludability of nonimmigrant visitors, 397 the officials at the 
Soviet desk who drafted and approved the telegram398 were 
instructing the visa officers in the Embassy to request from 
them an "appropriate adjudication" which, in effect, would 
guide the decision of the Embassy personnel. Finally, the 
Government would take advantage of the controls on Com-
munists in the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act to exert leverage 
over the visit. Under State Department codes,399 "Donkey" 
means a request for an advisory opinion from headquarters 
in Washington, and "Chipmunk" refers to a request for a 
determination as to eligibility under the Communist-exclu-
sion sections of the Act, with the further recommendation of 
the consular officer that if the applicant is thought to be inel-
igible only on the basis of Communist affiliations, the ineligi-
bility should be waived by the Justice Department.400 
At about the same time that the State Department sent 
its telegram to Moscow, State officials sent a visa proposal to 
396. U.S. Dep't of State, Outgoing Telegram No. 222084 from the Sec-
retary of State to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow Quly 16, 1987). 
397. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. · 
398. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 395 (drafters located in "SOV," 
the Department's Soviet desk). 
399. The codes are not secret; they are shorthands that date back to the 
days when telegraphic communication was so expensive that single words 
were used to express pre-agreed longer messages. Telephone interview 
with Cornelius D. Scully, Director, Office of Legislation, Regulations, and 
Advisory Opinions, Visa Office, U.S. Dep't of State Uuly 6, 1987). 
400. Id. 
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
1988] POUCY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE 95 
the three people on the National Security Council (NSC) 
staff who dealt with arms control issues.401 These officials 
refused, however, to allow State to decide the issue unilater-
ally or in consultation only with NSC staff. In mid-:July, NSC 
asked State to run the decision through the interagency pro-
cess, starting with the Working Group.-1o2 
Early in August 1986, therefore, the Working Group be-
gan to discuss the proper U.S. response when the Embassy 
reported the filing of a visa application. Because of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act, the government had more options with 
respect to the visas than it did with respect to the export 
licenses. As a result, the Working Group did not, in this 
case, reach an easy consensus. The State Department repre-
sentatives argued that the Soviet applications, once filed, 
should be handled in accordance with normal visa regula-
tions. This position had the cosmetic advantage of parallel-
ling the "normal processing" outcome of the Working 
Group's debate about the export license. In practice, how-
ever, since the Department consistently recommends waivers 
for Soviet nationals without applying foreign policy crite-
ria,403 the outcome for which State argued would have 
granted the Soviets the visas they sought. The State mem-
bers of the Group and a few others who agreed with them 
reasoned that as U.S. officials "[we] were going to have to 
take our lumps for giving them [the Soviets] the seismic data, 
but we shouldn't also have to take lumps by being seen as 
trying to spoil the process. We shouldn't look as though the 
U.S. wasn't as open as the Soviets were being."404 
The representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed 
·with the State Department,405 but Perle's representative, Ed 
40 L The three NSC staff members were Sven Kraemer, Robert Linhard, 
and Linton Brooks. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. Of the 
three, Kraemer was the most influential on this issue, because he was 
deeply familiar with the NRDC case by virtue of his membership on the 
Working Group. Cf interview with Dr. James Timbie, supra note 336. 
402. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. 
403. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text. 
404. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. 
405. In foreign policy matters, the uniformed services do not always 
agree with the Pentagon civilians. Richard Perle has observed that "most 
of these fellows [Pentagon generals he works with] are not paid to have 
ideas, when you come right down to it. Asking them to advise on arms 
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Nawrocki, strongly disagreed. Nawrocki believed that: 
the NRDC's goals were totally the opposite of our 
own. They went into this project to prove that a 
CTB is verifiable. [And we'd made verification into 
the main public objection to a CTB because] verifi-
cation is such a 'show stopper,' as Richard Perle is 
fond of saying. So the government didn't go much 
beyond verification as a reason why we shouldn't 
have a CTB. And NRDC was out to undermine the 
verification argument against a CTB.406 
Perle and Nawrocki had another reason to try to block the 
NRDC project, if possible. On August 8, 1986, in the midst 
of the Working Group's debate as to how the United States 
should respond, the House of Representatives was debating 
an amendment to the following year's military authorization 
bill. The amendment would have prohibited the United 
States from testing nuclear weapons of more than one kt un-
less the Soviets ended their moratorium and tested at yields 
higher than this level. Several members were pointing to the 
NRDC project as key evidence to show that the Soviets 
would indeed cooperate in CTB verification. The chairman 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee noted that the 
NRDC project "could be expanded to incorporate a wider 
network of monitoring stations on their territory which 
would provide even greater monitoring confidence."407 
In the Working Group, Perle's representatives did not 
take the hardest possible line, which would have been to 
deny the Soviet scientists any possibility of visiting the 
United States. Perhaps Perle saw the public relations price 
control is a little bit unfair. It doesn't come naturally to them." Hiatt, A 
Richard Perle Sampler, Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1985, at A20, col. 2. 
406. Interview with Col. Ed Nawrocki, supra note 347. 
407. 132 CoNG. REc. H5738 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. 
Fascell). One member displayed, in the well of the House, "the first seis-
mogram from an in-country monitoring system to come back from the So-
viet Union." Holding the seismogram up to the television cameras in the 
House, he added, "This, my friends, is the Soviet moratorium in action, a 
graphic description of what happens when a nuclear explosion doesn't go 
off. It should have been a U.S. official agency installing this equipment, 
not a private American environmental organization. The signatures that 
are on this seismogram should read: Adelman, Perle, Weinberger, Gaff-
ney, not the names of independent scientists." !d. at H5744 (statement of 
Rep. Hartley). 
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of a fiat denial as too costly. Instead, Nawrocki argued that 
the Soviets should be told that they could come, but only as 
official representatives of the Soviet Government, on an offi-
cial visit to the United States. In that context, they should be 
invited only to the Nevada Test Site, and only for the purpose 
of observing an American test and measuring its yield with 
CORRTEX or some similar mechanism.408 In other words, 
the Government should counter the NRDC project by invit-
ing the Soviets to accept the offer that President Reagan had 
extended to them a year earlier, an offer they had already 
rejected. In proposing this policy, Perle was indifferent to 
the Soviet reaction. If the Soviets accepted, the NRDC pro-
ject would be revealed as one that was really sponsored, on 
the Soviet side, by the Soviet Government.409 If Soviets 
turned the program down, "no damage would be done. "410 
The other members of the Working Group took posi-
tions between those of the two most directly affected agen-
cies, State and Defense, but somewhat closer to the stand of 
State. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency repre-
sentative argued that the visas should be granted but that the 
Government should insist that that the Soviet visit was lim-
ited to scientific purposes. This formulation might allow the 
Soviets to come, but, by characterizing the visit as a scientific 
exchange, could make the visit less newsworthy and could 
also reserve for the Government the option of discontinuing 
cooperation if it wanted to stop the Soviets from monitoring 
actual nuclear tests. The Department of Energy's member 
said that the visas should be granted, and that the Govern-
ment should avoid official involvement in the visit.4 11 
Unable to reach consensus among the four different 
proposals, the Working Group wrote an options paper 
408. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338, confirmed in part in 
interview with Frank]. Gaffuey, supra note 338. 
409. Interview with Richard Perle, supra note 335. 
410. Interview with Frank]. Gaffuey, supra note 338. The U.S. Govern-
ment might still have appeared obstructive, but the obstruction would 
have been less apparent than the clear blockade represented by a visa de-
nial with no counter-offer. 
411. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 352. The NSC member took 
no formal position, since the NSC is, in principle, a coordinating rather 
than an operating agency. 
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describing the agencies' positions,412 which was intended to 
be circulated to more senior officials for resolution at an IG 
meeting. Just after the paper had been completed, however, 
the Soviets filed their application, with a proposed itinerary 
that included areas in California and Nevada I 00 miles from 
the Test Site, and a proposed arrival date of September 14, 
1986.413 NRDC was already making arrangements for the 
Soviet delegation to meet reporters at several stops in the 
United States, and to attend various scientific meetings. 
With the clock running, the Labor Day holiday intervening, 
and little prospect for any greater agreement in the IG than 
in the Working Group, the IG members did not meet. In-
stead, they forwarded the options paper directly to the staff 
of the National Security Council.414 The reference of such a 
matter to the NSC staff had become a standard procedure for 
resolving State-Defense standoffs, "in fact it was as a conse-
quence of virtual paralysis in the development of arms con-
trol policy in 1983 that that subject was moved to the White 
House."415 
Meanwhile, the NRDC staff members attempted to work 
with the Department of State officials to smooth the visa pro-
cess, as they had with Commerce Department officials in the 
case of the export license. Cochran asked Myrick for assist-
ance, and Myrick's office told him to deal with Gladys 
Boluda, at the State Department's Soviet desk, who worked 
on visa matters.416 Cochran made no mention of inter-
agency disputes, working groups, Communist exclusions, or 
waivers. To the NRDC, impliedly, the decision was being 
handled through routine bureaucratic processes. Cochran 
412. Memorandum for Members of the Interagency Group on Nuclear 
Testing Limitations From the Nuclear Testing Working Group (Aug. 28, 
1986). The memorandum is still classified and the author has not seen it. 
413. Letter to Gladys Boluda, Department of State, from Dr. Thomas 
Cochran, NRDC (Sept. 2, 1986); Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran 
(entry of Aug. 26, 1986). 
414. Interview with Steven Blair, supra note 338. The NSC staff had a 
copy of the Working Group paper in late August by virtue of Sven Krae-
mer's membership in the Group. This paper was not formally transmitted 
by the State Department to the NSC, however, until September 13. Inter-
view with Charles East, supra note 338. 
415. McFarlane, Letter to the Editor, Wash. Post, June 28, 1987, at C6, col. 
3. 
416. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran (entry of Aug. 26, 1986). 
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called Boluda, informing her of the scientists' proposed itin-
erary and their proposed September 14 arrival date, and fol-
lowed his call with a letter appealing for her help in expedit-
ing the visa process.417 Two days later, Boluda told Ann 
Schonfield, an NRDC research associate, that although the 
U.S. Embassy in Moscow had not actually received the visa 
applications, everyone knew that they would be filed immi-
nently, and the Embassy staff was ready to process them. 
She told Schonfield that the approval process usually took 
two to three days, and, in response to a concern expressed 
by Schonfield, reasssured her that NRDC need not worry 
about the Soviets being restricted to certain geographic ar-
eas-that was a problem only for diplomats.418 
Two days after the Working Group completed its op-
tions paper and sent it to the NSC staff, Nicholas Daniloff, a 
journalist for U.S. News & World Report, was arrested and 
jailed in Moscow, apparently in retaliation for the August 23, 
1986 arrest in New York of Gennadi Zakharov, a Soviet sci-
entific officer assigned to the United Nations.419 The Presi-
dent and the nation were outraged. After writing two letters 
to General Secretary Gorbachev,420 President Reagan told 
the United Nations General Assembly that the Daniloff arrest 
had cast a pall over U.S.-Soviet relations,421 and the United 
States ordered the expulsion of twenty-five Soviet diplo-
mats.422 The NSC staff members who received the NRDC 
options paper could not have failed to notice the potential 
political fallout if they granted, in the midst of the Daniloff 
4I7. Letter to Gladys Boluda, supra note 4I3. 
4I8. Handwritten notes of Ann Schonfield, NRDC (dated Sept. 4, 1986). 
Travel of Soviet diplomats to certain areas (usually designated by county) of 
the United States is prohibited, in retaliation for restrictions on travel by 
Americans in the Soviet Union. See Note from the United States Secretary 
of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union (Nov. 1, 1983), rt:}ltcted in 
u.s. DEP'T OF STATE, MAP OF AREAS AND MUNICIPALlTlES IN THE u.s. OPEN 
OR CLOSED TO TRAVEL BY SOVIET OFFICIAL PERSONNEL (undated). 
4I9. Bohlen, KGB Says U.S. Reporter Engaged in Espionage, Wash. Post, 
Sept. I, I986, at AI, col. 1. 
420. Hoffman, Reagan Feeling Pressure From Daniloff Detention, Wash. Post, 
Sept. 22, I986, at AI, col. 4. 
421. Hoffman, Reagan U.N. Speech Cites Anns Progress, Hits Daniloff Arrest, 
Wash. Post, Sept. 23, I986, at AI, col. 5. 
422. Ottaway & Cannon, U.S. Firm on Ousting 25 Soviets, Wash. Post, 
Sept. 22, I986 at AI, col. 3. 
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crisis, unrestricted visas to a highly visible group of Soviet 
scientists who were coming to monitor American nuclear 
tests. With Daniloff a prisoner, the visit of the Soviet scien-
tists "had a domestic political dimension" which "had a psy-
chological bearing" on the outcome of the NRDC applica-
tion.423 
Unbeknownst to Cochran and Schonfield, who contin-
ued to write to Boluda,424 the matter was now in the hands of 
NSC staff members. Behind the scenes, each of the major 
players lobbied the NSC staff in attempts to persuade that 
arbiter to take its side. Frank Gaffney, Perle's deputy, was 
the Defense Department's "point man"425 in "some off-line 
discussions."426 While at Foggy Bottom, "everybody was 
talking to everybody at many levels."427 Both Whitehead 
and Secretary of State George Shultz called Admiral John 
Poindexter, the President's National Security Advisor, to 
press for a decision in State's favor.428 
The delay in processing the visas was caused in part by 
preoccupation throughout the national security community 
with other matters, including the Daniloff affair,429 partly be-
cause of the awkwardness of dealing with the issue with 
Daniloff unresolved, and partly by the continuing informal 
discussions with and among the NSC staff members and the 
President's National Security Advisor. During the first three 
weeks of September there were many such discussions. In-
423. Interview with Dr. James Timbie, Special Assistant to the Deputy 
Secretary of State (Mar. 10, 1987). 
424. Letter to Gladys Boluda, Department of State, from Ann Schonfield 
(Sept. 5, 1986). 
425. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. 
426. Interview with Frank]. Gaffney, supra note 352. 
427. Telephone interview with john Hawes, Deputy Chief of Mission, 
U.S. Embassy to Morocco Uuly 20, 1987). Mr. Hawes served in 1986 as 
the principal deputy for purposes of the NRDC project to Allen Holmes, 
Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Sitting in for Mr. 
Holmes, he co-chaired (with Perle) the IG meetings dealing with nuclear 
testing restraints. According to Richard Perle, although interagency con-
flicts are a "fact oflife, ... under this Administration the National Security 
Council has been weaker than in prior administrations. Its ability to rec-
oncile differences is less. So the differences persist longer and are fought 
out with greater determination." Pear, Those to Whom the "Bailie Royal" is 
Nothing New, N.Y. Times, july 28, 1987, at Al4, col. I. 
428. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. 
429. Interview with Frank]. Gaffney, supra note 352. 
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deed, "[t]he role of [Working Group and IG] papers is to 
trigger the informal discussions. The papers cause the dis-
cussions, but the decisions are really made as a result of a 
series of informal dialogues. "4So 
After Daniloff had been released from prison into the 
custody of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,431 the NSC staff 
members reached a decision which Admiral Poindexter rati-
fied.432 The NSC considered both the Perle option of re-
stricting the Soviets to an official visit to the Test Site under 
government auspices and the Whitehead option of letting 
them make the trip that they wanted to make. In the end, the 
NSC staff members selected some aspects of each approach 
and gave the Soviets a choice. They could come as an official 
delegation, measure a test in Nevada, and then do as they 
pleased, or they could come as guests ofNRDC but not go to 
the prospective sites that they wanted to examine:tss 
In part, this choice grew out of the previous proposals. 
Toward the end of the informal bargaining process, when it 
became clear to the State Department that the NSC would 
not support their preferred approach, State Department 
members stopped asking for unrestricted visas and argued in 
favor of a conditioned visa, so as to avoid a blanket denial.434 
But the idea of giving the Soviets two options took all of the 
agencies by surprise. The reason for this outcome was that 
the NSC staff "split the difference. The decision embodied a 
430. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. 
431. See Cannon, Daniloff Freed by Soviets; U.S. to Return Zaklzarov, Wash. 
Post, Sept. 30, 1986, at AI, col. 4. 
432. "The decision was formally looked at by Poindexter. I wouldn't say 
he 'rubberstamped' our decision; 'ratify' is the non-pejorative term. On 
issues other than very major ones, we staff members tend to debate and 
decide them, and the National Security Advisor signs off. In this case, he 
had no questions about our recommended course of action." Interview 
with Charles East, supra note 338. 
433. Outgoing Telegram No. 305164 from the Secretary of State to 
Europoean Embassies et aL (Sept. 27, 1986) (press guidance). 
434. Interview with Leonard Appleby, supra note 338. The concept of a 
conditioned license was originally suggested in an interagency meeting by 
someone from an agency other than the State Department, but after 
Myrick checked with the Visa Office to make sure that this device would be 
lawful, the State Department officials decided that they could live with it 
for the sake of compromise. Interview with William Clay, supra note 338, 
supplemented by telephone interview with William Clay (Aug. 17, 1987). 
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compromise between imposing no conditions [State's pre-
ferred approach] and permitting the Soviets to come only as 
government officials [favored by Defense]." The compro-
mise resulted because compromise is "the typical decision-
making mode in the U.S. government."435 As a NSC staff 
member explained, "Sometimes we have to be tie-breakers. 
But there is a very strong split-the-difference ethic that works 
over here. The NSC staff tries to find a solution that's ac-
ceptable for the country and to avoid complete winners and 
losers in the bureaucracy. This administration has some re-
semblance to a feudal system and there is no sense in pissing 
off the barons if you don't have to do so. We try to keep the 
process as a whole functioning."436 
On September 24, 1986, Myrick informed Cochran of 
the two options,437 and shortly thereafter the State Depart-
ment issued press guidance attempting to make the Govern-
ment's decision appear to have been an utterly routine 
one.43S The Soviet visit was rescheduled based on a trun-
cated itinerary, and the Soviet scientists selected sites for 
seismic stations in California and Nevada based on maps and 
rock samples shown to them while they were in San Diego.43!J 
When the Soviets asked to return a few months later, to par-
ticipate in the establishment of the stations, they were again 
offered two unpalatable choices. They could measure the 
yield of a U.S. test and then enjoy an unrestricted three-
month visit, or if they refused to monitor a test, they would 
be limited to a seven day U.S. visit and barred from visiting 
the areas in which they wanted to set up stations.440 
On this round of governmental consideration, some of 
435. Interview with FrankJ. Gaffney, supra note 338. 
436. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. 
437. Daily Journal of Dr. Thomas Cochran, NRDC (entry of Sept. 24, 
1986). According to the NRDC staff member who had primary responsi-
bility for trying to get an answer to the visa request from federal officials, 
"[w]e never got a formal tum-down. We never heard anything from 
Boluda though we'd been calling her five times a day." Interview with 
Ann Schonfield, NRDC Research Associate, in Washington, D.C. Uan. 7, 
1987). 
438. "Regarding the issuance of visas, visa requests submitted by Soviet 
officials routinely require waivers. Such waivers may involve certain condi-
tions or restrictions." Outgoing Telegram No. 305164, supra note 433. 
439. Moe, Soviets' N-test Plan Blocked, San Diego Union, Nov. 11, 1986. 
440. Telephone interview with S.Jacob Scherr (Mar. 13, 1987). 
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the factors had changed. Daniloff had long since returned to 
the United States and the diplomatic relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union was slightly less 
chilly. Nevertheless, the decision on this second visa applica-
tion was virtually identical to the decision on the first one 
because, through the interagency fracas, a new standard op-
erating procedure had been implicitly established-a proce-
dure for dealing with NRDC visa requests. As one State De-
partment participant in the process explained: 
the second time around, there was no Daniloff af-
fair, but by then we had a policy. It was easier just 
to follow the policy because it seemed to work. 
Also, by just following our previous policy, we 
could keep Defense out of our knickers. If you just 
say, 'now we've got a policy that everyone agreed 
to, and we'll carry it out,' they can't tell you what to 
do. Also it's easier to continue a policy than to re-
visit it. And you waste as little time as possible:H 1 
This time, however, the Soviets rejected both options, 
choosing not to visit. They preferred to allow the NRDC to 
perform the site preparation work and, if necessary, to ac-
cept electronic data reports without ever visiting the sites. 
Although data collection in Nevada would not actually be 
hampered by the fact that the Soviets never set foot there, 
the inability to provide reciprocal access to the sites in the 
United States opened the project to attack from the Soviet 
Government bureaucracy. The lack of reciprocity may have 
contributed to the Soviet decisions in the summer of 1987 to 
require NRDC scientists to move the Kazakhstan stations to 
locations further from Semipalatinsk, and to leave all of the 
Soviet stations under the day-to-day control only of Soviet 
nationals.442 
Because application for permission to install the seismic 
stations on government land had to await Soviet selection of 
particular sites, the interaction between the NRDC and the 
Government on this issue lagged behind the resolutions of 
the export license and visa issues. By the time the sites had 
441. Interview with Leonard Appleby, supra note 338. 
442. Telephone interview with S.Jacob Scherr ijuly 9, 1987);su Natural 
Resources Defense Council and Soviet Academy of Sciences, USA-USSR 
Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Agreement ijune 25, 1987). 
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been selected, NRDC had contract~d to the University of Ne-
vada at Reno the responsibility for setting up the U.S. sta-
tions. 
lnjanuary and February 1987, the University of Nevada 
applied for rights-of-way to erect the three stations.'143The 
University subcontractor suggested that the applications be 
filed by the University, rather than by the NRDC, and that 
they not mention the NRDC-SAS agreement.444 The NRDC 
agreed to this proposal. At both institutions, those who were 
working on the project made decisions about the application 
forms based on their understanding of bureaucratic deci-
sion-making. The technicians at the University Laboratory 
had long-standing relationships with the government agen-
cies that would process the applications. The University had 
been installing seismograph stations on public lands in Ne-
vada for more than twenty years. Their experience pre-
dated the Government's enforcement, beginning in the 
1970's, of laws requiring permits even for minor installations 
on federal lands. Walter Nicks, the engineer who actually 
signed the applications on behalf of the University, had, over 
a period of five to seven years, participated in obtaining per-
mits for about thirty such stations. All of the University's ap-
plications had been granted without difficulty, and no one 
had ever objected to seismic monitoring near the Nevada 
Test Site.445 
443. Application of the University of Nevada-Reno for Transportation 
and Utility Systems and Facilities on Federal Lands to the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management Uan. 30, 1987) (re: 
Deep Springs Valley); Application of the University of Nevada-Reno for a 
Special Use Application to the U.S. Department of the Agriculture-Forest 
Service (Feb. 24 1987) (re: Troy Canyon); Application of the University of 
Nevada-Reno for Transportation and Utility Systems and Facilities on 
Federal Lands, to the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land 
Management (undated) with covering letter from Walter Nicks to Ben Col-
lins, District Manager Uan. 30, 1987) (re: Nelson). 
444. Telephone interview with Walter Nicks, Research and Design Engi-
neer, Seismological Laboratory, University of Nevada-Reno (April 21, 
1987). NRDC'sjacob Scherr recalls agreeing with the suggestion that the 
applications be filed by the University, but does not recall being aware that 
the University was not even mentioning the agreement in its application. 
Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 25, 
1987). 
445. Interview with Nicks, supra note 444. 
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Nicks and his colleagues "thought it best not to men-
tion"446 the agreement with the Soviets. The NRDC's offi-
cials acquiesced in Nicks' judgment because of past adver-
sarial relationships between the NRDC and the Bureau of 
Land Management. "We have sued BLM and the Forest Ser-
vice countless times," reasoned Jacob Scherr, the principal 
NRDC attorney working on the project.447 
Accordingly, the applications were indistinguishable 
from those previously filed by the University and granted by 
the federal agencies. The applicant was the University, en-
abling it to check a box on the form categorizing the appli-
cant as "State Government." Where the application re-
quired the applicant to "describe in detail the land use," the 
University stated that the right-of-way was needed "to estab-
lish an earthquake monitoring station to obtain seismic data 
used in the laboratory's research."448 In the University's ex-
planation of why federal land had to be used, the University 
noted that "station location needed to obtain earthquake data 
from this location." In its statement of need, the University 
said that "sites are needed to provide essential seismic data. 
Science, education, public awareness and public safety all 
benefit from the collection of this data. "449 
Despite the the lack of mention of the NRDC, the Soviet 
Union or nuclear test monitoring on the applications, federal 
officials at all three offices responsible for processing the ap-
plications knew that the real purpose of the applications was 
to monitor testing at the Nevada Test Site as part of a coop-
erative project with the Soviets. At the U.S. Forest Service 
headquarters for Humboldt National Forest, the Troy Can-
446. /d. 
447. "It could have been counterproductive to have named NRDC as 
the applicant. The papers might have gone, eventually, to someone who 
knew about NRDC lawsuits and who might have let them remain for a 
while at the bottom of his stack. We didn't want to take a chance by calling 
special attention to these applications. We wanted them to be handled 
routinely." Telephone interview with S. Jacob Scherr, NRDC attorney 
(April 22, 1987). 
448. NRDC Application, supra note 443. 
449. Application of the University of Nevada-Reno for a Special Use Ap-
plication to U.S. Dep't of Agriculture-Forest Service, supra note 442 (em-
phasis added). Regarding the reference to earthquakes, Nicks reasoned 
that "it will measure earthquakes as well." Telephone interview with Wal-
ter Nicks, supra note 444. 
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yon application was assigned for investigation to Steve Wy-
att, a range conservation and mineral specialist and Gary 
Shafran, a recreation and lands staff officer. The first step in 
processing the application was to view the proposed site. In 
order to resolve expeditiously any problems that might arise, 
the federal officials invited Walter Nicks, who had signed the 
application, to walk the site with them. Nicks agreed, and he 
brought one ofhis students with him. The student had been 
to Kazakhstan, where he had helped to install a station simi-
lar to the one that would be installed at Troy Canyon. 
During the site walk, Nicks and his student discussed 
some of the technical aspects of the Soviet stations, and the 
federal officials joined the conversation. As a result, the fed-
eral officials learned about the NRDC-SAS agreement and 
the purpose of the Nevada station.4so 
This disclosure may have subtly improved the already 
good prospects for approval. "It probably influenced my de-
cision in a positive way," says Shafran, the senior of the three 
officials, and the one who had responsibility for making a 
positive or negative recommendation to BJ. Graves, the For-
est Supervisor. "It was a very positive factor in my mind be-
cause it was part of a larger effort to determine whether nu-
clear tests can be differentiated from earthquakes, and that is 
very worthwhile research."45I 
After the site visit, Larry Gillham, a recreational for-
ester, was assigned to draft the environmental assessment 
which would then be sent to Shafran for review. Gillham was 
aware of the agreement with the Soviets because he had seen 
the project on the television news and was already excited 
about the project. But Gillham was conscious of not al-
lowing his interest to affect his professional judgments. Nev-
ertheless, that the purpose of the project did not negatively 
impress him influenced him, at least in part. Gillham also 
confirms the validity of the concerns previously expressed by 
Jacob Scherr: 
I have pretty much full say about how this project 
goes. If I'd had a bias, I could have slowed it down 
450. Telephone interview with Steve Wyatt, U.S. Forest Service, Hum-
boldt Nat'l Forest Uuly 23, 1987); telephone interview with Gary Shafran, 
U.S. Forest Service, Humboldt Nat'l Forest Uuly 23, 1987). 
451. Telephone interview with Gary Shafran, supra note 450. 
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or speeded it up. That's how the government 
works. It all depends on individuals. But I'm new 
here, and I haven't built up biases yet. I just try to 
get a project done whatever it is.452 
107 
The function of Forest Service officials involved in mak-
ing a recommendation to the Forest Supervisor was not to 
judge the nuclear test monitoring purposes of the seismo-
graph station but to evaluate the environmental effect. "The 
purpose of a project has no bearing on our approval," Gil-
lham says. "We treated this application like we treat all spe-
cial use applications. Our only job is to mitigate environ-
mental impacts. Our only concern is with the disturbance of 
the surface and the protection of natural resources. We 
never get into what the project is specifically for. "453 The 
fact that the application had come from the University of Ne-
vada reinforced the officials' tendency to treat the project 
routinely. "That added a lot of credibility to the stated need 
for the site," Shafran remarks, "[i]t's a reputable school, so 
we would feel good about any proposal we received from 
them."454 
Concerned only with environmental aspects, Gillham 
did not consider soliciting comment from the State or De-
fense Departments. He did, however, confer with the De-
partment of Wildlife of the State of Nevada. The Wildlife 
Department was satisfied by the University's posting of a 
$5,000 bond to guarantee that the land would be re-
stored.455 With these issues resolved, Shafran recom-
mended approval to the Forest Supervisor. Because the test-
ban verification potential of the station was a positive factor 
in his mind, Shafran edited Gillham's environmental assess-
ment to include a description of the international ramifica-
tions of the permit: 
The seismic data is needed as part of a larger re-
search project. It involves both the United States 
and [the Soviet Union]. Seismic instruments are be-
ing located around both countries [sic] nuclear test 
452. Telephone interview with Larry Gillham, U.S. Forest Service, Hum-
boldt Nat'l. Forest Uuly 23, 1987). 
453. /d. 
454. Telephone interview with Gary Shafran, supra note 450. 
455. Telephone interview with Steve Wyatt, supra note 450. 
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sites. The objective being to be able to distinguish 
nuclear explosions from natural earthquakes. This 
could then be used to verify a nuclear test ban 
treaty.456 
The Forest Supervisor, however, was not favorably or 
negatively influenced by this statement. Focusing only on 
the environmental concerns, Mr. Graves granted the per-
mit:457 
"I granted the right-of-way because the project 
would have minimal ground-disturbing activity .... 
Even though it may have positive world-wide polit-
ical and social implications, I didn't take account of 
them. We do sometimes take political and social ef-
fects into account, but only when they are local 
ones, not global ones. My job is to assess how well 
the land can handle the use it's going to be put 
to."45s 
The application for a station site near Deep Springs, 
California, was assigned for initial processing to Eric Wat-
son, a natural resources specialist with the Ridgecrest, Cali-
fornia, office of the Bureau of Land Management. Because 
of a local policy of requiring that rights-of-way involving 
communications sites be approved at the District level, Wat-
son's evaluation could not be approved by the Resource 
Area Manager in the Ridgecrest office. Although the appli-
cation only mentioned earthquakes, Nicks told Watson on 
the telephone that the purpose of the station was to monitor 
U.S. nuclear tests as part of an exchange with the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences. Watson was troubled that "the written 
application wasn't really the same as the oral description we 
got [over the phone]. That isn't good."459 
An environmental assessment typically begins with a de-
456. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Forest Service, Environmental Assess-
ment Decision Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact, University of 
Nevada-Reno Troy Canyon Seismic Site Uune 18, 1987). 
457. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Forest Service, Special Use Permit, 
granted to the University of Nevada Uune 18, 1987). 
458. Telephone interview with BJ. Graves, Forest Supervisor, Hum-
boldt National Forest (Aug. 3, 1987). 
459. Telephone interview with Eric Watson, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment Uuly 23, 1987). 
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scription of the project. Watson began to write a description 
which included the real purpose of the effort stating that the 
project would help with weapons control and the prevention 
of nuclear war. On second thought he discarded his draft 
and began a new one which did not mention nuclear testing. 
"I decided to follow the written application," he said. "It 
was better that way, for the sake of the papenvork."4Go 
The entire staff of Watson's Ridgecrest office knew that 
the purpose of the seismograph station would be nuclear test 
monitoring.461 Nevertheless, all of the officials of that office 
who worked on the papers confined their focus to environ-
mental concerns. "We worked it up from a natural resources 
perspective: the botanical impacts, geology, wildlife, that 
sort of thing. We don't look at the politics or purposes of a 
project."462 
As a result, the District Manager receiving the papers for 
final decision was unaware that the application was for an 
NRDC-sponsored project or that it involved nuclear test 
monitoring as well as earthquake detection. Had the papers 
disclosed more, said Watson: 
the District Manager might have knocked it up to 
the State Director, and the State Director might 
have sent a copy of the papers to the Defense De-
partment. There probably would have been more 
inquiries, but the result would probably have been 
the same. The purpose certainly wouldn't have 
been a negative factor. From the point of view of 
most people, setting up mutual monitoring stations 
to verify limits on nuclear testing can only be a 
good thing.463 
As at Troy Canyon, the fact that the University of Nevada 
had applied for the Deep Springs right-of-way might have 
affected the processing of the application: 
460. /d. 
461. /d. 
462. /d. Mr. Watson's statement is entirely consistent with BLM regula-
tions. See supra notes 286-290 and accompanying texL 
463. Telephone interview with Eric Watson, supra note 459. At the time 
of the interview, Mr. Watson was probably not aware that some senior 
Defense Department officials viewed this particular monitoring project as 
a "subversion" of U.S. foreign policy. See supra note 352 and accompany-
ing text. 
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That made it a more routine case. The NRDC 
probably would have seemed more political, 
although I don't know because I know a lot of the 
environmental organizations, but I'm not familiar 
with the NRDC. If the applicant had been the 
NRDC, that probably would have at least led us to 
require a more complete written description of the 
project.464 
Nevertheless, the description was deemed adequate, and the 
application was routinely approved.465 
The application to build a station on BLM-managed 
land near Nelson, Nevada, followed a similar procedural 
path, though it included a twist which advanced its consider-
ation to a higher bureaucratic level. Initially, the application 
was assigned to a realty specialist, Dennis Samuelson, for re-
view. At Samuelson's level, the application was entirely rou-
tine. He needed only to insure that no archaeological arti-
facts would be disturbed, and that the grazing area of the 
local rancher would not be impaired.466 
The environmental analysis prepared by the staff was 
sent to Ben Collins, the District Manager in BLM's Las Vegas 
office. Collins would have granted routine approval to what 
appeared to be an application for a small earthquake moni-
toring station, with no significant environmental impact. But 
as Collins was about to sign the permit, he remembered that 
months earlier, he had been called by Bob Stewart, the pub-
lic relations director in BLM's State Office in Reno, and had 
been told to watch for an application for a right-of-way for a 
seismic station that would monitor nuclear tests at the Na-
tional Test Site. Although the University's application for 
the Nelson site did not mention nuclear test monitoring, 
Collins realized this application was the one Stewart had 
mentioned. As directed, Collins telephoned Ed Spang, 
BLM's Nevada State Director.467 
464. Telephone interview with Eric Watson, supra note 459. 
465. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Special 
Use Permit No. CA 19121 (a "right-of-way"), granted to the University of 
Nevada-Reno (March 8, 1987). 
466. Telephone interview with Dennis Samuelson, BLM Realty Special-
ist, Las Vegas, Nev. (Aug. 10, 1987). 
467. Telephone interview with Ben Collins, BLM District Manager, L,s 
Vegas, Nev. (Aug. 11, 1987). 
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When Collins spoke to Spang, the State Director told of 
two concerns. First, Spang noticed that the University of Ne-
vada was applying for several rights-of-way in the State, in-
cluding not only the seismic research stations at Troy Can-
yon and Nelson, but numerous other facilities unrelated to 
the NRDC project. This series of requests reminded him of 
another setting in which an applicant for the use of Nevada 
land-the United States Air Force-had over the years ac-
quired the right to use several small parcels. Each one indi-
vidually was innocuous but, combined, constituted such a 
large withdrawal of public land for bombing ranges and 
other military uses that BLM's acquiescence had become a 
public issue. Spang thought that the University's numerous 
pending and expected applications should be reviewed to-
gether, rather than piecemeal. The State Director did not 
want the Nelson application to become the "camel's nose 
under the tent. "468 
Second, Spang feared that if BLM granted the requested 
right-of-way, the Bureau might appear to be acting inconsis-
tently. In recent months, BLM had generated controversy in 
Nevada by granting rights-of-way in connection with two sig-
nificant local activities-a proposed nuclear waste repository 
at Yucca Mountain and the Air Force's emplacement of elec-
tronic devices in order to conduct tests involving tactical air-
craft. As a result of local concern, BLM had recently placed 
a moratorium on the granting of any further rights-of-way 
for these activi_ties. Spang wanted to know how BLM could 
justify granting a right-of-way for a nuclear test monitoring 
project while it was denying rights-of-way for these other nu-
clear or military projects.469 
Spang surveyed all of the University's applications, and 
was satisfied that they were not cumulatively excessive. Col-
lins found two answers to Spang's concern about consis-
tency. First, Collins noted that BLM's office in Ridgecrest, 
California, and the Forest Service in Humboldt, had already 
granted permits for the very same activity. The Government 
would certainly appear to lack consistency if it granted two of 
-the requested permits but denied the third. Second, Collins 
468. Telephone interview with Bob Stewart, Public Relations Director, 
BLM Nevada State Office, Reno, Nev. (Aug. 17, 1987). 
469. Telephone interview with Ben Collins, supra note 467. 
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determined, through a telephone call, that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), which manages the Nevada Test Site, 
had no objection to granting the right-of-way.47o 
To make the inquiry into DOE opinion, Collins called 
DOE's Nevada operations office and spoke with Pete Fitzsim-
mons, the Director of Health, Physics, and Environment 
there. Fitzsimmons regarded Collin's request as an informal 
inquiry regarding the granting of rights-of-way, not as an of-
ficial request for DOE approval. Consequently, Fitzsimmons 
did not check with more senior DOE officials and told Col-
lins that DOE had no objection to granting another right-of-
way.471 
Spang was persuaded by the precedential cases that Col-
lins cited, and by the fact that DOE had no objection. 
Neither Spang nor Collins ever questioned the State or De-
fense Departments regarding opinions on the application.472 
Spang authorized Collins to issue the right-of-way, and Col-
lins granted it immediately.473 
No one will know whether, had the rights-of-way appli-
cations been known about, the senior Defense Department 
officials who opposed the Soviet scientists' visit to the sites474 
470. Id. 
471. Telephone interview with Pete Fitzsimmons, Director of the 
Health, Physics, and Environment Division, Nevada Operations Office, 
U.S. Dep't of Energy (Aug. II, I987). 
472. Telephone interview with Ben Collins, supra note 467; telephone 
interview with Ed Spang, Nevada State Director, BLM (Aug. I8, I987). 
473. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Special 
Use Permit No. N 46068 (Aug. 2, I987). 
474. The senior officials of the Defense Department did not know. In-
terview with Richard Perle, supra note 335; Frank J. Gaffney, supra note 
352. The author assured the NRDC, in connection with soliciting that or-
ganization's cooperation in the writing of this study, that he would not ask 
questions that would cause officials who might be unsupportive of the pro-
ject to reopen matters that were just being settled. Accordingly, the pre-
cise question he asked Messrs. Perle and Gaffney was not "[a]re you aware 
that NRDC needs federal permission to install seismic equipment on fed-
eral property in order to carry out its project?" He asked, instead, "Be-
sides the export licenses and visas, are you aware of any other forms of 
government cooperation that NRDC wanted for its project?" To this 
question (posed after the Troy Canyon and Deep Springs rights-of-way 
were granted and, in one case, while the Nelson application was pending 
and, in the other,just after it had been granted), Messrs. Perle and Gaffney 
responded in the negative. Id. 
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would have tried to intervene or whether they would have 
succeeded.475 By chance, Defense was not part of the right-
of-way action channel. The lower level officials in the De-
partments of Agriculture and the Interior did not seek com-
ments from Defense, and Cochran's statements, reported in 
the national press,476 were apparently not noticed in the 
Pentagon. In addition, neither the Department of Agricul-
ture nor the Department of the Interior were connected to 
the National Security Council's action channel for nuclear 
testing issues. Consequently, the NSC staff had no knowl-
edge of the permits that those agencies were processing.477 
Fortuitously, a Department of Energy official (Fitzsim-
mons) was consulted regarding one station permit. His 
agency was represented on the Interagency Group and the 
Working Group on nuclear test limitations. The stations is-
sue might have been brought before the Interagency Group 
through this channel and, utimately, sent to the NSC staff. 
The official, however, was an environmental officer, not a 
policy-maker, and since he had only been consulted in an in-
formal manner, he saw no need to seek policy guidance from 
senior officials in Washington. For the above reasons, in the 
spring and summer of 1987, the national security policy-
makers who had fought vigorously over the issue of visa 
awards for the NRDC project, remained unaware that federal 
officials in other departments were in the course of routinely 
granting permits to install nuclear test monitoring stations 
on government property. 
The description of the Government's response to the 
NRDC initiative, as constructed by a Model III analyst, im-
plies explanations that can be phrased in terms of interper-
sonal interactions rather than policies of a nation or its stan-
dard responses. As seen by the Model III analyst, the central 
4 75. Given the regulatory plan, Perle and Gaffuey might have been able 
to slow down the processing for a while, but they probably could not have 
prevented the rights-of-way from being granted. See supra notes 286-290 
and accompanying text. 
476. Blakeslee, Russian Team Arrives to Mo11itor Atom Test.s, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 11, 1986, at C8, col. 3 ("[T]he American scientists said they did not 
think it would be difficult to get permission to place instruments at the 
monitoring sites to be selected. All of the potential sites are on Govern-
ment land."). 
477. Interview with Charles East, supra note 338. 
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determinants of the Government's response were: (I) the at-
titudes of key senior officials of bureaucratic organizations, 
particularly Perle and Whitehead; (2) an action channel-in 
this case the Working Group reporting to an interagency 
group and ultimately to the President's National Security Ad-
visor and his staff-through which policy decisions could be 
negotiated; (3) bargaining and eventual compromise among 
the participants with power to affect the outcome; (4) rules of 
the game affecting the bargaining process; (5) maneuvers to 
affect the action channel for decisions and their implementa-
tion; (6) the introduction of new players at the implementa-
tion stage; and (7) misperception, misunderstanding, and 
luck. The relevance of each of these factors to the NRDC 
project may now be summarized briefly. 
A. The Attitudes of Key Officials 
If Whitehead and Perle had agreed that the government 
should do everything it could to undermine the NRDC ef-
fort, or had they agreed that the project could contribute to 
knowledge about verification of a test ban, the government's 
response would probably have been quite different. In the 
former case, the export licenses might have been delayed for 
months, perhaps long enough to cause the Soviets to lose 
patience with the NRDC. The Soviets would have been de-
nied a visa or invited to visit only if they would witness a 
CORRTEX demonstration. In the latter case, the Govern-
ment might have taken over the project as the NRDC invited 
it to do, or the Soviets would have received unrestricted 
visas.478 
A more challenging question is why the leaders held the 
views that they did. An analysis of the attitudes of Perle or 
Whitehead in terms of their individual histories is beyond 
the scope of this work. At least one factor might have been 
the agencies in which they found themselves or, as Allison 
4 78. If the leaders had strongly believed in the NRDC project but had 
felt constrained by the domestic political consequences of granting un-
restricted visas to monitor tests in Nevada, the government might have 
conditioned Soviet access to seismic monitoring sites on Soviet willingness 
to permit the stations in Kazakhstan to remain operating even if Soviet 
testing resumed-a condition that would have been readily understanda-
ble in terms of the principle of reciprocity. 
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reminds us, ''[W]here you stand depends on where you 
sit."479 Government logistics and self preservation explain 
why the person more willing to tolerate this Soviet-American 
joint project was the Deputy Secretary of State, an official of 
the Department primarily responsible for negotiating agree-
ments and maintaining good relations with other govern-
ments.480 On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense, an official of the Department responsible for deterring 
Soviet aggression (in part by maintaining a nuclear arsenal 
that some believed would be threatened by a treaty banning 
all nuclear weapon tests),481 most wanted the project to fail. 
To conclude that these individuals' bureaucratic base 
could constitute a complete explanation for their stances 
would be a mistake. Perle had formed his general stance to-
ward the Soviet Union long before his appointment to a pol-
icy job in the Pentagon. Indeed, he was appointed to that 
job largely because he held those views, views consonant 
with those of the Secretary of Defense and of the President. 
Senior public officials are rarely ciphers whose outlooks are 
shaped (in Model II terms) by their agencies' missions. They 
frequently seek, and are appointed to office (an essential 
479. G. ALLisoN, supra note 1, at 176 (quoting Prof. Don K. Price). 
480. Indeed, Perle believes that "[i]n its heart of hearts, State would 
have wanted to embrace this project, as a stepping stone to a CTB 
Treaty," but that it couldn't do so because the government's general pol-
icy toward a CTB had long been set in concrete. A more fundamental 
conflict about test ban policy was therefore, in his view, deflected to the 
second-level issue of how to react to the NRDC project, and particularly 
whether to grant the visas. Telephone interview with Richard Perle, supra 
note 335. 
481. See Current Negotiatwns on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Hearings 
Before the Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Subcomm. of the 
Hovse Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). In these hear-
ings, held during the Carter Administration while the U.S. was actively 
negotiating for a comprehensive test ban treaty, a Defense Department 
witness testified that "CTB would have an adverse affect [sic] upon U.S. 
stockpile reliability and upon our ability to develop new nuclear weap-
ons .... In my view, such a CTB would be asymmetrical in favor of the 
Soviets." Id. at 59 {statement of Adm. R.R. Monroe, Director, Defense 
Nuclear Agency). Similarly, a witness from the Department of Energy (the 
agency responsible for developing new nuclear weapons and for maintain-
ing the Nevada Test Site) testified that "in the long run without testing, we 
could not maintain the same confidence in our nuclear weapons stockpile 
that we have today .... " !d. at 22 (testimony of Dr. Donald Kerr, Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Dep't of Energy). 
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move in the Model III game) because they and their ap-
pointing officials seek to affect national politics in a particu-
lar way. 
B. The Action Channel 
The existence of a decision-making mechanism for nu-
clear test ban issues also affected the outcome of the various 
applications. Most export licensing decisions are made in a 
particular action channel. Depending on the commodity be-
ing exported, either the Commerce bureaucracy licenses uni-
laterally, or Commerce and Defense engage in bureaucratic 
bargaining. The Department of State, unilaterally, deter-
mines most visa applications. Occasionally it consults with 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Depart-
ment of Justice. 
In this instance, however, the Government had, years 
earlier, established a special action channel especially for is-
sues relating to constraints on nuclear testing. This action 
channel's jurisdiction was broad enough to encompass the 
NRDC problem when it presented itself. As a result, the rel-
evant players included not only officials from Commerce and 
Defense (for exports), and State (for visas), but also the Pres-
ident's National Security Advisor and the NSC staff, the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of 
Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite the 
statute482 assigning to the Attorney General the duty to im-
pose conditions on nonimmigrant visas,483 the Justice De-
partment's role in this case was virtually irrelevant.484 The 
482. Aliens and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(6) (1982). 
483. In another context (asylum), the staff of a Congressional Commis-
sion has severely criticized the Department of Justice for permitting the 
State Department to exercise, de facto, the discretion in immigration mat-
ters assigned by law to the Attorney General. "Congress has given the 
Attorney General the primary responsibility for deciding on the admission 
or exclusion of aliens in accordance with the INA [Immigration Act] .... 
The Attorney General, or his designated agent, may not fail to exercise the 
discretion which has been granted to him by Congress through stat-
utes .... The Department of State is not at liberty to control or coordinate 
an alien's request for admission .... " CoMMISSION ON SECURITY AND Co-
OPERATION IN EuROPE, THE MIROSLAV MEovm INCIDENT, CSCE Doc. No. 
1-2, IOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1987). 
484. How the visa issue would have been resolved if it had been decided 
by the Justice Department rather than by the test ban action channel is 
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Government's decisions with respect to establishing the seis-
mic stations on federal land never entered the test ban action 
channel. While difficult to determine what would have hap-
pened had those land use applications been debated by the 
Working Group or referred to the National Security Advisor, 
the possibily that the permits would have been denied (sub-
ject to litigation) on the ground that they were not consistent 
with the "public interest. "485 
C. Bargaining and Compromise 
The Government's export license and visa decisions re-
sulted at least partially from inter-agency bargaining. The 
former occured in the Working Group which achieved con-
sensus on processing the application in the normal course of 
business: The latter occured in both the Working Group 
and in "off-line" communications between senior depart-
mental officials and the President's National Security Advi-
sor. The final, critical decision was a compromise between 
positions of disagreeing officials, drawn from elements they 
proposed. Once the agencies reached an impasse and re-
ferred the visa issue to the NSC staff, compromise was an 
inevitable outcome because the NSC staff wanted to avoid 
impossible to know. But perhaps the visas would not then have been con-
ditioned, because it was the custom of the Immigration and Naturalization 
service to condition visas very rarely, and only when unrestricted travel of 
the applicant threatened the United States with loss of technological 
secrets. Even those restrictions, however, seem to result from decisions 
made in other departments. The only court to have addressed this issue 
believed that independentjudgment by Department of justice officials on 
visa applications was an important part of the statutory scheme. The idea 
that the bureaucratic model of decision-making could be used to design 
systems that would help to ensure that the laws would be faithfully exe-
cuted was attributed to Congress, and the division of visa denial responsi-
bility between the State and justice Departments was even analogized to 
the constitutional separation of powers between branches of government. 
"Congress apparently designed the [McGovern] Amendment with the 
traditional division of responsibility between the two executive depart-
ments in full view. Such divisions of responsibility, and the closely kept 
balance of powers that results from them, have long been regarded as an 
effective check on the disingenuity of individual public officials." Ahourc.k 
v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1986 (citing THE FEDERAL· 
IST No. 51)), ajf'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. l (1987). 
485. Forest Service, 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(h)(2) (1986); Bureau of Land 
Management, Interior, 43 C.F.R. § 2802.4(a)(2) (1986). 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
HeinOnline  -- 21 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 118 1988-1989
118 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 21:1 
outright "winners" and "losers" in the line departments.486 
D. Rules of the Game 
The bargaining power of the players was governed not 
only by their personal persuasiveness or by long-term inter-
departmental power relationships, but also by specific laws 
and understandings applicable to this case. In the Working 
Group, the bargaining over the export license was strongly 
influenced by pre-existing regulations governing export con-
trols. The decision not to impose arbitrary delays was influ-
enced, at least for some players, by a sense that such delays 
were unfair, or, if reported in the press, would be perceived 
by the public as unfair. The visa decision was made in the 
context of a web of statutes and regulations which opened 
some options (e.g., conditioning the visas) and closed others 
(e.g., making no decision at all). Similarly, law and custom 
highly regulated the process governing grants of authority to 
use federal lands. This process included widespread under-
standings that the job of the relevant licensing officials con-
sisted only in examining environmental factors and ignoring 
national or global political implications. 
E. Maneuvers to Affect the Channels for Decision 
and Implementation 
The Working Group made a decision to allow the Com-
merce Department and related agencies to handle the export 
license application regardless of how long that might take. 
In all probability, none of the Working Group members 
knew, when the decision was made, that Commerce had two 
implementation channels-a slow lane, for 98% of the cases, 
and a fast track for the rest. A key maneuver was to move 
this application from one channel to the other, and at least 
part of that play was executed by someone at the State De-
partment, probably although not necessarily, Bismark Myrick 
or someone in his office. The NRDC itself executed a sec-
ond key play to the same effect when DeWind contacted Sec-
retary Baldrige and was able to have Baldrige's name in-
voked as an authority for expedition. Similarly, action on the 
486. This competitive dynamic is a central-feature of Model III. See supra 
note 296 and accompanying text. 
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visa applications might have been different if the determina-
tion of the applicants' excludability had been left, as it must 
legally be left, to the consular officer in Moscow. In order to 
avoid the risk of policy makers' eventual exercise of discre-
tion being determinative, officials at State in Washington 
sent the telegram ordering the consular officer to request an 
advisory opinion through a "Donkey Chipmunk" cable. In 
addition, the NRDC dramatically influenced the decision 
channel for the station permits by applying in the name of 
the University of Nevada, and by omitting any reference to 
nuclear test monitoring in their applications. Although offi-
cials at all three recipient offices knew that the proposed seis-
mic research stations were part of a nuclear test monitoring 
project involving transmission of data to the Soviet Union, 
the fact that the applicant was a respected Nevada institu-
tion, technically, a part of the state government, and that the 
application documents did not overtly refer to nuclear tests 
helped to prevent challenges to the applications that might 
have caused them to be referred to policy officials at higher 
levels or in other departments. 
F. The Introduction of New Pla)'ers 
After the action channel reached the export license deci-
sion, the manner in which the decision was implemented was 
affected by the introduction of a whole new cast of charac-
ters. These characters included the Secretary of Commerce, 
the Director of the Exporter Assistance Division, the "emer-
gency processing officer of the day," a Commerce Depart-
ment official not responsible for acting on the application 
but who became NRDC's Samaritan, and the Director of the 
Defense Department's Office of Strategic Trade Policy. 
G. Misperception, Misunderstanding, and Luck 
In any real, complex, human interaction, people do not 
act with machine-like precision. The outcome is at least par-
tially influenced by factors such as misperception, misunder-
standing, and luck. The policy-makers in the Working 
Group, and their senior officials to an even greater extent, 
were too busy to devote a significant amount of time to react-
ing to the NRDC. Although Cochran had told Whitehead 
that the Soviets would need visas, the Working Group did 
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not even attempt to address the visa issue until it had re-
solved the export license issue that had arisen first. Hence, 
the Group denied itself the opportunity to formulate for the 
government an internally consistent policy affecting both is-
sues. 
Senior officials also lacked the time to explore aspects of 
the problem beyond those brought to their attention. They 
were unaware, therefore, that NRDC also needed permission 
to establish stations on federal land, even though NRDC's 
need was evident from the nature of the project and from the 
fact that Nevada land is owned almost exclusively by the U.S. 
Government.487 The Working Group members did not per-
ceive the possibility of expedition in their decision to let the 
normal processes of export licensing take their course. The 
officials of the Office to Strategic Trade Policy may have mis-
takenly taken Perle's acquiescence in the export and his in-
structions not to delay the license for concurrence in expe-
dited licensing. 
The role of luck is illustrated most dramatically by the 
fortuity of personal connections linking the Chairman of the 
Board of NRDC with both Whitehead and Baldrige, the 
arrest of Daniloff as the Working Group completed its visa 
option paper (which at least delayed the decision and may 
have made the Group less favorable to the project), and the 
fact that the House was debating a testing funds cut-off just 
as Perle was asked to take a stand on visas for the Soviet 
scientists (which became a factor, though not the decisive 
one, in the position he took).4SS 
To the Model III analyst, an understanding of how a 
governmental decision was made must derive from a close 
examination of motivating factors. As evidenced in the 
NRDC case, the factors affect how real people interact with 
487. In addition, Cochran had told the press that NRDC needed permis-
sion to emplace the monitoring instruments on federal land, and the press 
had reported that fact. Blakeslee, supra note 476. 
488. Another less dramatic example of the role of luck is the processing 
of the Nelson station application. Chance factors completely unrelated to 
the NRDC project (the fact that the University of Nevada had recently 
made other applications to use BLM-managed land, the current contro-
versy over the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste dump, and the Air Force's 
encroachments on public uses of land) caused a delay in the permitting 
process while the Nelson application was reviewed by the State Director. 
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each other under conditions of: pre-existing relationships; 
institutions (including action channels); constraints; incom-
plete information; limited time; multiple agendas; and di-
vided power. In principle, sufficient information about the 
interactions of officials (and others) in this milieu could en-
able the analyst to "explain" the government behavior. 
VI. THE THREE MODELS 
Describing the Government's response to the NRDC 
project three ways suggests that just as major crises, deploy-
ments, and negotiations can be understood from multiple 
perspectives,489 relatively routine national security decisions 
can usefully be examined through Allison's three different 
"lenses."490 Each of the three models contributes additional 
information to our understanding of government behav-
ior.491 This study also intimates that Allison may underesti-
489. That scholars have not yet been able to formulate more definitive 
theoretical statements about national security policy, such as a statement 
that bureaucratically negotiated decisions are never rational or a claim that 
ideology conquers bureaucracy in all decisions involving East-West con-
frontations may be unsettling. Foreign policy analysis over the last two 
decades "has not developed a generally coherent and validated set of the-
ories, as the spirit of scientific advances requires." Hill & Light, Fortign 
Policy Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 153 (A. Groom & C. 
Mitchell eds. 1978}. The "state of the art is still one of competing para-
digms [and] most scholars agree that real-world decision processes are 
marked by a mix of the procedures postulated by [the various] models." 
Maoz, The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision A7!al)•sis Applied to Crisis Behavior, 
25]. CoNFLICT RESOLUTION 677, 677-78 (1981). The present study is, in 
part, a response to Allison's call for further research to develop a "typol-
ogy of decisions and actions that would serve as a guide to the analyst 
about predominant reliance for a first cut." G. ALLISON, supra note I, at 
276. 
490. The metaphor is Allison's. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 2. 
491. There is no reason to think that the behavior of the U.S. Govern-
ment is unique although, as a result of inadequate information, even so-
phisticated analysts who understand the bureaucratic determinants of U.S. 
Government actions tend to treat other countries as if their officials made 
national, rational decisions. Allison cites the example of a U.S. Govern-
ment interagency meeting on Middle East desalination in which represent-
atives of twelve different agencies disagreed strenuously with one another 
and revealed that their agencies were acting at cross-purposes. They then 
proceeded to discuss "the Israeli policy on desalination" as if that policy 
had been dictated by one individual. G. ALLISON, supra note 1, at 14647. 
But see W. WALLACE & W.E. PETERSON, FoREIGN PoLICY MAKING IN WEST-
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mate the significance of two aspects of his paradigms: the 
role of laws and regulations in Model II and the role of inter-
personal initiative by people who are not leaders in Model 
III. The study enables speculation on ways in which one of 
the models may possess relatively greater explanatory power 
as the decisions under examination move down the ladder 
from crises and other "major" events492 to more routine na-
tional security concerns. 
The case study confirms that the new kinds of informa-
tion developed in the context of Models II and III add addi-
tional dimensions to reason, dimensions that deepen an un-
derstanding of why a decision was made.493 At the same 
time, the case study demonstrates that none of these models, 
standing by itself, presents an adequate picture of a very 
complex reality. A Model I explanation of the Government's 
reaction is the easiest to develop, and it comports with our 
innate hope that governmental decisions are reasonable and 
ERN EuROPE 1-2, 19-20, 124 (1978) for the view that "[p]luralist politics in 
Washington, encouraged by the division of powers in the American consti-
tution, do not necessarily provide representative data for generalisations 
that will extend to the one-party systems of Eastern Europe, or the nar-
rowly based elites of many less developed countries." Id. at 20 (citation 
omitted). 
Applying the three models to a study of why the Soviet government 
responded as it did to various aspects of the NRDC project would be very 
interesting. Why did it agree, early in 1986, to allow NRDC scientists to 
monitor its nuclear test site from stations in Kazakhstan? Why did the 
Soviet Government agree to send its scientists to the United States even 
though they were refused access to the potential station sites? Why did it 
at first refuse to allow NRDC monitoring during nuclear tests and then, in 
june 1987, reverse this position? The author is not in a position to answer 
these questions in depth, since addressing them on more than a superficial 
level would require interviews with Soviet officials. Perhaps glasnost will 
one day permit issues like these to be explored by Soviet scholars. 
492. See the rough distinction between critical and second-level national 
security problems at supra note 21. 
493. From a more practical perspective, appreciation of Models II and 
III could make decision-makers better able to achieve the results they de-
sire, by helping them to predict how standard operating routines and in-
terpersonal interactions will cause their desired outcomes to be modified 
in the course of decision-making and implementation. For an outline of 
advice to decision-makers based on these paradigms, see the "planning 
guide" developed by Allison & Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm 
and Some Policy Implications, in THEORY AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS 40, 77 (R. Tanter & R. Ullman eds. 1972). 
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within the control of accountable public officials.4 9-1 But af-
ter learning the fuller contexts developed under Models II 
and III, the Model I analysis of this case, like Allison's Model 
I description of the Cuban Missile Crisis, "seems somewhat 
disembodied,"495 and since, by definition, it must demon-
strate rationality, it is hard pressed to account for the full 
range of governmental responses to the NRDC project. 
Still, Model I must not be rejected altogether.496 The 
officials whose representatives bargained in the interagency 
Working Group were motivated, at least in part, by their 
conceptions of a unitary, rational "national interest." How-
ever, particular notions of where that interest lay varied from 
person to person. The State Department actors thought 
there might be some merit to the project, and that the na-
tional interest would not be served if the U.S. Government 
were seen by the world as attempting to strangle the project 
through delay or denials. Perle believed that the project 
could mislead the American public into premature enthusi-
asm for testing restraints and could encourage the Soviets to 
continue to refuse to negotiate TTB Treaty amendments en-
compassing a CORRTEX system. Each of the major policy-
494. Model I analyses "are perfectly coincident with the ethical assump-
tions of democratic politics" while the "machines" that make policy under 
Model II "cannot be held responsible for what they do, nor can the men 
caught in their workings," and Model III analyses suggest that "[p]olicy 
results from compromises and bargaining[, not] the values of the Presi-
dent let alone of lesser actors." Krasner, Are Bureaucracies Important?, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POUCY 411,412,414 (C. Kegley & E. 
Wittkopf eds. 1983). Ifformer National Security Advisor john Poindexter 
is to be believed, the diversion of Iran arms sales profits to the Contras in 
Nicaragua in 1986 offers a spectacular example of Krasner's ethical criti-
cism of bureaucratic analysis. If Model I is generally accepted, the public 
would put the blame squarely on the President for the policies carried out 
in his name and the illegal means used to implement them, while the other 
models, and Poindexter's testimony, tend to exonerate the President and 
blame a flawed system of national security decision-making or its less ac-
countable minor actors. Cf U.S. TOWER COMMISSION, REPORT OF TilE 
PRESIDENT's SPECIAL REVIEW BoARD IV-3 (1987). 
495. G. ALusoN, supra note 1, at 247. 
496. Krasner's characterization of Allison notwithstanding, Krasner, 
supra note 488, at 410, Allison himself concedes a place for Model I rea-
soning as a "quick, imaginative sorting out of a problem ... a productive 
shorthand." G. ALusoN, supra note 1, at 254. 
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makers was probably moved in large measure497 by individ-
ual conceptions of a rational response to the NRDC. 408 
Whether or not that was the case, in the bargaining that fol-
lowed each actor had to argue as if he held such a concep-
tion.499 
If any one of the individual, human players had con-
trolled the entire decision, the final results, in terms of the 
combination of decisions on export licensing, visas, and sta-
tion permits, might have been internally consistent. Un-
doubtedly on some occasions one player does "win," and 
perhaps some in which the players' views of the world are 
nearly congruent. Model I may be a more useful theory for 
such cases.500 
497. In the view of Morton Halperin, "much of what goes on in the gov-
ernment involves efforts to analyze an issue from the point of view of 
shared images and to persuade others that the requirements of national 
security, flowing from those shared images, require that a particular stand 
be taken. However, what is in fact in the national interest is often elusive 
despite shared images .... In such cases [participants] will often look to 
organizational interests." M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, Bu-
REAUCRATIC POLITICS AND fOREIGN POLICY 25 (1974). 
498. The point has also been made that Model III is more of a "ra-
tional" process than it would at first appear to be, because the act of com-
promise is itself intentional. "[T]he compromise that results from the 
pulling and hauling was deliberately intended by the participants. The ex-
act nature of the compromise that results may be unintended or unfore-
seen, but not the initial intent to achieve some sort of compromise." Art, 
Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique, 4 PoLICY Sci-
ENCES 467, 471 (1973). Whether the result can qualify as "rational" is 
unclear if it is one that no bargainer intended or would have desired, any 
more than a decision to decide a foreign policy question by throwing dice 
would be made "rational" by the deliberate intention of the gamblers to 
have the decision made in that way. 
499. That is, the informal "rules of the game" would have ruled out a 
claim that the NRDC project should be scuttled because it could lead to a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that might impair weapons designers' 
employment security. 
500. In a particular case, bureaucratic routines could support rather 
than undercut rational decision-making. In the case of the Israeli raid on 
Entebbe, the existing standard operating procedure militated against ne-
gotiation with terrorists, even to buy time, for events in Israel or friendly 
countries, but allowed such negotiation for events in hostile countries. 
This routine "instead of constraining the decision-makers, provided a use-
ful guide for the exploration of multiple options, had a built-in element of 
value tradeoffs, and [was] sufficiently flexible to allow on-the-spot improvi-
sations." Maoz, supra note 489, at 704. 
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
1988] POUCY, PROCEDURES, AND PEOPLE 125 
Furthermore, to overlook the role of deliberate, rational 
decision-making in establishing the very routines that char-
acterize Model II would be an error. For example, some ir-
rational inconsistencies in the export licensing controls may 
exist, and the controls may have curious impacts in unusual 
cases (e.g., disabling senior officials from having discretion 
to prevent NRDC's export). But the control list was created 
as an attempt to impose some rational ordering on export 
licensing. The plan was intended to be useful, in the great 
majority of cases (i.e., typical commercial trade matters) to 
protect the nation from its own commercial entities which, 
through ignorance or the profit motive, might otherwise be 
inclined to sell to other nations technology or goods that 
could be used in military actions against the United States. so• 
Model II considerably enhances an understanding of the 
Government's response to the NRDC. To begin with, the 
model discards the assumption (which a Model III investiga-
tion shows to be erroneous for this case) that the export li-
cense, visas, and station permits were all part of a single "de-
cision" and substitutes two assumptions more plausible to 
virtually everyone who has ever worked in a large bureau-
501. In addition to influencing the thinking of individuals who engage in 
Model III bargaining and the creation of Model II institutional mecha-
nisms, rational planning may affect the Model III game through individu-
als' commitments to policies that transcend the case at hand. As strongly 
as Perle believed that the NRDC project was harmful to U.S. foreign pol-
icy, he may have been committed even more strongly to a principle (or 
policy) of "fair dealing" which caused him to accept what he thought 
would be the "standard procedures" routine (as opposed to deliberate de-
lay) of export licensing. This relatively rational explanation is not, of 
course, the only possible hypothesis concerning the fact that he did not 
hold up the license for any period of time. In pure Model II terms, Perle's 
bureaucracy may not have had an available routine for deliberate delay, or 
the trouble to try to deviate from routine altogether might not have been 
worthwhile. (Indeed, the Office of Strategic Trade Policy had been criti-
cized for excessive delay in the average case, and the bureaucratic impera-
tive was to reduce it. The Office was very proud of the fact that it had 
reduced the average West-to-East case processing time from 70 to 15 days 
in only two years. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE TECHNOLOGY 
SECURITY PROGRAM, A REPORT TO THE 99TH CoNe., 2o SESSION 28 (1986).) 
In pure Model III terms, a strategy of deliberate delay in the face of the 
working group consensus (which had been ratified by the interagency 
group) might have incurred the wrath of other officials from whom Perle 
needed action on other occasions. 
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cracy. The new assumptions are that each ,part of the bu-
reaucracy usually works on only the part of the "decision" 
for which it has principal responsibility, and that a bureau-
cracy usually reacts only to the matter immediately before it. 
A bureaucracy does not anticipate related problems or evalu-
ate all of their ramifications before taking action on part of 
the problem. Seen in this light, no "government" decision 
was made. Rather various bureaucracies undertook a series 
of separate responses to particular parts of the NRDC's pro-
posed project. These bureaucracies included the Office of 
Export Licensing in Commerce, the Office of Strategic Trade 
Policy in Defense, and various offices in the Departments of 
State, Agriculture and the Interior. This effect resolves the 
central problem of the Model I explanation-the inability to 
integrate all of the parts of the Government's response into a 
single, internally consistent rational explanation. 
In addition to offering this central insight, the Model II 
description highlights a world in which decision-making in-
stitutions are not free to do whatever seems best or most rea-
sonable under the circumstances. Instead, decisions are 
channelled and constrained by formal and informal operat-
ing procedures. Some of these are standard routines devel-
oped by an agency itself for convenience in most of its case 
load. These include some classically Allisonian SOP's: 
Commerce Department's procedure of according very quick 
review to a small percentage of export license cases, and as-
signing to junior officers the power to decide when cases fall 
into that category; the Forest Service's routine of having Dis-
trict Rangers or Forest Supervisors in the field rule on appli-
cations for rights-of-way in the National Forests, rather than 
sending such applications to Washington for high-level re-
view; and the justice Department's tradition of allowing 
State Department officials to decide when the Attorney Gen-
eral should exercise his statutory power to waive the exclu-
sion of an alien or to condition a visa. 
The constraints on bureaucratic judgment also include, 
to a surprising extent, a welter of statutes and regulations, 
which share with the informal SOP's their historical attach-
ment to the "typical" case rather than to any particular deci-
sion to which they must be applied. Allison is not concerned 
with the web of legislative and regulatory limits on govern-
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mental freedom to act in the area of national security,S02 de-
spite their emergence as an increasingly significant feature of 
the national security landscape.503 Given the detailed nature 
of the regulations governing export licenses, for any level of 
government to reach a "policy" decision that could have pre-
vented the export would have been difficult. However, delay 
would have been available if the policy-makers had reached a 
consensus to stall the project. 
This regulatory constraint was based more in history 
than in conscious planning. It was essentially fortuitous that 
off-the-shelf seismometers were uncontrolled; that the data 
recorders the NRDC wanted to use fit the guidelines for ex-
port to the Soviet Union, and that only "national security" 
and not "foreign policy" controls applied to the export of 
such recorders to the U.S.S.R. (depriving those who might 
have opposed such a license of the additional argument that 
the export of the devices in the NRDC project undercut for-
eign policy). 
Similarly, had the governmental leaders reached con-
sensus, after the Soviet visit, on a "policy" of denying the use 
of federal lands to seismic stations monitoring U.S. nuclear 
tests, they would have found it virtually impossible to impose 
that choice. The existing land use regulations simply did not 
recognize such a policy. The standard routines for changing 
the regulations504 are slow and cumbersome, and denying 
the rights-of-way despite the regulations would quite proba-
bly have resulted in litigation and perhaps an embarrassing 
court defeat for the Reagan Administration.505 
502. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
503. This emergence oflegislative limits reflects the increasing role that 
Congress is playing in foreign policy, but may also indicate that, as Freder-
ickS. Young put it, "laws are an attempt [by Congress] to make Model III 
questions into Model II questions." Memorandum to Philip G. Schrag, 
July 22, 1987. There is, of course, disagreement as to whether, in most 
cases, decisions will be more reasonable if the relevant officials are less 
restricted. 
504. 5 U.S.C.A. § 553 (1982). 
505. To rationalize such a decision, the Government probably would 
have to claim that granting of the permits was not in the "public interest," 
a ground for denial under 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(h}(2) (1986) and 43 C.F.R. 
§ 2802.4(a)(2) (1986}, because it undercut U.S. pressure for CORRTEX. 
This claim would have given the NRDC the opportunity for a highly publi-
cized court test of whether its seismic verification project was in the public 
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Even in the matter of the visas, where the Government 
was able to impose its policy decision, its ability to do so was 
based in large measure on luck. That the Soviet scientists 
were excludable at all (as a result of the 1952 McCarran-Wal-
ter Act's ban on the entry of those with Communist affilia-
tions) was an historical accident favoring the Government,506 
and a countervailing fortuity favoring the NRDC that a Mc-
Govern Amendment was on the books, creating a presump-
tion in favor of waiving the exclusion.507 Luck favored the 
Government, in that the 1979 Solarz amendment had 
changed the McGovern amendment so that it did not apply 
to the Soviet Union,sos but luck favored the NRDC, in that 
State had interpreted the Solarz amendment in a way that 
did not, in fact, lift the presumption of ineligibility for Soviet 
nationals.509 The final stroke of luck benefitted the Govern-
ment's position: a little-used 1917 statute permitti~g the vis-
its of excludable aliens to be "conditioned" still remained on 
the books.510 
interest, and given the fact that the "public interest" provisions are rarely 
if ever used for this purpose, the NRDC might well win such a case. 
506. The purpose of these provisions was to exclude "subversives," see 
H.R. REP. No. 1365, supra note 251, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE GoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEws 1703, but their existence gave the government an opportu-
nity to control the visit of the Soviet scientists for reasons of foreign pol-
icy, notwithstanding the fact that no one argued that their presence would 
endanger U.S. security. 
507. The purpose of the McGovern Amendment was to implement the 
Helsinki Final Act, designed to encourage the free flow of people and 
ideas. Few of the legislators who voted for it could have contemplated 
that it might have the effect of preventing the U.S. from employing visa 
restrictions for this purpose, namely, pressuring a foreign government to 
bow to a U.S. position on a nuclear test ban treaty. The resulting standard 
procedure of waiving exclusions was significant in this case, for it both 
created genuine pressure to admit the Soviet visitors (departing from stan-
dard practices is harder to explain than adhering to them, and it can invite 
lawsuits) and armed the State Department representatives to the Working 
Group with a rationale for opposing the Defense position. 
508. For a historical discussion of laws governing visas, see supra note 
243. 
509. /d. 
510. In writing the 1917 statute that created the visa-conditioning rou-
tine, Congress was in no way addressing the use of visas as instruments of 
foreign policy, or even the control of visiting Communists (the Communist 
exclusion was added to the law 35 years later). The "policy" was to create 
a humane exception to the absolute prohibitions on admission to the 
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The legal restraints on the government's reaction to the 
NRDC project were at least as significant as the informal bu-
reaucratic routines, and like the pre-existing routines, they 
had no strong relationship to the particular issues posed by 
the seismic monitoring exchange. It may be the case that 
statutory constraints exert more influence on second-level 
national security decisions (like those involved in this case) 
than on major controversies. Although major aspects of for-
eign policy are increasingly governed by statutes, those stat-
utes may be phrased in more general terms in order to afford 
flexibility to the President.s11 
Sometimes, formal and informal routines interact in cu-
rious ways. For example, the State Department was statuto-
rily required to allow the consular officer in Moscow to make 
an initial and final decision on the Soviet scientists' visit. But 
State had long ago developed an SOP (sending a cable in-
structing a consular officer to request a Donkey Chipmunk 
advisory opinion) for ensuring that, in significant cases, such 
decisions are really made in Washington. Like the Attorney 
General's de facto deference to the State Department, this sit-
uation represents an informal SOP taking precedence over a 
formal one. 
Model III resolves some of the questions that neither 
Model I nor Model II can explain: where no standard proce-
dure exists or where the Government succeeds in deviating 
from rote behavior. Model III also introduces the element of 
United States in prior laws and in the 1917 amendments, particularly the 
1917 prohibitions on visits by illiterates. Indeed, the policy considerations 
that led to the creation of this routine appear to have been focused primar-
ily in the direction of allowing students to enter the United States temporar-
ily regardless of their inadmissibility. The bill introduced into the House 
(in an era in which the main focus of debate was on the exclusion of illiter-
ates, see, e.g., 53 CoNG. R.Ec. H4775-4816 (1916)), 54 CoNG. REc. 8158-
162 (1916}, would have allowed the Government to make discretionary 
exceptions for "students and others"; this language was amended in the 
Senate Committee on Immigration to include the entire class of inadmissi-
ble aliens, eliminating the explicit reference to students. S. REP. No. 352, 
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916). 
511. The author is indebted to Peter Schuck for this observation. On 
the other hand, some statutes regulating very significant foreign policies 
such as the Boland Amendment and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act ap-
pear to be fairly specific in their commands and prohibitions, if not always 
free from ambiguity or even escape clauses. 
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humanjudgment and interaction.512 In Model III, individual 
people, working through established action channels, make 
the critical differences. Whitehead's warmth to the project 
gave it a chance. Perle's hostility created significant obsta-
cles. In this respect, Allison's paradigm may be due for some 
revision, for the case study suggests that many human hands 
make a difference. National security policy decisions are af-
fected not only by the heads of traditional national security 
related agencies, but also by the leaders of peripheral agen-
cies, lesser officials in agencies, and people outside of gov-
ernment. Bayless Manning, who was able to put the NRDC 
in direct contact with the Secretary of Commerce, was instru-
mental in expediting the export license, as was Donald Ham-
mond, a junior official in Commerce whose only connection 
to the project was his interest in it and his proclivity to help 
members of the public who were having trouble with his bu-
reaucracy. Very junior officers such as Larry Gillham and 
Eric Watson, in agencies far removed from foreign policy is-
sues, helped the NRDC project develop by their decisions 
not to include in the seismograph station right-of-way appli-
cations the information they had learned about the nuclear 
test monitoring function of the equipment. Only in the case 
of the visa requests was the outcome determined almost ex-
clusively as a result of bargaining, through representatives of 
senior officials of the relevant agencies-State, Defense and 
the NSC, with some input by the Department of Energy, the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency. 
The interpersonal maneuvering at the heart of Model III 
does not take place in a vacuum. To overlook the impact of 
standard procedures on what kind of bargaining or other in-
512. In a 1972 essay co-authored with Morton Halperin, Allison de-
scribed what he called Model III in a way that imported many Model II 
concepts, though he did not suggest that he no longer regarded distinc-
tions between Model II and Model III as useful. Allison & Halperin, Bu-
reaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications, in THEORY AND 
PoLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40 (R. Tanter & R. Ullman eds. 
1972). This publication has led one author to observe that Models II and 
III are "analytically distinct" but that "the evidence is often fuzzy-it can 
fit either model. This helps us to understand why even Graham Allison, 
author of the best description of the two models, can be found at various 
times using the two together or each one separately." P. MORGAN, THEO-
RIES AND APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 83 (1981). 
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terpersonal contact takes place or on how these interactions 
are translated into action would be erroneous. Most dramat~ 
ically, standard routines affect the central participants in the 
bargaining process. Routines determine which action chan~ 
nel is most relevant. No new negotiating group was created 
to deal with the NRDC. Instead, the project was thrown into 
an existing interagency group, with an established member~ 
ship. Indeed, the State Department's decision to refer the 
NRDC problem to such a group (as opposed, for example, to 
Whitehead simply determining the U.S. policy) was itself an 
example of following a standard operating procedure. Simi-
larly, the standard procedures of the Forest Service and 
BLM, to grant rights-of~way at the local level, without De-
fense or State Department consultation, determined which 
player or players had a voice in deciding the station permits. 
On a less dramatic level, standard operating procedures limit 
the types of possible bargains and significantly affect their 
implementation. The existence of an expedited system in 
the Department of Commerce (which was one of that De-
partment's standard procedures) helped to undercut the 
Working Group's decision, through an interpersonal pro-
cess, to avoid expediting the request. 
While generalizing from a single case study is a danger-
ous undertaking, an analysis of the Government's reactions 
to the NRDC enables speculation on which model might be 
more or less appropriate when the decision at issue is a sec-
ond-level national security matter. For several reasons, the 
structures, laws, and standard operating routines of Model II 
may have more effect in determining policy in second-level 
cases than they do in major ones. 
First, in a crisis or other major decision, the issue will 
directly implicate the "shared images" of the decision-mak.-
ers.513 With exceptions,514 most of the players will generally 
agree on the type of solution necessary to resolve a major 
513. Halperin identifies sixteen "shared images" which frequently affect 
American foreign policy specialists. These include such statements as, 
"the surest simplest guide to US interests in foreign policy is opposition to 
Communism," and "[c)oncessions made under pressure constitute ap-
peasement which only whets the appetite of aggressors." M. HAl.PERJN 
WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, supra note 497, at 11-12. 
514. One such exception is the disagreement between Secretaries 
George Shultz and Caspar Weinberger, on one hand, and CIA Director 
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problem such as whether to deploy troops to Grenada, bomb 
Libya, negotiate a missile reduction with the Soviet Union, 
or build the Stealth Bomber. By contrast, broad principles 
such as belief in military strength or opposition to Commu-
nism may be less helpful to decision-makers dealing with sec-
ond-level matters. Second-level issues involve questions of 
judgment as to which of several courses (e.g., pressuring the 
Soviets to observe CORRTEX or encouraging them in their 
willingness to accept seismic monitoring of their territory) is 
more likely to lead to a broadly desired result (negotiated, 
verifiable constraints on nuclear arms competition). The 
broad principles may be even less helpful in addressing mat-
ters that are essentially questions of implementation (e.g., 
would the United States be more damaged by allowing the 
Soviets to operate seismic stations in Nevada or by appearing 
to try to prevent them from doing so). To the extent shared 
images determine outcome, both Model I515 and Model 
III516 may be more significant than Model II. 
Second, because of the greater need for secrecy, major 
problems may be addressed by a smaller circle of players. 
Instead of leaving such problems to the bureaucracies of the 
departments and to the multiple layers of interagency 
processes, Presidents are more likely to bring them directly 
into the White House, calling upon the immediate personal 
attention of the relevant department heads and a few other 
advisors, as President Kennedy did in the Cuban missile cri-
sis.517 The bargaining at the core of Model III is most feasi-
ble when the number of players is so limited. By contrast, 
when a large number of government actors can play some 
role in the decision process, no clear action channel may 
emerge, and bureaucratic routines may simply take over. 
William Casey and National Security Advisor John Poindexter, on the 
other, on the desirability of secret sales of arms to Iran. 
515. "If shared images dominate ... are we not talking about a 'unitary 
purposive actor'? ... Have not the cases of shared mind sets occurred on 
precisely the pivotal decisions of American foreign policy since 1945?" 
Art, supra note 498, at 4 76. 
516. When what is in the national interest appears "elusive," the players 
often "look to organizational ... interests." M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & 
M. KANTER, supra note 497, at 25. 
517. Policy in that crisis was essentially made by a group of seventeen 
people in a group called the "ExCom." G. ALLISON, supra note I, at 185. 
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In the case of the Government's reaction to the seismic 
monitoring project, the export license decision was chan-
neled to the small Working Group. But, as so often hap-
pens, implementation was left to the large, indeterminate 
number of people in the bureaucracy, enabling numerous 
lower level officials to whisk the license through in close to 
record time. By contrast, the visa decision stayed within the 
control of the Working Group and the organizations to 
which it reported, and the results of the bargaining became 
the decision of the Government.s1s 
Third, bureaucratic routines may tend to predominate 
in second-level cases because only the most important na-
tional security cases are worth the extraordinary effort neces-
sary to change those routines. For example, routines estab-
lished by statute, or regulation, or effective order, can only 
lawfully be altered by amending the law, regulation, or or-
der. Escalation to the Presidential or Congressional level, or 
going through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures 
may not be warranted if the problem is ofless than immense 
importance. That any Defense Department official would 
even consider beginning a process of amending the export 
control regulations or seeking an Act of Congress to frus-
trate the NRDC project is doubtful. 
Fourth, because of the nature of second-level decisions, 
they are worth less time and attention than major ones, less 
effort is expended in investigation of the problems. In par-
ticular, the decision-makers may make fewer attempts to scan 
the horizon for related decisions, or neglect to make certain 
that they have considered as many alternative courses of ac-
tion as possible. In the case of the NRDC project, the Work-
518. However, once the first visa application was decided in September 
1986, a new standard operating procedure was born within the Depart-
ment of State. Each time the Soviets would apply for a visa, they would be 
given the choice of having the trip they proposed along with a CORRTEX 
measurement at the Nevada Test Site, or having a curtailed trip and not 
being allowed to go to the seismic station sites. See supra note 441 and 
accompanying text. A decision dominated by Model III had become one 
in which Model II factors were controlling because, in Henry Kissinger's 
words, "an attempt to change course involves the prospect that the whole 
searing process of arriving at a decision will have to be repeated." I. M. 
DESTI.ER, PRESIDENTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND FOREIGN POUCY 76 (2d ed. 
1974). 
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ing Group dealing with the export license and visa requests 
never attended to the station permit questions, even though 
the station permits were more central to the establishment of 
Soviet stations in the United States than were the visas.519 
Finally, Model II may be a more significant determinant 
of outcome in second-level cases because leaders are likely to 
give less attention to questions of implementation than in 
major cases. The literature contains numerous examples of 
significant leadership decisions in the area of national secur-
ity being ignored or sabotaged by the bureaucracy. For ex-
ample, President Kennedy was shocked during the Cuban 
missile crisis to learn that the order he had twice given to 
remove obsolete U.S. missiles in Turkey had never been ef-
fectuated.520 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had 
decided to begin construction of a small ABM system, capa-
ble of defending against a Chinese attack, but the military 
constructed a large anti-Soviet system.521 The State Depart-
ment authorized the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
to declare, contrary to President Truman's directive, that the 
United States did not support partition of Palestine.522 Ob-
struction of these decisions could take place because the 
leaders who made them were too busy with other problems 
to ascertain whether their instructions were being obeyed.523 
With respect to those decisions deemed most critical, leaders 
can and do attend to details, including details of implemen-
tation.524 Severe limits exist, however, as to how much lead-
519. Allison implicitly makes this point about second-level decisions 
when he says that in the Cuban missile crisis, "a small group of men, un-
hitched from the bureaucracy, weighed the options and decided. Such 
central, high-level crisis decisions would seem to be the type of outcome 
for which Model I analysis is most suited." G. ALLISON, supra note l, at 9. 
520. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS 95 (1969). 
521. M. HALPERIN WITH P. CLAPP & A. KANTER, supra note 497, at 804-
06. 
522. Id. at 252. 
523. McNamara, for example, was so preoccupied with the war in Viet 
Nam that he had to hand over implementation of the ABM decision, 
among other responsibilities to his Deputy Secretary, Paul Nitze. Nitze 
favored keeping open the option of having a large system, as did the 
Army, and the Defense Department engineers resisted having to redesign 
components so that they could not be used against Soviet ICBMs. Id. at 
305. 
524. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy himself gave 
positioning orders to the commanders of the submarines conducting the 
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ers can attend to the implementation of second-level deci-
sions, such as whether the bureaucracy expedites an export 
license that was intended to be processed routinely. 
Both the suggestion that Model II is relatively more use-
ful for smaller decisions and the specific hypotheses about 
why that might be the case must be tested through additional 
case studies of governmental decision-making. If the general 
proposition appears to be true, then the great majority of 
national security decisions-those not prominently featured 
in the headlines-may be subject to most of the inherent de-
fects of suboptimal decision processes and lack of accounta-
bility inherent in the organizational process paradigm. In 
that event, those who would reform the system to make deci-
sions more coherent and more responsive to elected author-
ity have an even greater task ahead of them than was previ-
ously thought. 525 
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS AND LAWYERS 
The bulk of this study has considered the Government's 
reaction to the NRDC project from the perspective of the 
academic analyst, testing the hypotheses advanced by Allison 
two decades ago. The study, however, also has implications 
for legislators and practicing lawyers. 
A. Legislators 
For legislators, a multi-model analysis of executive 
branch decision-making is a useful component in planning 
effective policy change. Imagine ten years after enactment of 
the McGovern Amendment, certain members of Congress 
believe that continuing governmental denials of nonimmi-
blockade, speaking to them by radio from the White House. G. ALUSON, 
supra note 1, at 128. (Even so, his orders were countermanded by the 
Navy's bureaucracy. /d. at 130.) President Carter's lengthy, personal in-
volvement in the Israel-Egypt peace treaty negotiations at Camp David is 
another example. 
525. On the need for reforms of the national security decision system, 
see generally G . .ALLISON & P. SZANTON, REMAKING FoREIGN Poucv: TuE 
ORGANIZATIONAL CoNNECTION (1976); 1. M. DESTI.ER, PRESIDENTS, Bu-
REAUCRATS AND FoREIGN PouCY (2d ed. 1974). Most of the organizational 
problems identified by Destler in his first edition in 1971 have become 
even greater problems since then, as the Iran-Contra hearings in Congress 
have shown in a dramatic way. 
Ima ed with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
HeinOnline  -- 21 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 136 1988-1989
136 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 21:1 
grant visas to certain Communist speakers and other visitors 
are embarrassing the nation and undercutting the Congres-
sional goal of encouraging worldwide freedom of travel. Im-
agine, further, that these members are attempting to design 
an effective legislative response.s2s 
To the extent that Model I accurately describes the 
world, repealing the statutory language mandating the exclu-
sion of Communists, 527 or declaring the policy of the United 
States to be that waivers should be liberally granted or de-
nied only where strong foreign policy or national security in-
terests so required would be enough for these legislators. 
Congress would presume good faith efforts by the executive 
branch to honor the new law, or to carry out the new policy. 
On the other hand, if Models II and III more accurately 
account for bureaucratic responses, tliis type of legislation 
might not suffice. Offices or individuals with responsibility 
for visa issuance might have their own agendas, and might 
claim legal support, despite the new statute, to carry out 
their goals. For example, they might claim that the repeal of 
the Communist exclusion provisions left the executive 
branch of the government with inherent authority, under the 
President's power to administer foreign relations, to exclude 
undesirable aliens.528 Alternatively, they might seize on any 
vaguely worded exceptions to a new "policy," claiming those 
exceptions covered the individuals they were seeking to ex-
clude. 
A legislator attuned to Model II explanations of "deci-
sions" might, therefore, be somewhat less concerned with 
the scope of the prohibition on exclusion and more attentive 
526. The 1987 withdrawal of governmental authority to deny visas was 
limited to visas sought between jan. 1, 1988 and Feb. 28, 1989. Pub. L. 
No. 100-204, 101 Stat. 1399 (1987). Sponsors of the law planned to usc 
that time to influence a comprehensive revision of the McCarran-Waltcr 
Act. Blumenthal, Congress Lifts Political-Beliefs Bar to Aliens Under McCarran-
Walter Act, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1987, at All, col. l. 
527. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28) (1982). 
528. Indeed, executive branch officials determined to retain the power 
to exclude individual Communists might even argue inherent Constitu-
tional authority despite contrary statutes, justifying nonconformance with 
direct statutory prohibitions on exclusion. Simple repeal of the McCar-
ran-Walter exclusions, however, would not require so dramatic a claim. 
Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) Uack-
son, J., concurring). 
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to the administrative procedures for implementing the new 
policy. The legislator might determine, for example, that ex-
clusions or domestic travel restrictions were likely to endure 
primarily because several people were employed in process-
ing exclusions and restrictions. A legislator who diagnosed 
the problem this way might require a written report to Con-
gress within days after each exclusion was made, or after 
each admission with travel restrictions, stating the reasons 
for the exclusion or the restrictions. Exclusions and restric-
tions might become less frequent because denials and re-
strictions would involve more work and more political expo-
sure than grants. This procedure is, in fact, part of the ap-
proach taken by the McGovern Amendment, which provides 
that the Secretary of State may refrain from recommending 
waiver to the Attorney General only upon certifying to the 
Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee that granting a waiver would be 
contrary to United States security interests.529 Curiously, 
the bureaucratic burden for denials was placed only on the 
Department of State, while the power to deny waivers con-
tinued to reside ultimately in the Attorney General. There-
fore, the "Model II" solution predictably failed. The Attor-
ney General could deny waivers (with or without off-the-rec-
ord coaching by State Department officials) without having 
to report to Congress. Additionally, although the imposition 
of domestic travel restrictions on admitted aliens had to be 
reported annually to Congress for the first three years after 
the McGovern Amendment was enacted, this deterrent ex-
pired in 1982.5 SO 
529. 22 U.S.C.A. § 269l(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1986). 
530. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L No. 
95-426, § 126(c)(1), 92 Stat. 973 (1978). The law was therefore not in 
effect when the Government conditioned the visas of the Soviet seismolo-
gists. 
A more severe set of legislated Model II procedural controls could 
have come into play if the seismic equipment to be exported by the NRDC 
had been subject, on the export control list, to "foreign policy" as well as 
"national security" controls. See supra text accompanying notes 167-180. 
In that case, the Secretary of Commerce could have prohibited the export, 
but to do so, he would have had (a) to have engaged in prior consultation 
with U.S. industries, and (b) to have testified before two Congressional 
Committees. In addition, the President would have had (a) to have con-
sulted with U.S. allies, (b) to have engaged in prior consultation with the 
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Procedural controls are less relevant to the extent that 
the intervention of leaders, rather than the purring of the 
bureaucratic machine, accounts for the problem that the leg-
islator seeks to address. Perhaps the hypothetical legislators 
discover that the relevant bureaus in the State and justice 
Departments are headed by officials who strongly believe 
that sooner or later, a Communist speaker will steal indus-
trial secrets or inspire violence by a domestic group. These 
officials are thought to have instructed their offices to deny 
or condition visas where legally possible to do so. Alterna-
tively, perhaps one or more of the relevant bureaus is 
headed by an official whose appointment to that post has 
been engineered by a particular anti-Communist Senator to 
whom the official is especially responsive. If one of these 
Model III explanations accounted for the Government's 
"policy," neither a substantive statutory change nor an alter-
ation of procedural routines might suffice to put a stake 
through the heart of visa denials. The best approach might 
be to impose counterpressure on the particular bureaucrats 
responsible for the policy, either through hearings (exposing 
the officials to public scrutiny), budget reductions (which 
might prompt their staffs to exert pressure from below in 
favor of less confrontation with Congress) or efforts to per-
suade the President or Secretary to change or reorganize 
personnel. 
Sanctions represent an important special case of how 
multi-model analysis can play a role in legislation. Consider 
an example of a problem that might have seemed a "second-
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House and the Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and (c) to have sent a 
lengthy written report to Congress responding to numerous statutory in-
quiries. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2405(d) and (f) (West Supp. 1988). 
For a purely domestic example of Congressional sensitivity to Model 
II issues, see the Civil Rights oflnstitutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1997 (1981). The justice Department is authorized to bring suits in fed-
eral court to protect the legal rights of prisoners, juveniles, or medical 
patients confined to state institutions, but it must make certain certifica-
tions to the court (e.g., of good faith efforts to negotiate a resolution with 
state officials), and the certifications must be "personally signed" by the 
Attorney General. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997(b)(2) (1980). This requirement 
prevents such suits from being processed routinely by the Department's 
Civil Rights Division and makes it likely that the Attorney General will per-
sonally inquire into the need for each case brought under the Act. 
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level" problem when Congress first considered it, but which 
developed into the most significant foreign policy issue of 
1987: the Iran-Contra Affair. How could a foresighted Con-
gress have prevented the executive branch of the govern-
ment from providing funds to insurgents in Nicaragua de-
spite Congressional defeat of a proposed appropriation for 
this purpose, trading arms to Iran in exchange for American 
hostages in order to finance this effort, and seeking to estab-
lish an all-purpose off-the-books covert action operation?5Sl 
If Model I correctly describes the behavior of the execu-
tive branch, the appropriate legislative precautions would 
have been to pass the Boland Amendment, barring the Gov-
ernment from giving financial aid to the Nicaraguan rebels 
"directly or indirectly,"532 and barring the government from 
selling arms abroad without meeting certain criteria, includ-
ing prior Congressional notification.533 In normal times, 
such measures as these suffice. No specific sanctions need be 
attached to them, because Congress expects its legislative 
mandates to be obeyed. 
Imagine that members of Congress intent on achieving 
these objectives had fully understood the bureaucratic struc-
ture within the executive branch. They knew that a small 
group of officials on the National Security Council staff, to-
gether with a few officials at the State Department and the 
Central Intelligence Agency, were planning to circumvent 
the Boland Amendment by raising and using money from 
foreign officials, by selling arms to Iran for a concealed 
profit, and by misleading Congress about these activities in 
executive branch testimony.534 In such a case, Congress 
might have strengthened its substantive law-making by sub-
stituting specific operational requirements for general provi-
sions in the laws themselves,535 enacting "whistle-blower" 
531. See REPORT OF THE CoNGRESSIONAL CoMMITTEES INVESTIGATING TilE 
IRAN-CoNTRA AFFAIR, H.R. Rep. No. 433, lOOth Cong., lst Sess. 41-78, 
269-74, 332-33 (1987) [hereinafter Iran-Contra Report]. 
532. Pub. L. No. 98-473 (1984). 
533. 22 u.s.c. § 2753(d) (1981). 
534. Iran-Contra Report, supra note 531, at 381-82,411-20. 
535. For example, Congress would require the President to notify it of 
all covert action operations within 48 hours, rather than "in a timely fash-
ion," as the law specified during the period of the Iran Arms Sales. 50 
u.s.c. § 413(b) (1981). 
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provlSlons and requiring routine oath-taking by executive 
branch witnesses testifying on national security matters. 
Finally, if Congress had understood that the relevant ex-
ecutive branch group consisted of determined, ideologically 
driven officials who would not easily have been deterred by 
procedural devices from skirting the law, Congress might 
have resorted to the tool most particularly appropriate for 
deterring individual misconduct. Specific criminal penalties 
might have been attached to the Boland Amendment, which 
could have reminded the relevant officials of their personal 
accountability, and of the risks they ran by using their posi-
tions to conduct a covert foreign policy. 536 
B. Lawyers 
Practicing lawyers, too, may use the Allisonian models 
to hone their ability to effectively bargain with a government 
bureaucracy. Returning once again to issues suggested by 
the case study, imagine a lawyer who is seeking, on behalf of 
a client, to obtain a Commerce Department export license. 
Assume, also, that the lawyer has never before dealt with this 
particular entity. 
Model I would suggest that the lawyer simply research 
the statutory and regulatory requirements, and then file the 
client's application. If meritorious, the government, being 
rational, will grant the application. 
The lawyer attuned to Model II would, however, also 
engage in considerable research on the structure of the 
Commerce Department. She would look into the substruc-
tures and subroutines of each relevant office. In the course 
of that work, she would discover, among other things, the 
Department's unpublished "fast track" routine. If her client 
wanted to export quickly, she would try to make her applica-
tion fit the "fast track" criteria. 
The lawyer would not merely file the application. Real-
izing the application had to go to several offices, each with its 
own concerns, she would attempt to make written or oral 
presentations to each of them. Each presentation would be 
536. For a more detailed look at how multi-model analysis can help a 
legislature to devise an appropriate sanctions regime, this time in a do-
mestic context, see Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate 
Crime, 85 YALE LJ. 1090 (1976). 
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designed to move the application to the top of the pile and 
would be tailored to the concerns of that office. If necessary, 
she would work with her client to alter the nature of the ex-
port to avoid issues which would bring about delay or objec-
tions in any office. 
The lawyer who believes that government proceeds 
through the actions of people rather than through policies or 
procedures would first identify the key players, both among 
the senior officials of the Commerce Department and among 
those on whose desks the license applications would actually 
reside. She would use all possible personal contacts to affect 
their judgments and to get them on her client's side. The 
staff of the NRDC did this very effectively with respect to the 
Commerce Department, the Bureau of Land Management, 
and the Forest Service. But NRDC's analysis did not extend 
sufficiently to reveal the involvement of those who were re-
ally making the visa decisions: the members of the Nuclear 
Test Ban Working Group and the three arms control experts 
on the National Security Council staff. 
Many practitioners work on all three levels instinctively. 
Despite their lack of familiarity with formal Allisonian the-
ory, they already make sophisticated multi-level approaches 
to key governmental groups and officials. By systematically 
applying Allison's three theories of decision-making, lawyers 
might nevertheless be able to exert greater influence over 
governmental and other bureaucracies. Formal models such 
as those developed by Allison can help them to think more 
clearly about what kinds of information they need to gather 
before acting for a client, and how to link their appeals to the 
needs and goals of bureaucratic organizations and their key 
personnel. 537 
VIII. THE NRDC PROJECT: A POSTSCRIPT 
By the middle of 1987, the NRDC's seismic verification 
project was in a curious stage of development. American 
scientists had already spent a year in residence at seismic 
537. Enhanced planning ability is one of lhe most important \'alues of 
models as lhey are used by policy analysts. Using a formal model "forces 
you to identify lhe levers lhat will influence outcomes, which are in actual-
ity lhe true policy alternatives." E. STOKEY & R. ZECKIJAUSER, A PRIMER ON 
POLICY ANALYSIS 19 (1978). 
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monitoring stations in Kazakhstan, and the NRDC had built 
virtually identical stations in California and Nevada to moni-
tor nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site. But the 
hopes of the project's initiators had been frustrated in two 
ways. First, the Soviet scientists had not been given the same 
right to work in the United States that their American coun-
terparts were enjoying in the Soviet Union. Second, 
although the NRDC's operation of the stations in the United 
States was unrestricted, so that these stations could provide 
continuous monitoring of test site activity, the Soviets re-
quired the Kazakhstan stations to be shut down during So-
viet nuclear tests. 
In June 1987, NRDC and Soviet Academy officials rene-
gotiated their agreement. For 1988, the Soviets agreed to 
permit the American scientists to leave their equipment run-
ning during Soviet tests, and to expand the number of sta-
tions in the Soviet Union from three to five. At the same 
time, the stations were required to be relocated to sites six 
hundred miles, rather than one hundred miles, from the 
Semipalatinsk test area. 538 Although the new and relocated 
stations would provide continuous data to the Americans, 
they would be operated primarily by Soviet scientists, "with 
occasional assistance as required and requested from the 
NRDC."539 The revised agreement also provided that non-
nuclear calibration explosions would be detonated in each 
country so the scientists could better determine what magni-
tudes of explosions could be detected at various distances. A 
side benefit of the calibration explosions would be that scien-
tists could use them to make better estimates of the yields of 
538. According to NRDC, this requirement, which appeared to be a 
political retreat on the part of the Soviets (and was probably imposed at 
the request of the Soviet military authorities responsible for testing at 
Semipalatinsk) was actually better from a research perspective, and it was 
welcomed by the American scientists on the NRDC team. The original 
stations were so close to the Soviet test site that they could easily pick up 
even very small seismic events there. To be able to monitor low-yield So-
viet tests from locations as far away as 600 miles would better demonstrate 
the verifiability of restrictions on such testing. Interview with S. jacob 
Scherr, Senior Attorney, NRDC, in Washington, D.C. (May 17, 1988). 
539. Natural Resources Defense Council and Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences, USA-USSR Nuclear Test Ban Verification Project Agreement 
§ 13(e) Uune 25, 1987). 
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nuclear tests detected by the seismic equipment.540 
Shortly thereafter, with their American counterparts on 
site, the Soviets set off two explosions of ten tons of TNT 
and one of twenty tons of TNT, as provided by the agree-
ment to detonate calibration tests. The American scientific 
team in the Soviet Union watched the seismic monitors at 
project stations, some of which were 400 miles from the 
blast. Despite the distances and the low yield of the explo-
sion, all of the NRDC stations detected the explosion, and its 
waves were clearly distinguishable from those caused by a 
distant earthquake which occurred, coincidentally, at almost 
the same moment as the test explosion. 54 1 
Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration continued to op-
pose ratification of the 150-kiloton Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty, conditioning acceptance on Soviet agreement tore-
negotiate its verification provisions to utilize CORRTEX 
measurements to check the yields of Soviet tests. Early in 
1987, Soviet opposition to consideration of CORRTEX be-
gan to dissolve, and in November, 1987, Soviet negotiators 
agreed to conduct experiments.· As part of these experi-
ments, the Soviets would permit U.S. Government repre-
sentatives_ to tour Semipalatinsk, would send Soviet repre-
sentatives to visit the Nevada Test Site, and would partici-
pate with American scientists in demonstration 
measurements of monitoring equipment, including both 
seismic and CORRTEX instruments.542 Notwithstanding 
this new Soviet willingness to observe a CORRTEX demon-
stration at the Nevada Test Site, the government continued 
to deny Soviet Academy scientists the right to operate or 
even visit the three project stations in Nevada and Califor-
nia.543 
540. /d.; interview with S.Jacob Scherr, supra note 538. 
541. Broad, American Scientists in Soviet Getting Read)' to Monitor Atom Tt.rts, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1987, at A3, col. 1. 
542. Smith, U.S., Soviets Move Toward Treaty RevisioriS, Wash. Post, Nov. 
21, 1987, at A23, col. 1. 
543. In December, 1987, the NRDC requested that federal officials un-
dertake a "reconsideration of U.S. policy on visas for Soviet seismolo-
gists," noting that the "rationale" of the Soviets' unwillingness to witness 
a CORRTEX demonstration "is no longer applicable and appropriate." 
Letter to Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Politico-Military Affairs, from Dr. Thomas B. Cochran and S.Jacob Scherr, 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics 
HeinOnline  -- 21 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 144 1988-1989
144 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 21:1 
By the spring of 1988, when NRDC applied once again 
for the Soviet scientists to visit the stations-this time to par-
ticipate in experiments in which a calibrating TNT explosion 
would be set off in Nevada-not only had the Soviets ac-
ceeded to observing the use of CORRTEX, but two other 
events of significance had occurred. First, both Richard 
Perle and his deputy Frank Gaffney had resigned from the 
government. 544 Second, for reasons having nothing to do 
with the NRDC project or nuclear testing,545 Congress had 
suspended, from January 1988 through February 1989, the 
government's power to deny or condition nonimmigrant 
visas on the basis of the applicants' beliefs or associations.546 
This suspension appeared to require a change in the routine 
that the government had established for dealing with NRDC 
applications. 
In March 1988, the NRDC applied once again for un-
restricted visas for the Soviet scientists, to allow the scientists 
to participate fully in calibration and monitoring experi-
ments with NRDC scientists.547 The Soviets wanted to visit 
all of the NRDC station sites in Nevada and California, to 
visit the sites of NRDC's TNT calibration explosions in 
northern Nevada, and to bring with them a ton and a half of 
their own equipment which they would use to monitor the 
NRDC (Dec. 10, 1987). The response stated that because "direct, bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union arc the only 
proper forum for addressing nuclear testing issues I do not anticipate the 
current US policy will be revised." Letter from William F. Burns, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, to Dr. 
Thomas B. Cochran, NRDC (Dec. 29, 1987). See also the visa issued to 
Igor L. Nersesov, a Soviet scientist working on the NRDC project, on 
which the following legend is inscribed: "Invited by NRDC. 
212(d)(3)(A)(28) Stay Auth: Nov. 28 until Dec. 8, 1987 only. NY, DC, San 
Diego, SF, and Reno only. NO SEISMIC STATION VISITS." Visa No. 
012411 Issued at Moscow (Nov. 27, 1987) (emphasis in original). 
544. Blumenthal, Richard Perle, Disarmed but Undeterred, Wash. Post, Nov. 
23, 1987, at B1, col. 1. 
545. See Blumenthal, Congress Lifts Political-Beliefs Bar to Aliens Under Mc-
Carran-Walter Act, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1987, at All, col. 1. 
546. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 
Pub. L. 100-204, § 901, 101 Stat. 1399 (1987). 
547. Letter from Terence]. Fortune, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and 
Garrison (representing the NRDC), to Lt. Col. Michael Fry, Deputy Direc-
tor, Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 
Department of State (March 18, 1988). 
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calibration explosions and the Nevada Test Site.54S 
In a legal memorandum attached to the application, 
NRDC argued that because of the suspension of statutory 
authority, the expected presence of the Soviet scientists at 
the NRDC stations was .. an impermissible basis for denial or 
restriction of the requested visas." This legal memorandum 
was co-signed by the Director of the National Security Litiga-
tion Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, which im-
plied, at least, that NRDC was prepared to test a denial in 
court.549 The State Department responded, "we disagree 
with your interpretation [of the suspension legislation]. In 
our view that section does not limit the Executive's authority 
to deny or restrict the admission of aliens where such action 
is necessary to protect important internal security or foreign 
policy interests of the United States. [Nevertheless], the in-
stant case does not require denial or restriction of the 
visas."550 
One month later, for the first time in history, scientists 
from the Soviet Union began to operate a seismic monitor-
ing station on American soil. 
548. Interview with S. Jacob Scherr, supra note 538. 
549. Letter from Terence]. Fortune, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and 
Garrison, and Kate Martin, Director of the National Security Litigation 
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, to Abraham D. Sofaer, 
Legal Advisor, Department of State {March 18, 1988), appemud to letter to 
Lt. Col. Michael Fry, supra note 547. 
550. Letter from Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of 
State, to Adrian W. DeWind, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison 
{March 31, 1988). 
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